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Abstract
This thesis examines the process of informed decision-making for low-risk women in their
first pregnancies as they consider whether or not to participate in non-invasive, nondiagnostic prenatal screening.
Using a social constructionist approach with a theoretical lens of feminist bioethics, data
from three sources were used to consider different aspects of the process of informed
decision-making about prenatal screening. Data obtained from patient education materials,
Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada policy documents, and interviews with
pregnant women were examined using the principles of constructivist grounded theory.
Findings are presented in the form of four integrated articles, addressing the issues of: I) the
potential for metaphors and figurative language in prenatal patient education materials to be
implicitly or explicitly directive; II) different counseling strategies and decision-making
models for health care providers to consider when striving to offer prenatal screening in a
way which supports autonomous informed choices; III) the type and content of information
that women have identified as necessary to consider themselves informed when preparing to
make a decision about participation in prenatal screening; IV) a proposed model for the ways
in which information from different sources is sought, received, and interpreted by women
engaged in the process of making a decision about prenatal screening.
Informed decision-making about prenatal screening is a complex issue, requiring significant
efforts on the part of the health care professional offering screening, and necessitating careful
consideration by the woman making the choice. Given an understanding of the complex
social context within which these screening tests are offered and chosen, the process of
informed decision-making may be more challenging than suggested by current policy and
public education documents.

Keywords
Prenatal screening, informed decision-making, informed choice
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1 Introduction
This dissertation presents a grounded theory study of the process of prenatal screening,
considering professional policy, public education materials, and the perspectives of
women pregnant with their first child. In 2007, the Society of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC), in conjunction with the Canadian Council of Medical
Geneticists (CCMG) released a clinical practice guideline instructing that all women
should be offered non-invasive prenatal screening to detect fetal aneuploidy and
incomplete neural tube closures (Summers, Langlois, Wyatt, & Wilson, 2007). This
guideline was re-affirmed in 2011 (Chitayat, Langlois, & Wilson, 2011), with increased
emphasis on the variety of conditions that can be detected through the first trimester
ultrasound and blood work.
Prenatal screening, as will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2, is a non-invasive,
non-diagnostic test performed by ultrasound measurements and a series of blood tests.
The results of these tests are combined with the mother's age at the expected date of
delivery to produce a probability that the fetus has a chromosomal anomaly or incomplete
neural tube closure. The pregnant woman can then choose to have an additional invasive,
diagnostic test, such as amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling, to confirm the
findings (Wilson et al., 2005). There are few in-utero treatments for the conditions
detected; for most women, prenatal screening provides information to consider when
choosing to continue or terminate the pregnancy.
The guiding question for this research is: From the perspective of women under the age
of 35 in their first pregnancies, seeking prenatal care from a family physician, how is the
process of choosing to participate in prenatal screening enacted in light of the new
SOGC guidelines? This guiding question informed the data collection and analysis of
data from three different sources: policies and guidelines, patient education materials, and
pregnant women. The data from these three different sources were examined to respond
to different elements of the process of choosing whether or not to participate in prenatal
screening:
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1) How do prenatal screening patient education materials portray concepts related to
prenatal screening?
2) How do policies and guidelines shape the offer of prenatal screening?
3) How do women use information when making a decision about whether or not to
participate in prenatal screening?
This dissertation reviews and analyzes the medical and social scientific literature on
prenatal screening; investigates the ways in which it takes place in Canada by analyzing
Canadian professional policy and patient information materials; gathers information from
pregnant women who have been offered and made a decision about participation in this
screening test; and composes an argument for changes that may increase the potential for
women to make informed choices about participation in prenatal screening.

1.1 Interdisciplinary Bricolage
The process of prenatal screening is at the juncture of many disciplines, such that this
dissertation is necessarily interdisciplinary, engaging with literature from medicine,
genetic counseling, bioethics, women's studies, sociology, anthropology, library and
information science, and disability studies. As this research has evolved, I have
recognized that the most compelling aspects of the topic are at the intersection of multiple
types of disciplinary knowledge: doctor-patient communication, reproductive rights, and
social justice in terms of available choices and resources for women, families, and people
with disabilities.
In this interdisciplinary endeavour, I have taken the approach of a researcher as bricoleur
(Levi-Strauss, 1962), a term which has no exact translation in English, but which Claude
Levi-Strauss describes as a person who works with a heterogeneous repertoire, using
whatever she has at her disposal (Levi-Strauss, 1962). The bricoleur does not have a set
repertoire of tools and materials to use for every job, but uses whatever is available to
complete the task, collecting and making use of an enlarging stock of tools which is the
"contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to
maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or deconstructions" (Levi-Strauss,
1962, p. 11). In this quotation I see acknowledgement that bricolage approaches are a)
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those which fit, work, illuminate, and aid, regardless of disciplinary affiliation and b)
often a result of techniques, ideas, and approaches that have fit, worked, illuminated and
aided in the past. With that said, coherency between approaches is important; while
hammers and screws are both tools with a myriad of effective uses, applying a hammer to
a screw will have poor results.
With bricolage, I attempt to fashion a theoretical and methodological approach through
which multiple perspectives are used, shaped by the topic of inquiry and internal
congruence rather than disciplinary knowledges or expectations. This approach
recognizes the socially constructed nature of knowledge and the tendency of objectivism
to "avoid contextual specificities that subvert the stability of its [objectivist] structures, its
fragmenting impulse that moves it to fold its methodologies and the knowledge they
produce neatly into disciplinary drawers" (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 681). The metaphor of the
researcher as bricoleur also acknowledges the iterative nature of qualitative research;
choices of analytical practices are not always made in advance, but are made in response
to the evolving context and questions of the research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). This
iterative strategy is encouraged in grounded theory as a way of being responsive to the
evolving nature of qualitative inquiry (Charmaz, 2006).
The evolving, iterative approach of research as bricolage requires a new form of rigor
that accounts for a new ontological context, where the object of inquiry is inseparable
from its socio-cultural and historically situated context (Kincheloe, 2001). In Chapter 9, I
propose guidelines for quality criteria to assess the rigor of this interdisciplinary work,
drawing on a shift in the humanities and social sciences to standards of reflexivity,
situation/standpoint, and means of production and re-presentation (Hodge, 1995).
Emerging work on quality criteria for interdisciplinary research concerns an emphasis on
contributions to different knowledge domains, coherent theoretical perspectives and
effective communication (Manathunga, Lant, & Mellick, 2006; Mitchell & Willetts,
2009; Mitrany & Stokols, 2005; Wickson, Carew, & Russell, 2006).
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1.2 Situated Research
The knowledge I have produced in this dissertation sits at the junction of several situated
standpoints: mine, yours, and the research participants'. My standpoint has been
influenced not just by my experiences and situation, but also by supervisory committee
collaborators and the literature. Dorothy Smith (Smith, 1987; Smith, 1990) describes
standpoint as the way we each make knowledge that draws upon our individual
experiences and subjectivity. For Smith (1987), it is important to begin research inquiry
from a standpoint rooted in every day experiences with recognition that one's own
particular subjectivity is located in a constantly shifting matrix of social locations (HesseBiber, 2007). It's not only important to recognize the impact of the standpoint of the
researcher; in Chapter 9 I explore the possibilities for understanding the standpoint of the
research participants and as you are reading, I ask you to consider your own standpoint.
The meaning of the text you hold in your hands is not mine, but remains to be completed
by you, from your particularly situated perspective (Smith, 1987). Smith (1983) states
that readers make sense of texts in a social way, using the interpretive schemas they have
learned as individual members located in particular positions of particular societies. In
Chapter 9 I discuss some of the reflexive decisions that I made while working on this
research to assist you to travel between my perspective, the perspectives of the
participants, and your own perspective (Koch & Harrington, 1998).

1.2.1

Standpoint of the researcher.

It is common for qualitative research dissertations to include a short sketch of the author,
so that readers may understand the particular standpoint or situated location of the person
who created that work. I will describe my social standpoint and then briefly outline the
major way in which my intellectual standpoint has changed throughout this research, a
conversation that will be continued in Chapter 9.
My social standpoint is one of privilege. I am young, white, able-bodied, educated and
wealthy. I am married to a man who supports my intellectual and other endeavours both
financially and emotionally. I have not yet been pregnant, although I plan to be a mother
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one day. I have not grown up in close contact with someone who has a disability, but I
have known people with disabilities as friends and classmates.
My intellectual standpoint cannot be named so easily. I have an undergraduate degree in
Philosophy and Health Studies. I have always liked to read and talk, to argue and debate.
I chose not to become a lawyer because I hated the idea of precedent- that the decision in
one case should be applied to other cases if they could be argued to be sufficiently
similar. I have always been interested in the idea of exceptions, and grey areas. I entered
the M.Sc program at Western looking to do a medical ethics project about a topic related
to reproduction. I decided at that time that I should pick a topic that I was interested in,
but about which I had no strong personal viewpoint, so that I could think of it from
different angles, and look at different perspectives. I didn't realize it at that time, but I see
now that topics which have a personal meaning forced me out of the comfort of the grey
area and made "intellectualizing" difficult. I think this is why I chose to study prenatal
screening- it was at the juncture of many topics I find interesting, but I don't have a
personal experience or connection that keeps me in one corner. It's less challenging for
me to be open minded about different perspectives than it might be if I had a disability, a
religious affiliation, or the experience of being pregnant. My challenge has become to
recognize the ways in which this is a personal topic, and to see how my past experiences
and situation make me gravitate to particular ideas or points of view.
In the endeavour to identify the ways in which my personal standpoint has shaped and
changed the questions I ask, the data I collect, and the claims I make, I am attempting to
engage in a process of scholarship with 'strong objectivity' (Harding, 1987). Strong
objectivity describes a socially situated view of the researcher, research participants and
the research process that examines the data created and claims made at the junction of
these perspectives. "The notion of strong objectivity conceptualizes the value of putting
the subject or agent of knowledge in the same critical, causal plane as the object of her or
his inquiry" (Harding, 1986, p. 161). When considering the extent to which I engaged in
reflexive examination of my standpoint and positioning, it is important to consider the
limitations of the structure of the integrated article style. Each article was written within
the genre and word limit of a particular journal, with a specific audience in mind. In most
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cases, it was not possible to expound upon the ways in which I tried to work reflexively
throughout the research process. In Chapter 9 I address these ideas more fully, drawing
together the choices made necessary by the integrated article style and outlining some of
the considerations of standpoint and perspective in which I engaged, but which were not
included in the published manuscripts.
A final note about my motivation throughout this project: when I explain my thesis topic
to non-academics, I am often asked the same question: "So..... are you for or against
prenatal screening?" I think academic contacts are interested in this question, too, but
tend to ask it in a more subtle way. The short answer is that I am neither for nor against
prenatal screening and abortion, nor is taking a stance on that question the aim of my
research. Professionally, I think that any choice a woman decides to make is the right
choice, as long as it is informed to a degree she judges sufficient. I am interested in doing
this research to examine and develop ways in which informed choices can be supported.
Prenatal screening is an important opportunity for some women. For some, it's a source
of anxiety. Prenatal screening may be an essential part of the choice to become a parent
for some women while for others, it's unnecessary and may even be offensive. My
interest in this project is to try and help women obtain the information they need to make
their own decision about the screening tests.
In the interest of transparency to the reader and reflexive awareness of myself, I have
thought about what I might choose when offered prenatal screening. I would probably
choose to participate in the tests, since I consider myself, in the words of one participant,
"the type of person who likes to know as much as possible". Knowing what I do now, I
would request my first trimester results when available, so that if a high risk result was
returned, I could access earlier diagnostic testing (chorionic villus sampling). I'm not sure
what I would do with a definitive positive finding. Thinking reflexively, I recognize my
reluctance to include this information in my dissertation, but I think it is important for the
reader to understand the way I approach the research. My decision whether or not to
terminate an affected pregnancy would depend on many factors, including what condition
was found, how I felt at the time about pregnancy, motherhood, social and financial
resources, my career, and my partner's feelings about the same. I think it's hard to know
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what you would do in a difficult situation before you are faced with that choice, and have
access to all the information available to you at that time. This difficulty in forecasting
decisions was illustrated in my interview data. I asked each research participant what
options she would be considering if she received a high risk result from the screening
test. Some women stated they would consider invasive, diagnostic testing, some women
stated that they wouldn't consider this testing. Only two of the sixteen women told me
that they would consider abortion for Down syndrome, a percentage which is very
different from epidemiological statistics, which show that about 90% of pregnancies with
confirmed cases of Down syndrome will be terminated (Biggio, Morris, Owen, &
Stringer, 2004; Gekas et al., 2009; Joan & Alberman, 2009; Korenromp, PageChristiaens, van, Mulder, & Visser, 2007) . Considering the discrepancy between these
figures emphasizes the importance of participant standpoint: did the volunteer
participants have particular views on the topic that made them more likely to volunteer?
How did the social situation, experiences and resources of the volunteer participants
differ from the epidemiological research populations? Were research participants less
likely to express their intention to terminate in the event of a condition? Is it harder to
predict how you might make a difficult choice before you are in that situation?

1.3 Story of the Research
The germ of this research idea started in September 2006, the last year of my
undergraduate degree, during a class on qualitative research methods. For the final
project of this class, we created a research project and completed a literature review,
chose a methodology, and outlined a study design. I chose prenatal screening for this
project, and developed a research project that is (rightfully) quite different from the one
contained in this thesis. As I look back to my initial literature review, I am struck by
some of the enduring issues of interest. In my first "statement of the problem", written in
October 2006, I wrote: "what is lacking, however, is literature on best practices for
introducing and explaining prenatal screening". I problematized the consequences of this
gap in a much different way than I do now, but my enduring interest has been in the ways
the presentation of prenatal screening shapes and constrains the choices available to
women.
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I enrolled in the M.Sc program at Western in September 2007, and developed a proposal
for a project that involved audio-taping prenatal visits and analyzing the ways prenatal
screening was discussed. I was interested in the context and structure of information
provided, assessment of comprehension, and indicators of directiveness towards a
particular course of action. During my first year of graduate studies, I started to become
interested in metaphors and figurative language and the impact that words have on
directiveness. I also started reading about different types of genetic testing throughout the
life span and was thinking critically about the ways in which prenatal screening is
different from preconception genetic screening, newborn genetic screening and pediatric
and adult genetic screening. These developed into two separate projects which I
presented for various audiences including medical students at Western, the Western
Graduate Research Forum, the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada
annual clinical meeting, and the University of Western Ontario's Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology annual research day.
When meeting with my supervisors about my M.Sc proposal in the summer of 2008, we
discussed the challenge that the research I was proposing was too large for the scope of
an M.Sc degree, and was really quite related to my side projects about metaphors and
genetic testing policy. The three of us made the decision to re-work the project to include
some of the ideas I found the most compelling from the other projects and to complete it
as a PhD project. I enrolled in the PhD program in September 2008.
As I re-worked the thesis proposal and thought about what was most interesting and most
compelling from the other projects, I realized (or perhaps re-realized, looking back at my
2006 statement of the problem) that I was most interested in the issue of informed choice.
I structured the project as an examination of the process of prenatal screening, to
examine the ways that patient information materials and policy guidelines relate to the
ways in which prenatal screening was presented to women. I decided at this point that
instead of audio-taping the first prenatal visit between family doctors and pregnant
women, I would talk to pregnant women directly. I was interested in more than what was
said inside the doctor's office, including the ways that women might inform themselves
and work towards making a choice by engaging with other material, or talking with their
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partners, friends, and families. I also realized that I wasn't really interested in what the
doctors said so much as in what the women heard -what they understood and
remembered- and how they contextualized this information with that from other sources.
I continued to refine the research project while I wrote my comprehensive papers and
created and defended a new proposal. I started to re-read the policy documents and
patient education materials with a new eye for their influence on informed -decision
making. The patient education materials were rich with metaphor and figurative
language, inspiring a "struck by" moment (Cunliffe, 1999; Cunliffe, 2002) about the
relation between this language and non-directiveness, an idea which informed the first
manuscript. The sensation of being "struck by" something may inspire us to re-think or
re-consider previous ideas, or open us up to new ideas. Through this, we may "be making
new connections between tacit knowing and explicit knowledge" (Cunliffe, 1999, p. 9).
This realization, described further in the first manuscript, re-directed my thinking about
the process of prenatal screening to focus explicitly on the idea of informed decisionmaking and informed choice. This refinement in the direction of inquiry changed the
focus of my interview guide and probes, shaping the data I collected. After interviewing
the first few participants about their experiences, what I identified as most interesting in
the policy documents started to shift. Instead of comparing prenatal screening policy to
other genetic policy, I thought about the particular context of prenatal screening and the
counseling requirements mentioned as necessary in the SOGC guideline. I started writing
the second manuscript after collecting most of the participant data, during the process of
analysis. Manuscript number two does not contain any participant quotes, but was formed
directly in response to what participants were telling me about the conversations they had
with the doctors and those which they had with their friends. Manuscript three was
written at approximately the same time, and attempted to respond to the articulations of
what information was important to consider when making a decision about whether or
not to participate in prenatal screening. Manuscript four was the last paper written, a
grounded theory of the interview data about the process of decision-making about
participation in prenatal screening, including discussion of the ways women worked with
information received from their doctors and other sources, sought out additional
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information, and then worked on interpreting that information to come to an
understanding about the screening test in order to make a decision.
In the summer of 2011, I was working on the second manuscript, a critique of the idea of
non-directive counseling, an approach described as an imperative for the presentation of
prenatal screening by the SOGC policy. This manuscript was written for submission to
the Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology Canada. The day after we submitted the
manuscript, the next issue of JOGC was released, with a new prenatal screening policy
(Chitayat et al, 2011). We revoked the submission so that it wouldn't go out to reviewers
while we were reading the new policy. Fortunately or unfortunately, the instructions for
counseling in the 2011 policy were identical to those in the 2007 policy, and so we resubmitted the manuscript without changes. Interestingly, there weren't many changes
between the 2007 and 2011 policies. Chitayat et al (2011) specified that the information
concerned singleton pregnancy and gave more information for physicians choosing
different types of prenatal screening tests, specifications that the ultrasound should be
performed by sonographers with specific training, a list of patient factors which may
potentially affect screening performance, and information on additional conditions that
prenatal screening can detect. In my reading of the two policies, the reason for the
updated guideline seems to be the provision of practical advice for primary care
physicians offering screening tests. Unfortunately, neither guideline offers practical
advice on how to offer the screening tests.

1.4 Definitions of Terms
Related to the interdisciplinary and sensitive nature of the topic, there are controversies
and inconsistencies around several of the key terms that I will use. In an
acknowledgement that discourse and word choices can shape and construct the way we
think about the world (Foucault, 1972; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), I have made several
particular choices about the language I use to describe my research topic and participants:
•

To reflect my feminist theoretical perspective and in acknowledgement of the
literature about the medicalization and institutionalization of birth, I refer to
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pregnant women or women rather than patients in an effort to avoid historical
and emotional overtones of illness (Herxheimer & Goodare, 1999).
•

Informed consent is a legal term, and refers to an educated acquiescence to the
suggestion or recommendation of a health care professional. Prenatal
screening should not happen through a process of informed consent, but rather
through one of informed choice or informed decision-making (Sherwin,
1998). I alternate between informed decision-making and informed choice,
using the former to refer to the process and the later to refer to the product of
that process in an effort to be consistent with the literature with which I am
engaging.

•

Dixon-Woods (2001) discusses the difference between patient information
materials and patient education materials, reasoning that the former aims to
provide information and the latter aims to indoctrinate to a particular way of
understanding (Dixon-Woods, 2001). In this dissertation I have chosen to
refer to the written materials on prenatal screening as patient education
materials, reflecting the way they are commonly known and the discursive
purpose that many serve. In my analysis of these materials I have found some
which provide information I judged as carefully considered, balanced, and
expressed in neutral language. These pamphlets might more accurately be
termed information materials, but as a genre, I believe this material reflects
the patient education definition suggested by Dixon-Woods (2001). Also,
while I don't use the word patient to describe pregnant women, I retain that
word to describe the educational materials, to nod to the embedded
assumptions informing most of the examples of this genre.

•

Consistent with person-first discourse advocated by disabilities scholars and
advocated by the American Psychological Association (American
Psychological Association, 2010), I refer to person with a disability rather
than disabled person; person without a disability, and typical or average
rather than normal or healthy.

•

Along this same line of thinking, when making reference to the conditions
detected by the prenatal screening test, I choose to use the words of condition,
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aneuploidy, anomaly, incomplete neural tube closure, or the specific name of
the condition rather than potentially alienating terms such as disorder, disease,
birth defect, abnormality or neural tube defect (Grant & Flint, 2007; Hodgson,
Hughes, & Lambert, 2005). Aneuploidy is a term which refers to the
possession of an unusual number of chromosomes and is often used to refer to
trisomy conditions (ex. Down syndrome) detected by prenatal screening.
Trisomy conditions manifest when three chromosomes exist (triploid) where
two are typical (diploid).
•

I use risk to refer to the genre of risk status (i.e. low risk result), but am aware
of the negative overtones this word may have (Hodgson, Hughes & Lambert,
2005). I use chance and probability when referring to the likelihood that a
pregnant woman may be carrying a fetus with aneuploidy (e.g. a 20 year old
woman has a 1 in 1600 chance of carrying a fetus with a chromosomal
anomaly. Based on her age, she is likely to receive a low risk result from
prenatal screening).

•

The terminology used to describe the "product" of a pregnancy is particularly
difficult and a very personal matter for pregnant women. During interviews, I
adopted the terminology that the participant used, sometimes fetus or baby or
pregnancy. In my written work, I use fetus or embryo before birth, depending
on the stage of pregnancy, although the distinction between the two is
arbitrary (Nisker, Baylis, Karpin, McLeod & Mykitiuk, 2010). Following the
dictionary definition and to reflect my belief that personhood begins at birth, I
use baby, infant and child only after the child is born. I use pregnancy to
describe the process, and fetus to describe the creation of that process.

•

Terms for abortion are often misused, sometimes for intentional effect
(Grimes & Stuart, 2010). For instance, pregnancy termination, commonly
used in medical literature, may be ambiguous- all pregnancies terminate, but
not all abort (Grimes & Stuart, 2010). I alternate between termination and
abortion depending on the disciplinary audience. I do not use the term
therapeutic abortion, since all abortions can be therapeutic, for instance,
therapeutic for the mother's mental health and wellbeing. I do not use elective
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or genetic as an adjective for abortion to avoid inferring a moral hierarchy of
types of abortion.

1.5 The Study of Prenatal Screening as Conceptualized
in this Dissertation
In Chapter 2, I review the basic medical and social scientific concepts that inform my
understanding of prenatal screening. In Chapter 3, I detail the particular way in which I
understand prenatal screening to fit in a broader context of medicalization of pregnancy,
risk, normalization, united by Foucault's notion of governmentality. I then let these
threads lie loose while I respond directly to the data and the literature suggested by my
research findings, engaging with ideas of information-seeking practices, informed
decision-making, and non-directiveness. In Chapter 9, I pick up the literature that has
been left to lie fallow from the literature review (Charmaz, 2006) and conclude by
weaving together these different threads.

1.6 Methodology
Constructivist Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2006) is the methodology used for this study,
due to its: congruence with a constructionist epistemology (which I discuss at length in
Chapter 3); flexibility and range of acceptable methods (Charmaz, 2006); recognition of
the importance of language (Charmaz, 2005); inductive approach to examining the data
without imposing particular theories (Charmaz, 2006); and congruence with an
interdisciplinary approach.
As necessitated by my doctoral program and institutional research ethics requirements, I
began the study with a literature review (Chapter 2), through which I identified particular
areas of analytical sensitivity. When designing the study, I was aware of my interest in
exploring issues of language, directive counseling, social justice, and disability. While
the initial literature review was necessary for pragmatic reasons, and informed the study
design, it was put aside, as per Charmaz's (2006) recommendations. As data collection
and analysis simultaneously evolved, new areas of theoretical interest were identified and
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explored, including information-seeking and informed choice. After data collection and
analysis was completed, further literature was reviewed in response to categories
identified through data collection, demonstrating a refinement of the topic, from a
consideration of the broad "process" of prenatal screening to a focused examination of
informed decision-making in prenatal screening. Each piece of data (patient education
pamphlets, policy documents, women's perspectives) was collected and considered
separately, and as part of a whole. Each manuscript speaks to one piece of data collection,
but is informed by the previous data, literature, and insights that came before. Chapter 9
details insights from the inter-connection of these pieces.

1.7 Plan of Presentation
In Chapter 1, I set the stage for the research by discussing my philosophy of
interdisciplinary scholarship, situating myself as a researcher, outlining the story of how
this research came to take the shape it has taken, clarifying terms, and introducing
methodological and theoretical choices, which will be elaborated on in chapters 4 and 9.
Chapter 2 situates the context and background of the study in an interdisciplinary
collection of literature on the topic. Chapter 2 also gives some explanation of the medical
and scientific aspects of prenatal screening for readers who are not familiar with the test.
Emergent tensions and key issues informing the shape and importance of the study will
be discussed prior to an introduction of the purpose and questions of this research.
Chapter 3 discusses the philosophical foundations of the particular iteration of
constructionism I have used throughout this work. Chapter 3 also reviews the feminist
bioethics and medicalization literature, which inform my theoretical framework.
Chapter 4 gives a methodological grounding of the study, including an explanation of the
ways in which Constructivist Grounded Theory is congruent with a constructionist
approach. Chapter 4 also includes an outline of the study design and methods and
concludes with an explanation of some of the methodological decisions I made
throughout the process.
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Chapter 5 is my first manuscript, "Critical reflection and prenatal screening public
education materials: a metaphoric textual analysis", published in 2010 in the journal
Reflective Practice. This manuscript includes data from a textual analysis of Canadian
prenatal screening patient education materials and engages with the idea of non-directive
counseling from the SOGC guideline, querying whether or not existing written material
support this counseling directive through critical reflection on the metaphors and
figurative language used. The findings conclude that written material on prenatal
screening is rife with directive elements encouraging women to participate in screening
tests for the purpose of detecting and terminating affected pregnancies.
Chapter 6 is the policy manuscript, "Information sharing to promote informed choice in
prenatal screening in the spirit of the SOGC clinical practice guideline: a proposal for an
alternative model", published in March 2012 in the Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology
Canada. Chapter 6, like Chapter 5, addresses the idea of non-directive counseling in the
SOGC guideline, reviewing the literature critiquing this approach and offering an
alternative way of counseling, based on a particular combination of Shared DecisionMaking and Informative Decision-Making. This article concludes that while the aims of
non-directive counseling (autonomous informed decisions) are admirable, the method is
problematic, and may be neither a desirable nor possible way of counseling. The article
proposes a particular way of approaching Shared Decision-Making that supports a shared
information and deliberation process culminating in the woman making her own decision,
without recommendation or suggestion from the health care provider.
Chapter 7 is entitled "Pregnant women's self-identified information requirements when
deciding to participate in non-invasive prenatal screening" and is currently under review
at the journal Health Expectations. Drawing on data from participant interviews, this
manuscript draws on women's discussions of what information they found important for
making their decisions about participating, including information they came across after
making their decision, but wished they had known earlier. The findings are structured in a
way that may be of use to clinicians offering the prenatal screening test, as seven topics
that could be used to guide a conversation. This manuscript draws a distinction between
information about the test and information to make a decision about participation, a
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distinction made by women but usually absent from the literature. This manuscript
acknowledges the time commitment required by clinicians to provide thorough
information about prenatal screening and discusses alternative ways of providing this
information after the initial consultation.
Chapter 8, "Women's decision-making about participation in prenatal screening: Beyond
the clinical encounter", is the synthesis of the participant information in an over-arching
grounded theory. This manuscript inductively generates a model of the ways in which
pregnant women seek and receive information, how they work with that information, and
how this process informs decision-making. The findings contrast three different types of
theories on this topic: a) the grounded theory developed from my thesis data, b)
consumerist and shared theories of decision-making in health care, c) theories of
information seeking practices for decision-making in the library and information sciences
literature. The health care literature tends to assume a more linear process of knowledge
acquisition for decision-making which places the health care provider as a central figure
in the process. My iterative theory is closer to theories found within library and
information sciences literature, which tend to take a non-linear view of the ways in which
people seek, receive, and use information in everyday life.
Chapter 9 discusses my understanding of reflexivity and reflexive research, offers
emerging insights and reflections on the relations between these four manuscripts and the
research process as a whole. I propose quality criteria drawn from literature on
interdisciplinary scholarship and constructivist grounded theory as a guideline for
assessing the quality of this work. Finally, I address the contributions of this work and
implications for prenatal screening patient education materials, policy, and counseling.

1.8 Conclusion
Prenatal screening is a process which is at the juncture of issues of interest to many
disciplines, and as such, requires an interdisciplinary approach. Drawing on literature,
theories, and methodologies from several disciplines, I construct a bricolage approach to
this study, aiming for internal congruency rather than disciplinary consistency
(Kincheloe, 2001). The shape and focus of this research has been continually refined
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throughout the process, to reflect an iterative inductive approach where initial data
collection and analysis provide insights to further structure the process (Charmaz, 2006).
The story of this research is one of examining the process of making an informed
decision about prenatal screening; the contribution is generative insights into barriers and
facilitators of this process, with suggestions for how it might be improved.
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2 Literature Review
In this chapter, I first define and explain common terms and concepts that surround the
topic of prenatal screening. Second, I summarize key aspects of the 2007 SOGC Clinical
Practice Guidelines, which inspired my interest in this area of research and discuss the
differences between this guideline and the new 2011 guideline. Third, I examine some of
the philosophical values that inform discussions of prenatal screening such as notions of
risk, non-directiveness, and autonomy. Fourth, I survey the literature concerning the
effect of prenatal screening on the disabled community. Fifth, I discuss the existing
literature on prenatal screening by examining the work of key scholars in the field.

2.1 Background Terms and Concepts
2.1.1 Types of prenatal and diagnostic screening.
First, it is important to note that in many popular works and media publications the terms
prenatal screening, prenatal testing, prenatal genetic diagnosis, and prenatal diagnostic
screening are conflated. There are important distinctions among these terms: a screening
program is not diagnostic, or even technological. For example, one of the most common
forms of screening is maternal age, as obstetric and perinatal risks increase with maternal
age (Johnson & Tough, 2012). As with other types of screening, in this example a
particular criterion is used to identify individuals who may face higher levels of risk than
the average person; this criterion is not sufficient to identify whether or not these
individuals are actually at risk, only that they are more likely to be at risk than others who
do not share this characteristic. Prenatal screening looks at a number of different markers
(biochemical markers in the mother's blood, physiological markers visible in an
ultrasound) to suggest whether or not the fetus is at higher risk for fetal aneuploidy or
incomplete neural tube closures. Testing and Diagnosis are terms with connotations of a
definitive result and are correctly used to refer to diagnostic testing such as amniocentesis
or chorionic villus sampling. This study concerns the non-diagnostic prenatal screening
presented during the first prenatal visit; the terms prenatal testing or prenatal diagnosis
will be used to refer only to diagnostic prenatal tests. A high risk result after a screen
will, in most cases, result in the offer of diagnostic testing.
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There are many types of prenatal screening and an explanation of the procedural,
historical, and medical information surrounding them is beyond the scope of this paper.
The most commonly used and studied procedures are as follows:

Integrated Pregnancy Screening: Integrated Pregnancy Screening (IPS) is one
type of non-invasive screening referred to by the SOGC guideline. IPS combines an
ultrasound with two different blood tests. The ultrasound and first blood test (first
trimester screen) take place between 11 and 14 weeks gestation. The second blood test
(maternal serum screen) is done between 15 and 18 weeks gestation (Goel et al, 1998).
For details about ultrasound and maternal serum screening, please see the sections below.
The first trimester screen measures Pregnancy-Associated Plasma Protein A (PAPP-A)
and free beta Human Chorionic Gonadotrophin (hCG) which can indicate a risk status for
aneuploidy and incomplete neural tube closures. Unusual levels of this pregnancy related
protein (PAPP-A) and hormone (β-hCG) can indicate (but do not always mean) a higher
likelihood of aneuploidy (Breathnach & Malone, 2007). IPS has a sensitivity rate of
about 85% with a false positive rate of 2% (Malone et al., 2005).

Serum Screening: Maternal serum screening (MSS) is a three part analysis of
women’s blood performed at 15-18 weeks gestation (Goel, Glazier, Zummers, &
Holzapfel, 1998). Maternal serum screening used to be the norm for prenatal screening in
Ontario (Carroll & Reid, 1997), and as such is the type of screening addressed in many
social scientific studies. MSS no longer meets the minimum standard for detection rate
and false positive rate (Summers, Langlois, Wyatt, & Wilson, 2007). Serum IPS is a
blood-work only type of screening which meets the minimum standards suggested by
Summers and colleagues (2007). Serum IPS includes a first trimester PAPP-A test as well
as a second trimester test of the panel of biochemicals included in the Quad Screen. The
quadruple screen is a second trimester blood test which includes the original three
biochemicals from MSS: Human Chorionic Gonadotrophin (hCG), Alpha fetoprotein
(AFP) and Estriol (E3) and adds one additional biochemical marker, inhibin-A (Chitayat,
Langlois, & Wilson, 2011). The quadruple screen takes place in the second trimester, and
so may be the only prenatal screening option available for women who are late seeking
prenatal care.
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Ultrasound: Ultrasound, or ultrasonography, is a medical imaging technology which
uses high frequency sound waves and echoes to create an image of the fetus. Sonographic
"markers" visible on the ultrasound may detect physical characteristics such as nuchal
translucency, which may suggest the presence of conditions such as Down Syndrome
(Unterscheider & Malone, 2011). Ultrasound technology is one of the most common
tools for prenatal screening because it can detect markers early in pregnancy
(Unterscheider & Malone 2011) and is generally accepted to be safe, although some
authors disagree (Gudex, Nielsen, & Madsen, 2006). Ultrasound for nuchal translucency
is included in several types of prenatal screening approved by the 2007 SOGC Guideline
(Summers et al, 2007), although there are endorsed methods of prenatal screening (Quad
Screen, Serum IPS) that do not include ultrasound.

Amniocentesis: Amniocentesis is the most commonly used form of prenatal
diagnosis for chromosomal and single gene disorders (Wilson, Langlois, Johnson, &
Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada, 2007). Amniocentesis involves
the extraction of amniotic fluid (which surrounds the fetus) with a needle. Current
techniques allow the use of ultrasound imaging to accurately guide the needle, thus
reducing negative effects of the procedure (Seeds, 2004). Amniocentesis enables the
culture of fetal cells contained in the amniotic fluid to perform genetic analysis (including
chromosome karyotyping) (Borrell et al., 1999). Amniocentesis was first used in the
1950s to determine the sex of the fetus so that sex-linked genetic conditions could be
detected (Rothschild, 2005). The risk of fetal loss after amniocentesis is not agreed upon
(see the “Physical Risk” section below), but the procedure is generally performed only to
verify the results of a less invasive test when an anomaly is detected. Amniocentesis can
be performed prior to 15 weeks gestation (early amniocentesis) but is more commonly
performed between 15 and 20 weeks gestation (mid trimester amniocentesis) (Seeds,
2004).

Chorionic Villus Sampling: CVS is the only accepted method for first trimester
diagnosis (Brambati & Tului, 2005). Evidence shows it may be as safe and as reliable as
amniocentesis (Borrell et al, 1999). CVS can be performed two ways; a needle can be
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inserted into the placenta through the maternal abdomen (known as transabdominal CVS)
or a catheter or biopsy forceps can be inserted through the cervical canal (known as
transcervical CVS) (Brambati & Tului, 2005). CVS can be done at 7-12 weeks gestation,
compared to more than 15 weeks gestation for amniocentesis. CVS can detect most
conditions that amniocentesis can detect. It is appropriate for DNA analysis and has the
advantage over amniocentesis of quicker test results and efficacy at an earlier gestational
age. It is considered to be reasonably safe, although there are risks of fetal loss, and low
risks of bleeding and amniotic fluid aspiration (Brambati & Tului, 2005).
Transabdominal CVS is considered safer than transcervical CVS because the needle does
not pierce the membrane therefore the antibacterial barrier properties of the maternal
tissues remain intact (Brambati & Tului, 2005). In the mid 1990’s there were reports of a
few clusters of children born with limb anomalies after CVS (Kuliev et al., 1992)
however, later research reported that the rates of limb anomalies were similar to the
general population and that the clusters may have been coincidental (Brambati & Tului
2005; Philip et al., 2004).

2.1.2 Risk status.
It should be noted that some authors find the word risk to be value laden (Grant & Flint,
2007; J. Hodgson, Hughes, & Lambert, 2005; Skotko, 2005; Skotko, 2006). They suggest
a term such as “chance” would be more congruent with a non-directive approach. For a
more theoretical discussion of risk, please see section 2.6, "Re-examining Risk".
Prenatal screening is not diagnostic, but rather gives the patient an idea of her risk status
of having a child with an anomaly. Furthermore, as prenatal screening is only targeted
towards certain anomalies, it is possible that a woman could receive a low risk result, but
still have a child with an anomaly (Fanos, Spangner, & Musci, 2006). The opposite of
this can also occur- a woman can receive a high risk result that is found to be a false
positive on amniocentesis or after birth (Fanos, Spangner & Musci, 2006). Risks are
provided statistically (i.e. 1 in 200, 1 in 37), with the high/low/medium risk lines drawn
idiosyncratically. Patients and physicians might not agree on what constitutes a high or
low risk.
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Rayna Rapp (1999) conducted a 9 year ethnographic study of genetic counselors and
their patients. She concluded that risk status is a significant stress to pregnant women and
that many do not initially understand that prenatal screening tests will not provide a
definitive answer (Rapp, 1999). This theme is echoed throughout both the social science
and medical literature (Carroll, Brown, Reid, & Pugh, 2001; Heyman et al., 2006;
Kleinveld, Timmermans, de Smit, & Ader, 2006). Rapp also includes an interesting
discussion of how risk status interpretation varies across ethnic and socioeconomic lines:
How do we convey a chromosome risk when a low income pregnant Afro-Puerto
Rican woman experiences a 100 percent chance of running out of food stamps
this month, a 25 percent risk of having one son or brother die in street violence,
and an 80 percent chance of getting evicted by the end of the year? A one-in-180
chance of having a child with a chromosome abnormality at age 35 is probably
the best odds she’s facing. (New York genetic counselor in Rapp, 1999, p.69)

2.1.3 Physical risk.
Prenatal screening tests have low physical risk, although diagnostic prenatal tests, such as
amniocentesis or CVS, do carry physical risks (Farrell et al., 1999). As discussed earlier,
amniocentesis carries a risk of miscarriage, as well as the rare risk of malformation
(Farrell et al, 1999), and so is only performed when other, less invasive procedures
indicate that there is a higher risk of anomaly. It is difficult to establish an exact rate of
miscarriage for amniocentesis. The commonly accepted rate by SOGC is 0.6-1% or
(Wilson et al., 2007) but a recent, and much criticized, study (Kuehn, 2006) suggests that
the rate is actually closer to 0.06% or 1 in 1600 (Eddleman et al., 2006). The rate has also
been reported as high as 1.53% (Wilson et al, 2007). It should be noted that even
procedures seen as low risk (for example, ultrasound) are not proven safe (Gudex et al,
2006) and may require additional testing to determine whether or not there are long term
effects.

2.1.4 Social-psychological risk.
The social and psychological risks of prenatal screening are often overlooked in the
medical literature. Some authors contend these risks are also often neglected in
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discussions of prenatal screening between physicians and patients (Browner, Preloran,
Casado, Bass, & Walker, 2003; Marteau et al., 1992; Pilnick, Fraser, & James, 2004;
Pilnick, 2004; Press & Browner, 1995; Press & Browner, 1997; Smith, Slack, Shaw, &
Marteau, 1994; Smith, Shaw, & Marteau, 1994).
Social and psychological risks are the greatest risks that many pregnant women and
couples face during prenatal screening and are the concern of many excellent social
scientific and bioethical works (Franklin & Ragone, 1998; Gastmans, 2002; Rapp, 1999;
Rothenberg & Thomson, 1994; Rothschild, 2005). There are several authors who have
dedicated much of their careers towards exploring these issues (see all listed sources:
Abby Lippman, Carole H. Browner, Nancy Press, Rayna Rapp, Barbara Katz Rothman)
and there have been many national and international conferences convened to work on
these issues. Issues commonly addressed in this literature include the emotional strife of
selective termination, aborting a much wanted but potentially anomalous fetus, anxiety
around testing, carrying an “abnormal” fetus, struggling with issues of abortion, not being
able to acknowledge a pregnancy until the fetus is “confirmed healthy”, worrying about
the impact of a disabled child on other children, a marriage, mental resources, and
finances.

2.2 The 2007 SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline on
Screening for Fetal Aneuploidies: Implications for
prenatal care
Prior to the 2007 clinical practice guideline, Canadian women were offered prenatal
screening based on advanced age or family history, although some provinces had
screening programs offered to a wider population of pregnant women (Carroll & Reid,
1997). The definition of advanced maternal age has changed as scientific knowledge and
the field of biostatistics has progressed, but in Canada it is generally considered to be 35
years (Johnson & Tough, 2012). Rothschild (2005) notes that 35 years is a generally
accepted marker of advanced maternal age in many countries, but it is an arbitrary
threshold based more on economics than medicine. It is also often cited that 35 years of
age is the threshold because at that age the physical risks of amniocentesis are equal to
the risk of receiving a test result positive for anomalies (Wilson et al, 2007). The new
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SOGC guidelines are, in effect, recognizing the arbitrary nature of screening after age 35.
After all, although older women have a much higher probability of bearing a child with
Down Syndrome (for example), most children with Down Syndrome are born to women
below 35, due to the higher numbers of women under 35 having children (Rapp, 1999).
The 2007 SOGC guidelines state that all pregnant women, regardless of age, must be
offered non-invasive screening for “the most common clinically significant fetal
aneuploidies in addition to a second trimester ultrasound for dating, growth, and
anomalies” (Summers et al 2007, p. 149).
There are several implications to the SOGC guideline: first of all, it implies that all
pregnancies have the potential to be high risk pregnancies. Secondly, it forces
consequences of testing such as iatrogenic anxiety or the experience of a “tentative
pregnancy” (Rothman, 1989) on to a larger number of women. Third, this
recommendation expands the scope of practice of many family physicians who care for
pregnant women. Previously, if a woman desired prenatal screening or was over the age
of 35, her physician might refer her to a genetic counselor or obstetrician. With the new
guidelines, physicians must discuss prenatal screening with all their pregnant patients.
Some family physicians may lack the knowledge necessary to provide all the necessary
information (Tyzack & Wallace, 2003), or be unprepared to provide counseling in a nondirective way (Summers et al, 2007), considering that in other circumstances (e.g.
regulating blood sugar, controlling hypertension) non-directiveness may be seen as a
problematic way of practice (Caplan, 1993; Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 2002b).
Fourth, it normalizes the experience of prenatal screening in the eyes of the health care
provider, which may affect both the standard of care and the discourse used by the
physician (Press & Browner, 1995; Press & Browner, 1997; Seavilleklein, 2009). Fifth,
Asch (2000) has argued that the expansion of prenatal screening will continue to
eliminate people with disabilities from our society, which could increase marginalization
and reduce many forms of social and financial support, this idea is further elaborated in
section 2.3, “Prenatal Screening and Disability”.
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2.2.1 Genetic screening and primary care providers.
It is predicted that genetic screening services will increasingly become the domain of
primary care providers (Biesecker & Peters, 2001; Greendale & Pyeritz, 2001). This
raises questions concerning the implications of this transfer of counseling from specialist
genetic counselors to family physicians, including whether family doctors have sufficient
time, training, knowledge, and resources to provide this service.
Genetics has an ever expanding role in medicine and is poised to change family medicine
in a number of different ways. By generating new screening and diagnostic tests, the
Human Genome Project will introduce new ethical challenges with regard to informed
consent, patient autonomy, confidentiality, malpractice, and psychological complications
(Fetters, Doukas, & Phan, 1999). As genetic services expand into the domain of family
medicine, there are many benefits, but also many potential challenges.
The SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline (Summers et al, 2007) expands the scope of
prenatal care in family medicine to include genetics. Prenatal screening has been
performed by family physicians in the UK (Qureshi, Armstrong, & Modell, 2006) and
California (Browner & Press, 1996) for some time. Ontario family physicians have been
counseling patients about Maternal Serum Screening (MSS) since 1993 (Carroll & Reid,
1997). Park and Mathews (Park & Mathews, 2009a) found that 68% of pregnant women
in Newfoundland and Labrador discussed Maternal Serum Screening with their family
physician. There have been several investigations into the strengths and weaknesses of
genetics in family medicine, the findings of which will be summarized in the following
section. The conclusion of most of these studies and systematic reviews is that good
quality counseling about genetic and prenatal testing requires knowledge, training, time,
and commitment on the part of the health care provider, however the question is raised as
to whether the majority of family physicians possess all of these necessary components.
Greendale and Pyeritz (2001) have produced an important commentary on the current
state and future direction of genetic screening in primary care. For various reasons, the
number of specialist geneticists (both PhD and MD medical geneticists as well as
master’s level genetic counselors) has not kept pace with the need for these professionals.
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The result of this is that non-genetic specialists and primary care providers take on an
increasing amount of this workload. Greendale and Pyeritz (2001) suggest that nonspecialists providing this service “may not be able to provide accurate risk assessment,
choose appropriate tests based on clinical and family histories, or interpret DNA results”
(p. 226). Furthermore, there is a shortage of family physicians in general (CFPC-CMA
PCWTP, 2009), and adding another service to their already full roster is problematic.
There are some significant advantages to moving genetic services into the domain of the
primary care provider. First, it is unlikely that there will ever be enough specialist
geneticists and genetics counselors to provide these services. The nature of family
medicine (long term care, ability to develop relationships, knowledge of family members
and family dynamics) has many possibilities for excellent genetic care (Greendale &
Pyeritz 2001). Unfortunately, the nature of family medicine also discourages excellent
genetic care because of issues such as time constraints (Carroll, Blaine, & Ashbury, 2006;
Watson, Shickle, Qureshi, Emery, & Austoker, 1999; Young & Ward, 1999), financial
considerations (Carroll et al, 1999), and lack of current knowledge about developments in
genetics (Watson et al, 1999).

2.3 Prenatal Screening and Disability
One of the most compelling arguments against a cavalier attitude to prenatal screening
comes from the disabled community. Known in bioethical circles as the expressivist
argument, it is argued that by identifying certain genetic conditions as undesirable and
aborting fetuses with these conditions, negative judgments are made about the status and
value of the lives of people with these particular conditions. This argument is taken up
widely by feminist philosophers and by the disabled community (Edwards, 2004; Gedge,
2010; Kaplan, 1994; Klein, 2011; Lippman, 1991; Lippman, 1999b; McMahan, 2005;
Patterson & Satz, 2002; Press, Browner, & Tran, 1998; Scott, 2005) who argue that a
systematic bias against people with disabilities is embedded within the structure and
practice of prenatal screening.
Another related argument is the quality of life argument. Terms such as suffering and low
quality of life are subjective and many people with disabilities do not rate their subjective
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life experience as poor (Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999; Asch, 2000). Disability scholars are
concerned with the way that quality of life is perceived by the general public and
interpreted in the prenatal screening debate. Disability advocates frequently argue that
their quality of life is affected more by societal barriers than their disability. For instance,
Deborah Kaplan (1994) compares a wheelchair to a pair of eyeglasses; it is a tool for
people with mobility limitations. A wheelchair only impacts on quality of life when
architecture, technology, and attitudes get in the way. Scholars participating in this
debate question the use of selective abortion as a response “to social problems that could
be resolved through other policy initiatives” (Kaplan, 1994). It should be noted that most
“birth defects” are the result of prematurity, low birth weight, and environmental
exposure. Many of these conditions could be ameliorated with social, environmental and
economic programs (Wertz & Fletcher, 1995).
Because caring for a disabled child, as any other child, requires patience, time, and
resources, advocates of the expressivist argument do not support a ban on prenatal
screening (Gedge, 2007; McMahan, 2005; Patterson & Satz, 2002). Instead, they
advocate for increased awareness about living with a disability, increased social support
for persons with disabilities and their caregivers, and non-directive counseling that does
not include subconscious prejudice against disability (Kaplan, 1994; Parens & Asch,
2000; Wertz & Fletcher, 1995).
1

Within these ideas, feminist standpoint theory (Harding, 1987; Harding, 2004)
contributes to an understanding of the phenomenon. Harding's standpoint theory argues
that “knowledge claims are always socially situated and that failure by dominant groups
to interrogate beliefs arising from their social situation leaves them in an
epistemologically disadvantaged position, that is, one that distorts” (Patterson & Satz,
2002, p.121 ). For example, if health care providers who counsel about prenatal screening
fail to make themselves aware of the reality of living with a disability, they may impart

1

While both Harding (1986, 2004) and Smith (1987, 1992) name their work "standpoint theory", the
theories are quite disparate (Smith, 1993). This section uses Harding's conception of standpoint theory;
Smith's standpoint theory is discussed in Chapter 3 and 9.
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incorrect knowledge to their clients, who then make decisions based on this distorted
knowledge (Grant & Flint, 2007). It is necessary for genetic counselors (and other health
care professionals who provide prenatal screening counseling) to acquire knowledge
about the lived experiences of the conditions identified with prenatal screening so that
they can provide appropriately “non-directive” counseling to patients. Some writers
wonder if truly informed choice and completely non-directive counseling is possible,
noting that the words used to describe the process of prenatal screening create anything
anomalous as inherently pathological (Grant & Flint, 2007; Skotko, 2006; Hodgson et al,
2005). Press et al (1998), Grant and Flint (2007), and Skotko (2005, 2006) argue that
when health care professionals speak about prenatal screening, they should be prepared to
provide patients with contact information for parent groups and social groups that
advocate and care for people with the conditions being discussed. A number of scholars
have suggested that this is not happening, that many women receive no information
whatsoever about what it is like to live with or raise a child with the different conditions
being tested for by prenatal screening (Browner & Press, 1996; Marteau, Slack, Kidd, &
Shaw, 1992; Marteau, 1995; Pilnick et al., 2004; Pilnick, 2004; Press & Browner, 1995;
Press & Browner, 1997; Skotko, 2005; Skotko, 2006).
During informal communication during the International Conference on the “Healthy”
Embryo (University of Western Ontario, November 16 2007), legal and disability scholar
Jackie Leach Scully made the valuable point that it is important to differentiate between
terms such as disability, disease, condition, illness, impairment. There is significant
difference between the participatory abilities of people with deafness, cystic fibrosis,
Down syndrome, or hydroencephaly. Different conditions should be given different
considerations (Leach Scully, personal communication, November 16, 2007). Various
conditions are often conflated in prenatal screening debates, created as the “other” in
opposition to “normal” (Rothschild, 2005). Wertz and Fletcher have also noted that the
academic literature tends to consider “disability” rather than speak about certain
conditions and they identify this trend as harmful and counterproductive (Wertz &
Fletcher, 1995).
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2.3.1 Social construction of disability.
There is a wide range of literature on the ways in which disability is socially constructed.
Scholars tend to take what I term a strong constructionist (e.g. Wendell, 1996) or a weak
constructionist (e.g. Asch, 2000) viewpoint. The strong constructionist view of the social
construction of disability, exemplified by the work of Susan Wendell, holds that
impairments in functioning are only disabling because of the way in which society is
constructed- they are not inherently disabling. Weak constructionists differ in stating that
although disability is largely socially constructed, there are some attributes of
impairments which are inherently disabling, such as the experience of living with chronic
pain (Asch, 2000).
Wendell (1996) outlines a number of ways in which society disables people who do not
live up to the idealized vision of a citizen, that is the white, male, young, fit, able-bodied,
wealthy citizen. First, she describes ways in which social conditions affect people’s
bodies. Then she names a number of societal norms which can be disabling. In one
illuminating example, Wendell identifies the pace of life as a societal factor which
disables people who may be able to be productive and contributing members of society,
but because of the pace they are expected to keep, are unable to make contributions. For
example, we could consider a worker who would be able to work a half time job based on
the productivity expectations for this amount of work. If those productivity expectations
were to increase, the worker may not be able to keep up and be forced to leave
employment. In this way, the social construction of the expected level of individual
productivity “can eclipse the actual contributions of people who cannot meet them,
making people unemployable when they can in fact do valuable work” (Wendell, 1996, p.
39).
Wendell points out that disability is also constructed by the inability to give individuals
the assistance they need to live productively. For example, the inefficiency of public
transit disables people who cannot drive for reasons such as poverty, epilepsy, blindness,
paralysis etc. Wendell points out that society gives a lot of assistance to non-disabled
people such as education grants and training, public communication, public
transportation, recreation, social support etc. When these services are geared towards
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non-disabled people they are considered an entitlement of being a citizen. If these
services are adapted so that people with impairments can use them, they are considered
charity.
Such discussions about the social construction of disability raise a number of questions
related to prenatal screening. How is disability constructed by health care professionals
when they talk about prenatal screening? How do societal constructions of disability and
the lives of disabled people affect the decisions that pregnant women make about prenatal
screening? How can health care professionals circumvent these societal norms and
constructions to assist the woman in making her own decision about her own family? The
SOGC guidelines (Summers et al., 2007; Chitayat et al., 2011) do not explicitly address
the issue of how disability is constructed in society, however they do address the issue
that prenatal screening, diagnostic testing, and the decision to continue or terminate the
pregnancy should be the woman’s own decision. They suggest this can happen through
non-directive counseling.

2.4 The Ethos of Non-directive Genetic Counseling
Non-directiveness is one of the original and principal tenets of genetic counseling (Fine,
1993; Weil, 2003; Wertz & Fletcher, 1989) and has long been considered the “norm” in
genetic counseling practice (Burke & Kolker, 1994; Kolker & Burke, 1998). Nondirectiveness originated from Carl Roger’s (1951) psychosocial counseling model of
Client Centered therapy, adopted by the first graduate program in genetic counseling, at
Sarah Lawrence College (Weil, 2003). Non-directiveness is thought to be important
because it aims to promote and support autonomous decision making by clients.
Emphasizing individual choice and decisions separates the field of genetic testing and
diagnosis from its undesirable cousin, eugenics (Duster, 2003). Bartels et al (1997)
report that 96% of American genetic counselors surveyed thought non-directiveness is
very important to genetic counseling practice (Bartels, LeRoy, McCarthy, & Caplan,
1997). It is regularly included as an imperative in literature from other medical
professions, including the SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline (Summers et al, 2007).
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There is a core group of scholars in genetics and bioethics who question whether nondirective counseling is possible or desirable. These discussions center around definitions
of non-directiveness, the values that it may hide or silence, the opportunities that may be
lost for active engagement with counselees, and the moral and ethical discussions that it
prevents. Within this argument, there are four different camps:
N-D is possible, desirable

N-D is not possible, but it is desirable

N-D is possible, but not desirable

N-D is neither possible nor desirable.

Of these four options, the accepted view in the medical mainstream is that non-directive
counseling is both desirable and possible, but the tide has shifted in the genetic
counseling and midwifery communities (Burkell & McKenzie, 2005). Many authors
present compelling arguments to support the need for an acknowledgement of the
impossibility of non-directive counseling. I situate myself in the place which sees the
spirit of non-directiveness as desirable and on a continuum of possibility, however I view
a purist practice of non-directive counseling as neither desirable nor possible. By the
spirit of non-directiveness, I mean the aim of providing complete and balanced
information provided without intent to persuade the woman to pick a particular outcome.
I propose that providing information in the spirit of non-directive counseling becomes
more possible when we acknowledge the effect our personal standpoint has on the
information we provide and the way we provide it. An ideal approach towards nondirective counseling appreciates the standpoint of the counselor and counselee (Smith,
1987), and encourages counselors to provide information in a way that the counselee can
apply to her particular situation. I describe this idea further in the second manuscript,
Chapter 6.
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Table 1: Reasons why non-directive counseling may not be possible
Author (year)

Reasoning

(Anderson, 1999)

There are moral imperatives embedded within counseling that make
non-directiveness impossible.

(Bartels et al., 1997;
Williams et al., 2002a;
2002b)

Difficulty ensuring that verbal and non-verbal cues are non-directive.
By choosing what information to present and how to present it, you
cannot be non-directive.

(Cunningham-Burley

Practitioners and clients may hold different perspectives about genetic

& Kerr, 1999)

risk and disease, making neutrality on the part of practitioners
impossible.

(Bhogal & Brunger,

Health professionals cannot help weaving their own values into the

2010)

information they impart.

(Greendale & Pyeritz,

There is often a lack of time for proper counseling, especially when this

2001; Smith et al.,

counseling is provided by primary care providers.

1994)
(Stacey, 1996)

There is a power differential between patient and physician which
prevents neutrality in their communication.

(Weil, 2003)

Directiveness can be inadvertent (counselor’s values show despite
attempts to be neutral), inevitable (there are inevitable choices to be
made re: choosing information to present and how it should be
presented), or institutional (the message and setting can imply one
course of action is preferable or desirable).
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(Williams et al.,

Attempting to give information in a value neutral way can undermine

2002b)

the possibility of encouraging open communication.
Denial of advice/opinion may be interpreted as a lack of care.
There is influence to follow particular screening pathways. This can be
overt or covert, such as the state sanctioning a screening program.

(Greendale & Pyeritz,

Genetic counseling has now expanded to be the jurisdiction of

2001; Williams et al.,

practitioners who may not normally practice in a non-directive way.

2002a; Williams et al.,
2002b)
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Table 2: Reasons why non-directive counseling may not be desirable
Author (year)

Reasoning

(Anderson, 1999)

The moral imperatives hidden in counseling make it difficult for
couples to make a decision that these imperatives do not support. They
make the offer of genetic testing a medical directive rather than a
choice.

(Benkendorf, Prince,

Practitioners often practice non-directively by using indirect speech,

Rose, De Fina, &

which leads to confusion on the part of the patients. Indirect speech

Hamilton, 2001)

does not invite the patient to state his or her values.

(Caplan, 1993)

Non-directiveness ignores many difficult issues and isolates itself from
the moral, ethical, and political issues inherent in genetic screening.

(Clarke, 1997)

Non-directiveness fails to address the social and economic context in
which the decision is being made.

(Clarke, 1994)

Unacknowledged directiveness is much more dangerous than
acknowledged directiveness. Using a norm of non-directiveness may
hide directive elements.

(Gervais, 1993)

Non-directive counseling may hide the value of autonomy from
examination and reevaluation.

(Caplan, 1993; Stacey,

The ethos of neutrality silences public discussion of difficult issues

1996)

related to “improving the population”. It also prevents discussion
within medical genetics about these issues.

(Vanstone, Kinsella, & A non-directive approach may hide excuses for directiveness, such as
Nisker, 2012)

Bartels et al (1997) informants who admitted using directive counseling
when their clients could not comprehend information because of low
socioeconomic status, low education, different cultures.
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(Weil, 2003)

Non-directiveness impedes the future progress and evolution of the
profession by inhibiting creative responses to the challenges posed by
advances in genomic medicine.
It may constrain counselors, many of whom feel they cannot counsel
both actively and non-directively.

Bartels et al (1997) found that while 96% of American genetic counselors thought of nondirectiveness as a very important value, 72% of them admitted to being sometimes
directive. They acted in a directive fashion for several reasons. Many admitted that it was
difficult to be non-directive because the language they use, the information they present
and the way they present it are all directive, even if the counselor strives to take a neutral
stance. Others admitted consciously pursuing a directive counseling strategy when the
client didn’t understand the information, a better choice was clear, there was a perceived
need for further medical care or counseling, or the client couldn’t make a decision.
Bartels et al (1997) did not examine the assumptions behind some of these reasons, for
instance, that 15% of their respondents took a directive stance when clients were unable
to understand the information for reasons of low mental function, low socioeconomic
class, low education, client immaturity, cultural practice, and comprehension. I wonder if
there would be a more effective way of presenting the information so that the client could
understand it in order to articulate his or her values and preferences, rather than the
counselor deciding that a directive approach was necessary due to the socially
disadvantaged status of the client.
Williams, Alderson, and Farsides (2002b) examine what is happening with genetic
counseling now that it is increasingly being carried out by health care providers who do
not normally practice in a non-directive way, such as obstetricians and family physicians.
Anderson (1999) and Greendale and Pyeritz (2001) share this concern about the provision
of genetic counseling by other care providers. Park and Matthews (2009) report that 37%
of women in Canada who participated in prenatal screening did so because their
physicians instructed them to participate. Williams et al (2002b) state that attempting to
give facts in a value neutral way is not possible or desirable and ask instead, what aspects
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of directiveness are acceptable and what aspects are problematic? They support an
attempt to understand the difficulties of non-directiveness and the possible uses of
alternative counseling strategies through professional and public debate.
Anderson (1999) interviewed 24 couples who received prenatal genetic counseling. She
found that there are moral imperatives embedded in the process of genetic counseling
which are not explicitly articulated and therefore not questioned. These moral imperatives
empower professionals and make it possible for them to portray genetics as a social good.
With this in mind, it is not correct to equate non-directiveness with the protection or
fostering of autonomous decision making. The informants Anderson interviewed who
accepted genetic testing did not see it as an autonomous choice, but rather as a medical
directive that a person could follow or not follow. They were “swept away” (p. 132) by
the moral imperatives embedded in the testing and unable to articulate a counter
argument to justify not pursuing the testing.

2.5 Autonomy
One of the most commonly cited advantages for striving towards non-directive
counseling is that it promotes patient autonomy. Literature on directive vs. non-directive
counseling often assumes the inherent value in supporting autonomy and concerns itself
with the achievement of this value, without questioning whether it is something we
should strive to achieve. This approach is well grounded in traditional bioethics, but
traditional conceptions of autonomy in relation to prenatal screening have recently been
challenged by a number of scholars (Ho, 2008; Langston, 2009; McLeod, 2002;
Seavilleklein, 2009). Victoria Seavilleklein (2009) has written an interesting synthesis of
the ways in which autonomy is used to justify the widespread offer of prenatal screening.
She contends that prenatal screening does not promote autonomy and a more patientcentered approach necessitates the use of a relational conception of autonomy, as
articulated by Susan Sherwin (1998).
Autonomy is one of Beauchamp and Childress’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009) four
guiding principles of bioethics. While many bioethicists have critiqued the theory of
principlism (Clouser & Gert, 1990) and traditional conceptions of the principle of
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autonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Sherwin, 1998; Wolpe, 1998), it is still one of the
most popular decision making guides in medicine and the values espoused by Beauchamp
and Childress have been adopted by other disciplines to guide ethical decision making.
Autonomy is the central value espoused by most of the leading approaches in health care
ethics (Sherwin, 1998).
Despite its wide popularity, autonomy has been challenged as a worthy principle on
several fronts and these arguments will be explored briefly. But first, where does the
value of autonomy come from? Whose value is it? Is it really a universal good that should
be used to guide clinical decisions as Beauchamp and Childress (2009) suggest?
Catherine Myser (2003) suggests that autonomy is part of the normativity of whiteness of
bioethics, a term she uses to describe the invisible cultural norms that are behind socalled universal values. Myser challenges the universality of autonomy by contending
that it is a cultural value. Fox (1990) identifies self determination/autonomy as the
'highest moral good' in American bioethics. She discusses the “American-ness” of
bioethics as an important indicator of its WASP ethos and whiteness. Myser (2003) calls
for the problematization, displacement, and relocation of the dominant white center of
bioethics. This would involve the adjustment or revision of dominant bioethics values
and concepts, such as autonomy. Myser (2003) asks us to examine the dominant values in
bioethics and ask what ideas and concepts these values suppress. For instance, the focus
on self determination, individualism, and autonomy may subjugate values of community,
relationships, altruism, sacrifice, and love. What ideas do our values hide and what do
they show? Whose values are they and where do they come from?
The principle of autonomy guides many approaches in prenatal screening: the norm of
non-directiveness in genetic counseling, the idea that an individual has the right to
determine her own future without consideration of the community, and the idea that
suffering hardship (e.g. financial difficulties that may be encountered when raising a
child with special needs) is an experience one must deal with alone. Discussions of
choice and the right to choose are considered in isolation from and without
acknowledgement of the influence of the social and political structures in which they are
deeply embedded (Ho, 2008; Lippman, 1999a) Considering the social construction of the
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value of autonomy and the implications this value has in relation to the offer of prenatal
screening, I introduce a different conception of autonomy, Sherwin's (1998) relational
autonomy. Relational autonomy fits well with a feminist approach to prenatal screening,
and allows consideration of the ways in which decisions about prenatal screening are
linked to family, community, societal, and socio-economic considerations.

2.5.1 Relational autonomy.
Feminist scholars are particularly concerned with the value of autonomy. As Sherwin
(1998) points out, feminists are often unsure whether or not to support the principle of
autonomy. On one hand, it affords protection to people who are vulnerable to coercion
and other influences. Without strong respect for the principle of autonomy, patients and
other vulnerable populations may be abused and exploited. On the other hand, is
autonomous decision-making really possible? When one considers the power differential
between physician and patient (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010; Summers, 1994), social and
political structures which oppress women (Lippman, 1999) and possibly coercive or
constraining contextual factors specific to prenatal screening (García, Timmermans, &
van Leeuwen, 2008; Hunt & deVoogd, 2003), it is unclear if wholly autonomous
decisions are possible. Sherwin makes a distinction between autonomy and agency. A
woman presented with choices about prenatal screening may exercise agency by
choosing the option which she prefers, yet due to constraining factors outside of her
control, that decision may not be autonomous (Lippman, 1999a; Sherwin, 1992; Sherwin,
1998). For instance, societal factors may constrain autonomous choice in prenatal
screening;
The societal treatment and professional viewpoints of disability continue to shape
the meaning of pregnancy and the role of screening programs, pre-determining
people's decision-making framework and feasible options while giving the
illusion of autonomy. ... the ableist socio-cultural framework is full of negative
messages about impairments. It constructs the meanings of a good life according
to the able-bodied and able-minded ideals, underlying the social and professional
structures within which discussions and decisions regarding various impairments
are held.(Ho, 2008, p.197)
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McLeod and Sherwin (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000) declare that oppression is
unrecognized as an inhibitor of autonomy equal to coercion, internal compulsion, and
ignorance. Sherwin (1998) makes the assertion that the value of autonomy serves to “hide
the workings of privilege and to mask the barriers of oppression” (Sherwin, 1998, p. 25)
by letting those indoctrinated into the North American culture of individualism and
autonomy think of their successes as self created and deserved. Sherwin infers that this
type of thinking creates an obliviousness to the barriers that oppression and disadvantage
pose to self determination. As a result, privileged people may be inclined to blame less
privileged people for not achieving similar levels of success, without acknowledging the
costs of oppression.
Oppression problematizes the conditions for autonomy. Sherwin (1998) writes that
patient decisions are thought to be autonomous if 1) the patient is deemed to be
sufficiently competent (rational) to make the decision at issues, 2) the patient makes a
reasonable choice from a set of available options, 3) the patient has adequate information
and understanding about the available options and 4) is free from explicit coercion
toward or away from one of those options. Sherwin (1998) states that each criterion is
more problematic than it initially appears. The call for patient competency can exclude
people who are not equated with being rational - traditionally the rationality of women
and other members of oppressed groups have been questioned. The requirement of a
patient to make a reasonable choice from a set of available options is problematic
because the set of options and the “reasonableness” of the decision is constructed by
someone other than the patient herself. The call for adequate information and
understanding is problematic because the information that is made available to patients is
that which has been deemed: worthy of funding by policy-makers, worthy of study by
researchers, and relevant by health care providers. Decisions made at policy, research,
and management levels affect the relevance of the available information and the list of
available options. Regarding the third criterion, access to relevant information, power,
knowledge and experience differences between the health care provider and patient can
make the provision of comprehensible and relevant information difficult. Patients may
feel too intimidated to ask questions and so may not receive the information they need in
a way they can understand. The fourth condition, a demand for freedom from coercion
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when making decisions is difficult to evaluate when the decision-maker is oppressed.
Sherwin (1998) gives the example of a woman who chooses prenatal diagnosis and
abortion because she cannot afford to care for a disabled child in the society in which she
lives, even if she would value that child herself.
When a woman’s sense of herself and her range of opportunities have been
oppressively constructed [so that]… having a(nother) child will impose unjust
and intolerable costs on her, it does not seem sufficient to restrict our analysis to
the degree of autonomy associated with her immediate decision about a particular
treatment offered. We need a way of acknowledging how oppressive
circumstances can interfere with autonomy. (Sherwin, 1998, p. 28)
Sherwin proposes the concept of relational autonomy as an essential element of a
feminist health care ethic (Sherwin 1992, 1998; McLeod & Sherwin, 2000) that will both
serve as an alternative to and address some of the shortcomings of a traditional
conception of autonomy. Relational autonomy could be called situational or contextual
autonomy, because it focuses on considering the individual as part of a web of relations,
both personal and public. It is best understood to be “a capacity or skill that is developed
(and constrained) by social circumstances. It is exercised “within relationships and social
structures that jointly help to shape the individual while also affecting others’ responses
to her efforts at autonomy” (Sherwin, 1998, p. 37).
Sherwin supports this theory with Marilyn Friedman’s call for contextualized thinking as
a way of highlighting the limitations of minimalist moral theory by paying attention to
contextual details in issues of justice, care, and relationships (Friedman, 1987 as cited in
Sherwin, 1992). Relational autonomy recognizes that individuals define and pursue
autonomy within their own specific context and that particular context shapes the way
that autonomy can be achieved (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000). Relational autonomy also
calls for attention to dimensions beyond the individual patient, focusing on the broader
social context of the individual patient rather than his or her cognitive decision-making
capacity. McLeod and Sherwin (2000) argue that a focus solely on the individual ignores
key elements at the source of problems and fails to acknowledge the interconnected
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nature of a person in her society. A focus on the individual encourages patients to see
their decisions in isolation from the decisions of others, which can increase their sense of
vulnerability and dependence on medical authority (Sherwin, 1998).

2.6 Re-examining Risk
Risk is a concept that is often discussed in relation to prenatal screening. In an earlier
section I discussed the idea of physical risk and the expression of statistical risk. Risk is a
word with an unclear meaning and status, both in the context of prenatal screening and
social science inquiry in general (Heyman, Alaszewski, & Brown, 2010; Roth, 2010).
Risk is used in many different ways in prenatal screening, for instance, risk may be used
to refer to physical risk and statistical expressions of risk, as discussed earlier in this
chapter. There is literature describing risk in many contexts: minimizing risks of prenatal
screening (Ekberg, 2007); the risk of invasive procedures (Wilson et al, 2007); the
experience of having a pregnancy labeled high risk (Heyman et al., 2006); negative
connotations associated with the word risk and the transfer of those negative connotations
to the conditions one may be at risk for (Hodgson et al, 2005; Grant &Flint, 2007);
congruency between pregnant women's perceptions of risk and the risk statistic derived
from prenatal screening (Georgsson Öhman, Grunewald, & Waldenström, 2009) and the
challenges of interpreting risk statistics (Burkell & Campbell, 2005; Gigerenzer,
Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007; Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011;
Miron-Shatz, Hanoch, Graef, & Sagi, 2009; Press and Browner, 1995; Rapp, 1999).
Receiving a label of high-risk has been shown to produce several negative psychological
sequelae in pregnant women, including perceptions of a loss of control (Saxell, 2006),
fewer positive expectations about the pregnancy (Heaman, Gupton, & Gregory, 2004),
increased stress and increased negative emotions (Jordan & Murphy, 2009).
But what is risk? There is a large body of literature on risk theory, but in this thesis I
engage with a few particular conceptions of risk. Abby Lippman examined the socially
constructed nature of risk in regards to prenatal screening (Brunger & Lippman, 1995;
Lippman, 1991; Lippman & Wilfond, 1992) and the ways in which it may be used to
exert social control over women. Bob Heyman (Heyman, Henriksen, & Maughan, 1998;
Heyman et al., 2006; Heyman et al., 2010) has considered the increasing societal
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sensitivity to risk as providing a particular historically and socially situated approach to
visualizing alternative futures (Heyman et al., 2010); preoccupation with a risk oriented
way of looking at the world shapes health care delivery and practice. This perspective
was explored in relation to midwifery practice, where medical conceptions of risk were
found to create tensions between midwives' wishes to empower and protect their clients
(Scamell, 2011). Deborah Lupton is a sociologist who has examined the social
construction of risk (Lupton, 1999a) in the context of public health (Petersen & Lupton,
1996), everyday life (Tulloch & Lupton, 1997; Tulloch & Lupton, 2003), AIDS and HIV
(Lupton, McCarthy, & Chapman, 1995; Tulloch & Lupton, 1997) and pregnancy
(Lupton, 2011; Lupton, 1999b). Her work is discussed at length in Chapter 3 for its
relevance to prenatal screening. Lupton’s book traces the evolution of different concepts
of risk, based on the idea that the identification of risks takes place in specific sociocultural and historical concepts. Lupton believes that Western culture’s fascination with
control over one’s life has resulted in the popularization of the concept of risk to explain
deviations from the norm, misfortune, and frightening events. This concept assumes
human responsibility for these events and behooves us to recognize that “something must
be done” to prevent misfortunes. Risk is culturally significant because the “concepts we
identify as risky are ontologically important- they have significant implications in the
way we understand the world, and social and material orders” (Lupton, 1999a) (p. 14).

2.7 Influential Prenatal Screening Literature
There is an enormous amount of literature about prenatal screening available in the fields
of medicine, nursing, midwifery, and philosophy, but most of the literature I have
engaged with addresses prenatal screening from a social scientific perspective. A
significant amount of critical literature on prenatal screening was published in the 1990's;
foundational work was published by Canadian scholar Abby Lippman (Basen, Eichler, &
Lippman, 1993; Beaulieu & Lippman, 1995; Brunger & Lippman, 1995; Lippman, 1991;
Lippman, 1993; Lippman & Wilfond, 1992; Lippman, 1993; Lippman, 1994; Lippman,
1999a; Lippman, 1999b); American anthropologists Carole Browner and Nancy Press
(Browner et al., 2003; Browner et al., 2003; Browner & Press, 1996; Browner et al.,
1996; Browner, Preloran, & Press, 1996; Markens, Browner, & Press, 1999a; Markens,
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Browner, & Press, 1999b; Markens et al., 2010; Markens, Browner, & Mabel Preloran,
2010; Press et al., 1998; Press & Browner, 1995; Press & Browner, 1997; Root &
Browner, 2001); American medical anthropologist Rayna Rapp (Rapp, 1984; Rapp,
1988; Rapp, 1998; Rapp, 1999); American sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman (Rothman,
1989; Rothman, 1993) and British health psychologist Theresa Marteau (Dormandy,
Hankins, & Marteau, 2006; Loeben, Marteau, & Wilfond, 1998; Marteau et al., 1992;
Marteau et al., 1992; Marteau, Plenicar, & Kidd, 1993; Marteau, 1995; Marteau et al.,
2000; Marteau & Dormandy, 2001; Marteau, Dormandy, & Michie, 2001; Marteau &
Kinmonth, 2002; Marteau & Richards, 1996; Michie, Bron, Bobrow, & Marteau, 1997;
Michie, Dormandy, & Marteau, 2003; Michie, Lester, Pinto, & Marteau, 2005; Sapp et
al., 2010; Smith et al., 1994; Smith et al., 1994; Van den Heuvel et al., 2008; Van den
Heuvel et al., 2009). Several significant interdisciplinary collections of work on prenatal
screening were also published during this time period (Asch, 2000; Franklin & Ragone,
1998; Rothenberg & Thomson, 1994). Much of this work addresses the diagnostic
prenatal test amniocentesis and precursors to contemporary prenatal screening, such as
the maternal serum screen or the alphafetoprotein screen. These differences
notwithstanding, this literature articulates an array of foundational questions about nondiagnostic prenatal screening.
Browner, Lippman, Marteau, Rapp, Rothman and Press have greatly influenced
contemporary social scientific scholarship of prenatal screening, and more recent
literature has built on their scholarship by examining prenatal screening in the national
contexts of Canada (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010; Burkell & McKenzie, 2005; Gagnon et al.,
2010; Legare et al., 2011; Park & Mathews, 2009a; Park & Mathews, 2009b;
Seavilleklein, 2009; Spoel, 2006; St-Jacques et al., 2008); Australia and New Zealand
(Hodgson et al., 2005; Hodgson, Gillam, Sahhar, & Metcalfe, 2010; Jaques, Halliday, &
Bell, 2004; Jaques, Bell, Watson, & Halliday, 2004; Jaques, Sheffield, & Halliday, 2005;
Jaques et al., 2010; Milligan, 2004; Milligan, 2008; Mulvey & Wallace, 2000; Mulvey &
Wallace, 2001; Rostant, Steed, & O'Leary, 2003; Rowe, Fisher, & Quinlivan, 2006;
Tyzack & Wallace, 2003) and Europe (Dahl, Hvidman, Jørgensen, & Kesmodel, 2011;
Dahl, Kesmodel, Hvidman, & Olesen, 2006; Ekelund, Jørgensen, Petersen, Sundberg, &
Tabor, 2008; Gottfreðsdóttir & Árnason, 2011; Gourounti & Sandall, 2008; Gudex et al.,
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2006; Heyman et al., 2006; Pilnick et al., 2004; Pilnick, 2002; Pilnick, 2004; Pilnick,
2008; Sandelowski & Barroso, 2005; Schoonen et al., 2011; Schwennesen, Svendsen, &
Koch, 2010; Williams et al., 2002a; 2002b; Williams, 2005; Williams, 2006). In this
section, I will review some of the contributions of the foundational social scientific work
on prenatal screening mentioned above and describe some of the emerging themes in
contemporary work.

2.7.1 Abby Lippman (Canada, Epidemiologist, Bioethicist).
Abby Lippman is a Canadian scholar who works with issues of genetics, feminism, and
ethics. She uses a critical feminist/social justice and constructionist lens to examine
prenatal screening. In three similar articles, Lippman (1991, 1992, 1995) examines the
ways in which prenatal screening has been socially constructed and the impact that this
construction has had on the status of women, children, and people with disabilities. Her
argument is relevant to my motivation for undertaking a critical and constructionist
examination of prenatal screening.
Lippman (1995, pg. 375) identifies a number of contradictory constructions of prenatal
screening:
•

“public health”, or a way of reducing the frequency of selected birth
defects.

•

“reproductive autonomy”, or a way of giving women information to
expand their reproductive choices.

•

“assembly line”, a way of separating out those products we wish to
develop from those we wish to discontinue.

•

“autonomous control”, a way of respecting (increasing) women’s
autonomy to choose the kinds of children they will bear.

•

“reassurance”, a means of reassuring women to enhance their experience
of pregnancy.

•

“disaster avoidance”, a way of avoiding an undesirable future.

Lippman recognizes that these constructions are in tension with each other, but often
occur together, particularly the themes of reassurance, control, and choice. Lippman
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decries this discourse as marketing strategy, one which hides other facets of prenatal
screening by not asking questions such as why reassurance is sought, how risk groups are
generated, and how eligibility for obtaining this kind of reassurance is determined. The
discourse on prenatal screening further constructs the project by constructing a “need” for
prenatal diagnosis and the promotion of “choice”. These concepts are further analyzed in
Lippman (1991) and (1992).
Despite its insistence of objectivity and neutrality, the Western biomedical system is
grounded in particular social and cultural assumptions. These assumptions shape the way
that disease, malady, and disorder are constructed by biomedicine, as there is no
essentialist or universal biological basis for these conditions. There is no value-free view
of disease, rather, scientists give biological processes different forms in different people,
thereby creating disorders and disabilities as social products. Technology used by
biomedicine reinforces and reflects social norms and standards that exist within power
relationships in our society. Just as disease cannot be value-free, neither can technology.
As a development in a world stratified by hierarchies of gender, class, and race, prenatal
screening cannot escape being used in a stratified way, and therefore reinforcing unequal
distribution of health. Prenatal screening takes place in a particular historical and cultural
context where risk dominates pregnancy. Lippman notes that when pregnant, women are
immediately labeled high-risk or low-risk, but never no-risk (Lippman, 1992). The risk
identified by authorities is never external, never the effect that a woman’s occupational or
social environment might have on the baby. Risk is always internal, and sets up the
pregnant woman as the party worthy of blame regarding behavior she may have engaged
in during pregnancy, food or vitamins she may not have ingested, and substances she may
have smoked, eaten, or drunk. After attaching a risk label, medicine reconstructs a normal
experience – one that requires their supervision. Lippman (1991, 1992) predicts that
eventually the “high-risk” age category of 35 years and older will be removed, thereby
making all pregnancies high risk and encouraging physician surveillance and control over
all pregnant women.
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Lippman (1991,1992, 1995) asks what choice really means when the pregnant woman is
forced to choose from options constructed by others. The discourse of reassurance that
surrounds prenatal screening hides the fact that reassurance could be offered in other
ways. Many more babies have health problems after being born premature or
underweight than with a genetic anomaly. Would it not be more reassuring to provide
women who live below the poverty line with adequate nutrition? Why is genetic testing
more reassuring than allocating funds for home care, respite care, and domestic
alterations that would let women manage their special needs if their child is born or later
develops a health problem? Is bearing a child with Down Syndrome really a choice when
society does not truly accept children with disabilities or provide assistance for their
care?

2.7.2 Barbara Katz Rothman (USA, Sociology).
Any discussion of prenatal screening would be remiss not to include Barbara Katz
Rothman’s groundbreaking work The Tentative Pregnancy: Prenatal Diagnosis and the
Future of Motherhood (1989). Katz-Rothman interviewed 120 women, men, physicians,
and genetic counselors in the early and mid eighties, when the prevalence of
amniocentesis and genetic abortion was growing and the issues with which this literature
review is concerned were first being articulated. Reading this work more than two
decades later, I am struck by the prescience of many of the questions and issues that
Rothman raised. When she completed her book in 1989, chorionic villus sampling was
just starting to be used in mainstream clinics, and it was expected to solve many of the
difficult “late abortion” issues of amniocentesis. Serum screening was not available in the
form that we know it today, but the potential of an early blood test for abnormalities was
seen as a magic cure for many problems of existing technology. Rothman raises potential
issues about both CVS and serum screening that are relevant today- does the possibility
of an early (and less traumatic) abortion mean that the tests might be used with less
gravitas? Could they become a vehicle for sex selection?
While our technological capabilities have increased greatly since 1989, the questions
Rothman raised at that time are still relevant today. For instance, Rothman describes the
decline in Tay Sachs research with increased use of amniocentesis. Before amniocentesis,
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there was a lively research community dedicated to finding treatments and cures for this
disease. Rothman describes the great public pressure to find therapies and cures for this
disease. After the gene for Tay Sachs was isolated and it became possible to screen for
the disease and selectively abort affected fetuses, this research stopped and the focus
shifted to screening and prevention programs. Rothman discusses how technology and
change comes from social pressure and asks “where is the social pressure when a room of
fifty Tay Sachs babies is replaced by fifty individually grieving women” (Rothman, 1989,
p. 231)? In 2012, we take a “screening and prevention” approach to many more
conditions, many of which are significantly less severe than Tay Sachs. Rothman makes
reference to a cure for the painful condition of Tay-Sachs, but we could consider this
warning also applicable to other types of support for people with disabilities. From where
will the social pressure for increased support and acceptance for people with disabilities
arise when these people are less visible in society?

2.7.3 Rayna Rapp (USA, Anthropology).
Rayna Rapp undertook a nine year ethnography of genetic counseling in New York City
which resulted in her 1999 book Testing Women, Testing the Fetus. One of the most
important ideas she discusses concerns the effect of a patient’s race, language, age,
socioeconomic status, and religion on the prenatal counseling session. Rapp found that
counselors consciously or unconsciously alter their discourse, explanations, and
information to match their perception of the patient in front of them. Counselors are
forced to make quick judgments about the scientific literacy and education level of a
patient that sometimes result in explanations that are too simple or complex for the
patient to understand. Rapp also discusses the use of metaphor as an important tool for
tailoring scientific explanations to a particular patient. She found that genetic counselors
used several stock metaphors to describe things such as genes, DNA, and testing. The
metaphor they used for each individual patient appeared to depend on the initial judgment
made about the patient’s education and scientific literacy level. Patients were never asked
explicitly about their level of education which at times resulted in misjudgments and substandard patient care. Rapp notes that metaphors don’t always translate through language
and culture and that when genetic counselors used metaphor they sometimes gave false
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ideas to patients. For instance, she found that a disproportionate number of Spanish
speaking women understood amniocentesis as a needle through a woman’s belly button
into the baby’s umbilical cord (Rapp, 1999, p.83). She explained this misunderstanding
as a result of an inappropriate metaphor for Spanish speakers and a cultural disconnect. It
is interesting to note that most other research about genetic counseling and the
presentation of prenatal screening from this time period do not mention cultural or
socioeconomic variables relevant to the experience, This thread has been picked up in
later work: (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010; Browner et al., 2003; Hunt & deVoogd, 2003;
Hunt & de Voogd, 2005; Hunt, de Voogd, & Castañeda, 2005; Teman, Ivry, &
Bernhardt, 2011).

2.7.4 Carole Browner and Nancy Press (USA, Anthropology).
Carole Browner and Nancy Press have produced a wide range of work about prenatal
screening together and separately (Browner et al., 2003; Browner et al., 2003; Browner &
Press, 1996; Browner et al., 1996; Browner et al., 1996; Markens, Browner, & Press,
1999; Markens et al., 2010; Markens et al., 2010; Press et al., 1998; Press & Browner,
1995; Press & Browner, 1997; Root & Browner, 2001). Much of this work focuses on
the experience of Latinas in the southwestern United States, although a few of their
articles concern American women generally. In their 1997 article about the acceptance of
prenatal screening, Press and Browner (1997) found that the attitude of the health care
practitioner was of great importance when predicting whether or not women would
accept prenatal screening. In clinics that had great support and pressure towards patient
acceptance of prenatal screening, acceptance rates were double the national average.
Genetic counselors, nurses, and doctors were observed as tending to downplay the risk of
prenatal screening and concentrate on the physical test rather than the emotional and
ethical implications. They directed patient attention to the fact that the Maternal Serum
Alpha Fetoprotein (MSAFP) test was a blood test and often grouped this screening test
with other routine prenatal blood tests for anemia or diabetes. In many cases, pregnant
women did not understand what they were being tested for, much less ideas of risk status
and the consequences of receiving a high risk result. Browner and Press (1995) suggest
that there is pressure on health care professionals to ensure a high uptake of prenatal
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screening tests among their patients, due to a climate of medical malpractice suits.
Physicians may wish to protect themselves from “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life”
suits (Cowan, 1993) by providing all the information possible, even if it is not wanted. In
another study, Browner and Press found that women’s stated opinions about disabled
people were often in direct opposition to their decisions about whether or not to abort a
fetus with a genetic condition that would cause disability (Press et al, 1998). In their
study of serum screening in California, Browner and Press found that HMO-employed
health professionals went out of their way to secure “compliance” with the test, often
assuming consent unless a patient indicated explicitly that she did not wish to have the
test done (Press & Browner, 1994). These health care providers used language that was
very persuasive as well as conversational tactics to direct patient attention to the logistics
of the test rather than other issues. Women were informed that MSAFP screened for
vague conditions such as “birth defects in the baby” or that prenatal screening “shows us
how your baby is developing” without information about specific conditions or the
physical or emotional implications of raising a child with those conditions (Press &
Browner, 1991). Press and Browner are very critical of this stance and have written a
number of articles in opposition to the techniques used by the counselors they studied
(Press & Browner 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, Browner & Press 1995).

2.7.5 Theresa Marteau (United Kingdom, Health Psychology).
Theresa Marteau is a health psychologist who has conducted a prolific amount of
quantitative and qualitative research on prenatal screening, focusing on the topic of
informed decision-making. Marteau's early work describes a dire state of decisionmaking in the United Kingdom. For instance, Marteau and her colleagues (1992) taped
102 consultations between patients and obstetricians or midwives. They found that most
consultations focused on the procedural information about the test and that little specific
information was given about the conditions the test screened for, the meaning of negative
and positive results, or the limitations of the test (false positives, false negatives,
conditions not tested for). On only two occasions (of 102 interviews) were women
informed that a negative test result does not mean that the fetus would be unaffected. In
over half of the consultations, women were not asked to make a decision to choose the
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test, but were told it was a routine test. Marteau attributes the hospital’s 90% uptake rate
to the fact that women were provided with incorrect and misleading information, or that
important information was often omitted. This uptake rate is astounding, considering
Rapp (1999) found hospitals with an uptake rate as low as 30%. Another Marteau
publication (Smith, Slack, Shaw & Marteau, 1994) suggested that incorrect and
misleading information provided to women may be a result of a lack of knowledge about
prenatal screening and testing by the health professionals counseling about these tests.
Inadequate knowledge to counsel about prenatal screening and testing has also been
found amongst British and Australian physicians. (Sadler, 1997;Tyzack & Wallace,
2003).
Smith, Shaw and Marteau (1994) found that counseling usually focuses on the procedural
nature of the test and neglects counseling components. They attribute the high uptake of
screening tests to the inadequate provision of information. In their study of 353 pregnant
women offered serum screening for Down Syndrome, it was found that after counseling,
most women did not understand that: most positive test results are false and women will
often have unaffected babies, negative test results do not guarantee a unaffected baby,
about 5% of women are recalled for further, more invasive testing. Only 38% of women
understood that the test being offered was for Down syndrome (Smith et al, 1994).
Supported by both her own empirical research and a review of existing literature,
Marteau (1995) found that prenatal screening/testing programs are rife with issues of
poor understanding, anxiety, and with false reassurance. Marteau's career has focused on
improving the state of informed decision-making in prenatal screening and testing
(Marteau & Dormandy, 2011). To this end, Marteau has examined ways of promoting
and measuring informed decisions.
Marteau has examined the efficacy of different ways of presenting information (Loeben,
Marteau & Wilfond, 1998; Marteau et al, 2000; Michie, Lester, Pinto & Marteau, 2005)
including an empirical study of non-directiveness. She found that directive statements
were prevalent in the genetic counseling visits observed, particularly when counselees
were of lower socioeconomic status or judged by counselors to be highly concerned.
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Neither counselors, counselees nor the standardized rating scale concluded that these
sessions were conducted in a non-directive way (Michie et al, 2005).
Marteau, with colleagues Susan Michie and Elizabeth Dormandy, have offered an
influential definition of informed choice as one which is "based on relevant knowledge,
consistent with the decision-maker's values and behaviourally implemented" (Marteau,
Dormandy & Michie, 2001 p.99). They developed a multi-dimensional validated measure
to determine how often decisions about prenatal screening can be characterized as
informed (Michie, Dormandy & Marteau, 2003; Marteau & Dormandy, 2001; Marteau,
Dormandy & Michie 2001). This measure has been cited over 200 times, and used in
screening contexts such as breast cancer (Sepucha, Ozanne, Silvia, Partridge, & Mulley,
2007), colorectal cancer (McCaffery, Wardle, & Waller, 2003), cardiovascular risk
(Marteau & Kinmonth, 2002). Marteau is still actively publishing in this area; her recent
work has examined the role of ambivalence to making a decision about prenatal
screening (Dormandy et al., 2006; Sapp et al., 2010).

2.7.6 Recent contributions to the literature.
The scholarly legacy left by Lippman, Browner & Press, Rapp, Rothman and Marteau
continues to inform current work about prenatal screening. This literature is reviewed in
each of the four manuscripts (Chapter 5-8), so in the interests of avoiding repetition, an
additional review is not included here. Prevailing themes in this literature include an
emphasis on promoting autonomous choice (Seavilleklein, 2009; Williams et al., 2002b;
Williams, 2006) by examining the ways information is provided by clinicians (Bhogal &
Brunger, 2010; McKenzie, 2004; Pilnick et al., 2004; Pilnick, 2008); patient education
materials (Dahl et al., 2006; Fox, 2006; Sanderson, Wardle, & Michie, 2005; Stapleton,
Kirkham, & Thomas, 2002); decision-making processes (Dahl et al., 2011; Gagnon et al.,
2010; Legare et al., 2011; Schwennesen et al., 2010; St-Jacques et al., 2008); and the
experiences of women deciding about prenatal screening in particular social contexts
(Cavanagh, Mathews, & Crane, 2007; Ekelund et al., 2008; Gottfreðsdóttir & Árnason,
2011; Gourounti & Sandall, 2008; Hodgson et al., 2010; Hunt & deVoogd, 2003; Park &
Mathews, 2009a; Park & Mathews, 2009b; Teman et al., 2011; van Berkel & van der
Weele, 1999).
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2.8 Conclusion
The context of prenatal screening in Canada has changed significantly since 2007 with
the introduction of the SOGC guidelines (Summers, 2007), with prenatal screening now
being offered to all pregnant women, rather than just those over the age of 35. This
guideline assured consistency across Canada. The literature indicates there are some
significant problems with the values that predicate prenatal screening, the process in
which it is introduced, and the choices that are offered. There are significant implications
to the lives of women, children, and people with disabilities. By investigating the way in
which prenatal screening is currently taking place, the aim of this research is to gain
insight into current practices, and to explore avenues for improving women’s experience,
as well as the education and future practices of health care practitioners in this important
area.
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3

Epistemological and Theoretical Perspectives

3.1 Introduction
Continuing with the metaphor of the bricoleur (Levi-Strauss, 1962) introduced in Chapter
1, in this chapter I set the stage for my bricolage, describing the foundational knowledge
that informs my approach and my choice of tools for this project. In this research, I have
engaged with two epistemological perspectives, constructionism and critical social
theory, and the theoretical lens of feminist bioethics. I begin by describing the way I
understand constructionism, the critical social theories I engage with, and the points of
congruency between the two. I then outline the work of several scholars who have
influenced my approach to feminist bioethics, and contributed to the way I think about
prenatal screening.
Switching metaphors, I conceptualize my epistemological and theoretical approach as
combining different lenses to see something unique, something which was perhaps
visible, but out of focus in each individual lens. Bateson (1979) describes binocular
vision as the confluence of two different but compatible perspectives which, when used
together, have the ability to create new understandings. To expand upon the metaphor,
each lens of a pair of binoculars has a particular scope, or field of focus, which shows the
object of the looker’s gaze in a particular way. An individual lens may bring particular
objects into focus while obscuring others. When both lenses are combined, a different
scene comes into view, a scene which is more than the sum of what was seen through
each individual lens. I use the metaphor of “lens” here to describe the influence that a
collection of theoretical perspectives has on the way I see the world.

3.2 Epistemological Underpinnings: Constructionist and
Critical Perspectives
3.2.1 Constructionist.
There is significant confusion and conflation surrounding constructivist and
constructionist perspectives. Within both the ivist and the ionist categories there are many
different iterations. Briefly, the distinction between ivist and ionist theories can be
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summarized as follows: constructivism most accurately describes "epistemological
considerations focusing exclusively on the ‘meaning-making activity of the individual
mind’"; constructionism "is used when the focus includes ‘the collective generation [and
transmission] of meaning’” (Crotty, 1998, p.58). These perspectives do not exist in
isolation, but can be conceptualized as existing upon a continuum, with those focused on
subject-centered meaning making (meaning making activity of the individual mind) at
one end, and socially centered meaning making (social generation of meaning) at the
other (Crotty, 1998).
Constructionism is not defined by clear cut boundaries, especially since it has been
adopted by several different disciplines and has evolved in several directions at once
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2008). Weinberg (2008) defines social constructionism as an
attempt to demonstrate “how certain states of affairs that others have taken to be eternal
and/or beyond the reach of social influence are actually products of specific
sociohistorical and/or social interactional processes” (pg. 14). The way that these 'states
of affairs' are produced by sociohistorical and social interactional processes, to a large
extent in the absence of the intent or consciousness of the individual, is the one of the
main epistemological claims of social constructionism. Constructionism focuses on
discourse and interaction as some of the methods through which meaning is produced in
society. Discourse is a key term in constructionist theory and one which has many
meanings; I understand discourse in the Foucauldian sense. Mills (2003) emphasizes the
multiple and sometimes contradictory ways that Foucault uses the word “discourse”. One
of the most widely cited definitions is found in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault,
1972), and that is the definition I choose to work with. Foucault (1972) defines discourse
as a group of institutionalized statements (including any type of utterance) about a
particular topic (or object) that function socially by forming that topic. A discourse is a
regulated group of statements that can combine with other discourses in predictable ways.
There are
rules which lead to the distribution and circulation of certain utterances and
statements … but rather than seeing discourse as simply a set of statements which
have some coherence, we should think of a discourse as existing because of a
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complex set of practices which try to keep them in circulation and other practices
which try to keep other statements out of circulation. (Mills 2003, pg. 54)
According to Blood (2005), discourse, or group of statements is the manifestation of
thought into language and can both transmit and produce power, defining the ways we
can talk or think about a topic (or object), and therefore defining the truth of that topic (or
object). Discourse shapes and constrains our ways of understanding the world, by acting
as a system that structures our perceptions of reality. By understanding Foucault’s
conception of the way that discourse operates, we can see that social construction (as it
uses the methods of discourse and interaction- or the social process of discourse) can be
used as a way to effect social change, especially by challenging authoritative accounts of
the way the world is in order to foster participation in effecting change (Gergen, 1999).
One of the seminal texts on social construction, The Social Construction of Reality, by
Berger and Luckmann (1966), declares that “language used in everyday life continuously
provides me with the necessary objectifications and posits the order within which these
make sense and within which everyday life has meaning for me” (pg. 22). Social
construction also holds that discourse affects and is affected by social relationships,
structures, and organization (Gergen, 1999). Through this statement, Gergen emphasizes
the collective nature of meaning generation, through language and other social processes.
The emphasis on the importance of discourse is particularly strong in psychological
accounts of constructionism (Gergen, 1999; Hibberd, 2005), and postmodern (Saussure,
1983), and poststructuralist (Foucault, 1977) uses of constructionism. Sociological
accounts of constructionism focus more on social interactions and processes (Gubrium &
Holstein, 2008).
“Social processes” can be a vague and confusing term, perhaps best explained by Fish
(1990). Crotty (1998) quotes Fish (1990) declaring that all objects are made through
society and convention, rather than simply found. There are social institutions and
conventions in which we are already embedded and through which we make meaning
(constructivist) and meaning is made through us (constructionist): “these institutions are
the source of the interpretive strategies whereby we construct meaning” (Crotty 1998, pg.
53).
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From a social constructionist perspective, humans are understood to use meaning made
by the social world and to interact with the world as it makes meaning through them,
therefore the historical and social context of the world is revealed as important in this
meaning-making activity (Crotty, 1998). From a social constructionist perspective,
people do not make meaning by interacting with each and every phenomenon, they are
born into a world full of cultural meaning and people come to make their own meaning
through meanings and discourses that already exist (Crotty, 1998). Crotty (1998) offers a
summary of this perspective:
We enter a social milieu in which a ‘system of intelligibility’ prevails. We inherit
a ‘system of significant symbols’. For each of us, when we first see the world in
meaningful fashion, we are inevitably viewing it through lenses bestowed upon us
by our culture. Our culture brings things into view for us and endows them with
meaning and, by the same token, leads us to ignore other things. (p.54)
Crotty warns against the misconception that the social in social constructionism refers to
the type of object that has meaning (for example, that a rock cannot be socially
constructed). He clarifies that it refers to the way meaning is made (perhaps the rock
itself was not made through social construction, but the way we understand what that
rock is, what it can do, and how it can be used is socially constructed). For example,
objects in the natural world have meaning that is made socially, and it is the social aspect
which leads us to a particular interpretation of these objects, guiding our interpretation to
emphasize and ignore certain other aspects.

3.2.1.1 Hacking’s (1999) constructionism.
Canadian philosopher Ian Hacking (1999) has written a persuasive text that asks the
following critical questions of constructionist theory: What is socially constructed? How
far does social construction stretch? Are there different types of social construction?
Hacking identifies that most constructionist scholars start with the meaning, or definition,
of social construction but do not ask what the point of social construction is. By
interrogating the purpose of social construction, Hacking has created a version of social
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constructionism that is readily applicable to critical research. Hacking states that most
social constructionist statements are based on local claims. A local claim is a claim about
the constructed nature of a specific thing (X). Local claims may be influenced by
overarching claims, but their point is to raise consciousness about something specific (X).
They are (in principle) independent of each other. For instance, an individual could
support the local claim that workplace gender roles are socially constructed, but refute the
claim that starvation, or the boy scouts, or gravity is socially constructed. Hacking points
out that it is a very different kind of social construction that sees danger as socially
constructed than that which sees reality or women refugees as socially constructed. He
thinks it is possible to see concepts as socially constructed, but objects as not constructed.
That is not to say that the meaning, use, connotation, feeling etc. of the object is not
constructed, just that the object itself is not constructed. Hacking cautions that most
constructionists conflate the object with its meaning.
Hacking makes the astute observation that most people who use social construction want
to show the arbitrary nature of a specific thing (X) as a starting point to criticize, change,
or destroy. They might employ a social constructionist approach to recognize that X is
taken for granted or established by the order of things, and then further use a
constructionist approach to uproot this opinion of X as inevitable, hoping to change the
way that people think about X or the way in which X operates in the world. Within this
observation, Hacking also notices that people seem to have grades of commitment to
social construction, but there is little room in traditional constructionist theory to identify
different levels of commitment. Commitment to social construction may be assessed by
asking “what are we saying when we say X is socially constructed?” Hacking suggests
that depending on our level of commitment to constructionism, we may be stating one or
more of the following: X is taken for granted; X appears inevitable; X is not determined
by the nature of things; X is not inevitable; X is quite bad as it currently is; X would be
better if it was done away with or radically transformed. Hacking then expands this
theory to include several different types of social construction.
Hacking's vision of social construction describes a perspective filled with infinite small
differences, with the universalist notion of social construction on one end of the
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continuum and what I will term “partial construction” on the other. Within this
continuum he identifies 6 stances: Historical, Ironic, Unmasking, Reformist, Rebellious,
and Revolutionary (Hacking, 1999, p. 19).

3.2.1.2 How I understand constructionist theory.
Within Hacking’s work I am able to find an increasingly sure foothold for my own
constructionist stance. I identify with the “Unmasking” type of social constructionism.
Within this type of constructionism, I do not seek to refute ideas (necessarily) but to
unmask them by exposing the function they serve, to strip them of their false appeal or
false authority. Hacking identifies that some “Unmasking” constructionists may also
(although not necessarily) be “Reformist” constructionists. Reformist constructionism
believes that X is quite bad. They have no idea how to live without X but by
understanding that X is not inevitable, they can modify some aspects of it to make it less
objectionable. While I identify mainly with the Unmasking stance, I also appreciate
aspects of Reformist stance, particularly the hope to modify aspects of X.
I situate myself in a constructionism that recognizes the power of discourse and social
institutions to shape the meanings that people live within. In order to recognize that
discourse and institutions can have a real effect, one must embrace a certain amount of
what I have termed “partial world construction” after the writings of Hacking (1999) and
Harris (2008). From Harris' (2008) objective sociological constructionism (OSC), I take
the aspect which emphasizes that an individual’s understanding of her life, her self, and
her world is influenced by the power exercised through social institutions, formal or
informal. I draw from social constructionism an emphasis on the importance of discourse
as the vehicle through which one articulates the parameters of her world and herself. I
believe, like OSC thinkers, that these constructions have the power to effect real change;
that family relationships are real, not just the “putative interpretations of relationships”
and that many people experience the forces of racism, classism, ageism, and sexism as
changing their realities, and not just their perception or interpretation of what is real.
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3.3 Critical Social Theoretical Perspective
My critical social theory perspective is at the nexus of several inter-related topics: the
ways in which medicalization, normalization and risk function as forms of social control
which are intrinsically related to Foucault’s ideas of power/knowledge and
governmentality. It is important to note that Foucault’s conceptual ideas overlapped
considerably with one another, and continued to evolve throughout his life, as did the
interpretations and applications of his work. Most of the writers I draw upon to
understand the topics of medicalization and risk are indebted to Foucault. I begin by
introducing the topic of medicalization before providing an outline of the main
Foucauldian concepts that inform this work. This ordering was chosen to provide context
for my explanation and interpretations of Foucault. I will then move on to discuss various
ideas of risk. Throughout this section I provide explicit links between prenatal screening
and the ideas I am engaging with. While headings have been added throughout as an aid
to the reader, it should be noted that the ideas are inter-linked and the divisions made by
the headings are somewhat artificial.

3.3.1 Medicalization.
Following a review of the literature, Morgan’s (1998) definition of medicalization
remains my favourite, for its simplicity and impact. Morgan starts with a standard
definition by one of the seminal thinkers on the topic, Peter Conrad. Conrad and
Schneider (1980) see medicalization as the unintentional or intentional expansion of the
domain of medical jurisdiction. Morgan politicizes the term, declaring that successful
medicalization involves a culture that supports “the legitimacy of using medical concepts,
theories, and discourses to describe medicalized life phenomena and the acceptance of
the use of medical interventions to 'treat' them" (pg. 85). This may not seem overtly
political, however the ensuing explanation of the dialectic nature of the process of
medicalization completes this definition. Morgan sees medicalization as necessitating a
dialectical relationship between micro-institutionalizations (through self management and
doctor-patient relations), macro-institutionalizations, and societal conceptualizations. In
short, medicalization is not something that is simply imposed on people by the institution
of medicine. Medicine does not expand its jurisdiction through a creeping invasion of
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territory as conceptualized by Zola (1972). Morgan makes the point that people must
accept or acquiesce to the new jurisdiction that medicine proposes for itself, thereby
becoming implicit in the process of medicalization. As an example of this implicitness,
sometimes people request increased medical surveillance, or medical definitions of
formerly non-medical problems. Conrad and Schneider (1980) discuss several examples
of this, such as the lobby for alcoholism to be classified as a disease. I view Morgan’s
definition as political because I read Foucault’s conception of bio-power,
governmentality, and normalization into the idea that people must accept, acquiesce, and
even request participation in this new jurisdiction of medicine. I see her definition as
related to social construction because of her emphasis on the dialectical nature of the
relationship between the individual and the institutions, and between institutions.
Morgan’s definition of medicalization also emphasizes the way that social forces can
create new needs, opinions, and discourses at the level of the individual. Morgan also
recognizes that not all people, indeed, not all women, are medicalized to the same extentother social forces shape the relationship between an individual and the institutions of
medicalization.
Morgan posits that there are three contextual conditions that successful medicalization
requires: First, the domain (e.g. sexual satisfaction) /process (e.g. menopause) /topic (e.g.
alcoholism) currently becoming a medicalized problem must be defined in medical terms
through assimilation into medical paradigms or theories. This problem must be
describable through medical discourse. Second, medical authorities must be seen as the
only legitimate authorities in terms of having knowledge and control over the problem.
They must have the means to apply this knowledge to the medically defined problem.
Third, there must be widespread acceptance of the dominant medical conceptualization of
this problem. This process of successful medicalization has the effect of transferring “the
locus of pathology from society to the individual” (Figlio, 1983, p. 232 as cited in
Wilkerson, 1998). As medicalization becomes more politicized (by transferring
responsibility from society to the individual), social roots of problems are obscured.
Prenatal screening provides an example of this. As screening technology advances, the
responsibility for the support of individuals with disabilities moves from society (in terms
of supportive housing, health care, recreation) to the individual (responsibility of mother
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to prevent individual with disability from being born). The onus placed on women to
detect and abort fetuses with disabilities may obscure the responsibility of society to help
all people live to their full potential.
By discussing the context, process, and interactions which necessitate successful
medicalization of a domain, process, or topic, Morgan demonstrates the many levels upon
which medicine’s social control may operate. This is in contrast to definitions offered by
Zola (1972), and Conrad and Schneider (1980) who view medicalization as a
contextually opportunistic colonization or Wilkerson (1998) who describes
medicalization as a conscious affront against women in an effort to exert control. More
nuanced discussions of medicalization involve descriptions of why women pursue
medicalization. Again, there are multiple layers to this question. Some theorists describe
the benefits of medicalization- it offers legitimacy to a perceived problem, efforts and
resources to solve the problem, and social acknowledgement of the problem (Conrad &
Schneider 1992). Conrad and Schneider (1992) see medicine’s capacity for social control
as a way to “secure adherence to social norms using medical terms to minimize,
eliminate, or normalize” (p. 242). Others discuss the way social control operates twice:
once to convince a person she has a problem and then again to convince her that medicine
is the answer (Lock, 2001). Kathryn Pauly Morgan conceptualizes an even more
complicated approach. The processes of medicalization do not just operate on people,
but are also put into motion by people. Her idea of how micro (i.e. medicalized
subjectivity, the gaze) and macro (i.e. social, economic, political, symbolic forms)
institutional factors interact with medicine echoes the social constructionist tenet that
society shapes and is shaped by its members (socially constructed knowledges) and the
Foucauldian idea that power is exercised by enabling people to act in order to constrain
them (Foucault, 1978). Morgan (1998) sees the “ordinary life world” (p.87) as shaping
and as shaped by conceptualizations of medicine, macro-institutional effects, microinstitutional effects (through self management and through doctor-patient relations). All
of these institutions shape each-other as well as the “ordinary life world”.
In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault (1973) discusses how social control was at one time
exerted through the church, upon the soul. Foucault suggests that as the social power of
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church began to decline, medicine filled the void of power by exerting control over the
body. Foucault contends that medicine exerts control over the body through disciplinary
tactics: by regulating its forces and operations, as well as the economy and efficiency of
bodily movements. Conrad (2007) describes several contextual forces that promote
medicalization: a decline of religious influence; a rise in scientific authority; a rise in
trends toward individualism, technological solutions, and humanitarian concern. As the
authority of scientific knowledge increased, knowledge was re-defined as that which is
measurable, objective, irrefutable, and neutral. Medical authority increased concurrently
due to claims based on a similar epistemic base. Instrumentation was a large part of the
authority of this knowledge. After all, the scientific paradigm holds that instruments
cannot lie. Instruments also appeal to the desire for observable and measurable
knowledge popularized by science (Wilkerson 1998). Foucault (1973) states that
medicine’s normative moral authority is located in its epistemology, and that knowledge
about the body is both the effect and a condition of the exercise of power (Foucault,
2003).
But what is the relationship between medicalization and prenatal screening? As
medicalization has normalized and promoted prenatal screening, the implications,
purposes, and practices of pregnancy have changed. As prenatal screening becomes more
normalized and therefore more frequent, social support and acceptance for people with
disabilities has become increasingly rare. Taylor (2008) notes that an increasing amount
of money, time, technology, and effort has been spent incorporating technology into
finding (and aborting) fetuses with disabilities. Comparably, very little time, effort, and
money has been spent ameliorating social inequalities that demonstrably produce similar
health problems.
Medicalization has a curious affect on issues such as the ones mentioned above. When
problems become subsumed into the institution of medicine, they are removed from
discussion amongst ordinary citizens in the public realm, and become part of the medical
realm, where only people with medical authority may discuss or critique them (Conrad
& Schneider, 1992). I think this has two potential effects. First, there are few ways for
citizens to express opinions about what they think is acceptable medical practice or
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behaviour. Would citizens choose widespread prenatal screening? We don’t know since
there has never been public debate because the topic is in the realm of medical authority.
Second, are individual women able to choose what they want to do? Some might say yes,
since prenatal screening is an optional procedure that incorporates an informed decisionmaking process.

3.3.2 Normalization.
I appeal to the notion of normalization when considering these questions. Normalization
can be understood here in two ways: normalization of the screening test and
normalization of ways of being. Considering normalization of the screening test, Susan
Sherwin (2001) states that women are well conditioned to comply with medical advice
and direction about their pregnancies. This ideology of compliance is hard to resist
because it is built upon the discourse of protecting the unborn child. Women who may
not wish to have prenatal screening, or other types of medical intervention, may feel
obligated to participate. Sherwin (2001) questions the autonomy2 available to a woman
considering ultrasound. She finds that the normalization of the technology places an
enormous burden of proof on those who do not want to participate. Each use of the
technology consolidates its “necessity” and the power and control of those who provide
it. Seavilleklein (2009) makes a similar point about normalization: “the very offer of
screening, however it is framed, may create a perceived need for testing, especially when
screens have been selected and implemented by the medical system; this decision
establishes screening as a legitimate use of scarce medical resources and thereby
surreptitiously underlines its importance” (p. 75). Sherwin (2001) also argues that the
technology medicine uses to examine the fetus distances the mother from her pregnancy.
The constant testing may create anxiety. This distance and anxiety has the effect of
making the mother more reliant on her physician, increasing the sense of dependence and
minimizing reproductive autonomy.

2

See the literature review for a lengthy discussion of different conceptions of autonomy in prenatal
screening
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Concerning normalization of ways of being, medicine’s inclination to measure and
compare people has created a body of numerical information that defines normal as
average. This allows medicine to compare people based on whether or not their traits fall
in or outside of the norm. If they are outside, they are encouraged (or coerced) to engage
in treatment or practices which bring them closer to the norm (Lupton, 1999a). The
Human Genome Project has intensified this idea of “normal”. By mapping the human
genome, scientists have produced a definition of “genetically normal”. Unfortunately, no
one individual meets that baseline norm- individual genomes show infinite variations. In
other words, we are all deviants (Lock, 2001). If one questions whether any of us are
genetically “normal”, a challenging question is raised: What gives any institution the
authority to declare particular genetic compositions as better or worse than others?
The notion of risk is intrinsically linked to normalization- for example, genetics does not
always explicitly refer to “normality” or “deviation”, but uses the idea of risk to express
this concept (Waldschmidt, 2005). “High-risk” people are those singled out as requiring
expert knowledge and surveillance in order to become normal. Lupton (1999a) sees two
kinds of medical risk: clinical risk (deviation from characteristics observed in case
studies) and epidemiological risk (deviation from observations of patterns identified with
associated risk factors). These two types of observable risk serve to make risk calculable
and governable, therefore making them problems that require action. This is the way that
normality as risk is seen to govern women- by inciting them to take action to prevent risk.
Any deviation from the statistical norm means that woman is high-risk, abnormal, and in
need of medical surveillance. In prenatal screening, risk distribution is continuous, with
no sharp definition of what is normal and what is high-risk (Waldschmidt, 2005).
Notably, in pregnancy there is no “no-risk” category - all pregnant women are seen as at
some level of risk and in need of expert surveillance. The more prenatal screening tests
are introduced, the more intensified discourses of risk become and the more choices a
woman must make (Lupton, 1999a). These new tests exert a subtle (and sometimes, notso-subtle) pressure on women to conform by participating in the tests.
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3.3.3 Foucault's governmentality & bio-power.
It is impossible to discuss medicalization, normalization, and risk without talking about
the ideas of Michel Foucault. I will introduce Foucault by talking about his idea of risk as
a component of governmentality and then move on to provide a brief synopsis of how
Foucault’s idea of governmentality informs his notions of risk, normalization and biopower. Finally, I discuss the ways in which these concepts are related to prenatal
screening.
Governmentality is a concept developed most fully during Foucault’s lectures at the
College de France (Burchell et al, 1991). Governmentality is the basis of the technologies
through which we become subjects, through which we police others and are policed
ourselves. In this way, governmentality is an attitude associated with governance of self
in order to allow the governance of others- it creates subjects in order to control them.
The word “police” is very important- Foucault gave this word more meanings than we
typically associate it with in English, and defines it relative to the sublimation of the
individual into the social entity (see Barker, 1998 for a full explanation).
Foucault’s construction of risk as a method of governmentality, as discussed in his 197879 lectures at the College de France, is particularly relevant to risk in prenatal screening
(Foucault, 2008). He contends that risk is formed by expert knowledges that provide
guidelines and advice by which populations are governed. They do this by comparing
things against norms and training people to conform with these norms (and thus be
rendered productive). Central to this theory is the idea of normalization (Foucault, 1978).
Foucault’s normalization is a form of social control whereby norms are constructed and
those who adhere to those norms are rewarded while those who deviate are punished.
Normalization and governmentality are enacted by technologies of mass surveillance,
monitoring, observation, and measurement. They help maintain disciplinary power, by
ensuring that people discipline themselves and each other, creating productive and docile
bodies (Foucault, 1977). Normalization and governmentality are also seen to construct
understandings of bodies in space and time and use these understandings as a disciplinary
tool. From this Foucauldian perspective, risk is understood as a disciplinary strategy of
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regulatory power by which populations and individuals are monitored and managed
(Lupton, 1999b).
Foucault’s concept of normalization can be used to understand the appeal of prenatal
screening. Foucault sees two possible ways for power to act: negatively (juridicodiscursive) through repression or positively (bio-power), through enablement and selfsurveillance. Foucault has used the term “juridical” to describe negative power in a way
that draws attention to its relation with the law and law enforcement. This type of power
forbids, prevents, and restrains. It “is poor in its resources, sparing of its methods and
monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed
always to repeat itself … the power to say no” (Foucault, 1978, p.85). Foucault sees the
second type of power (bio-power) as more interesting and more effective because it can
overcome the paradox that paralyzes juridical power. Juridical power is paralyzed
because of a paradox in its function: it is incapable of doing anything except rendering its
target also incapable of doing anything. Bio- power is an agent of transformation in
human life, bringing life and bodily mechanisms into the realm of knowable, calculable
things (Foucault 1978). This causes life, the body, and bodily mechanisms to be subject
to power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). The knowledge and measurability of life is central
to the idea of normalization through medicalization. As human science developed, bodily
mechanisms began to come under the control of the institution of medicine. Medicine
measured, counted, calculated, and then formed ideas of “normal” which allowed it to
appraise, hierarchize, judge, and draw a line between acceptable and unacceptable ways
of being, beginning the process of normalization. Foucault saw normalization as the
“outcome of a technology of power centered on life” (Foucault, 1978, p. 144). According
to Foucault (2003), normalization can only function through knowledge; knowledge is
both an effect and a condition of the exercise of normalizing power. In a series of
lectures given a year after the publication of The History of Sexuality (Vol 1), Foucault
expanded on his ideas of normalization as an exercise of power that is linked to
intervention and transformation (Foucault, 2003). He makes clear that, in his view, what
is normal is not linked to any kind of natural law or principle of intelligibility, but is
entirely socially constructed. Normalization does not make a clear distinction between
those who are normal or abnormal, instead it works by making a series of fine and
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constantly observed differences between individuals who are normal and those who are
not.
Foucault (1978) stated that the success of power “is proportional to its ability to hide its
own mechanisms” (p. 86) and by this measure, bio-power succeeds admirably. By
engaging with the process of normalization, bio-power works through enablement and
coercion and through self-surveillance. Bio-power enables citizens to act in order to
constrain them (Tremain, 2005). In contrast to the operation of negative juridical power
(excluding, banishing, marginalizing, repressing), normalization fashions, observes,
knows, includes, forms knowledge, functions through production, distributes according to
individual capacities and is linked to a series of mechanisms that secure formation,
investment, accumulation and growth of knowledge (Foucault, 2003). Normalization
does repress, but only as a secondary effect (Foucault, 2003).
Governance through normalization (bio-power) is an important idea to feminists.
Although Foucault is widely criticized by the feminist community for failing to
differentiate between the way that bio-power and normalization have operated differently
on male and female bodies, his ideas have been taken up and furthered by feminist
scholars. In many cases, ideas which are credited to Foucault were published in different
forms in feminist literature prior to his work (Bordo, 1994). Bordo (1994) believes that
the reason why bio-power produces and normalizes bodies is to serve prevailing relations
of dominance and subordination. While Foucault (1977) denies the centralization of a
power that is used to subordinate certain subjects more than others, stating that power is
not held by any one group or person, but acts on and through all people - it is not
authoritarian, conspiratorial, or orchestrated, Bordo emphasizes the idea that people and
groups are positioned differently within fields of power, stating that “no one may control
the rules of the game, but not all players on the field are equal” (Bordo, 1994, p. 232).
Tremain (2005) sees practices of bio-power as central to the emergence of the disabled
subject. Normalization and medicalization of human life have “created, classified, coded,
and controlled social anomalies by which some people are divided from others and
objectivized” (Tremain, 2005, p. 6). As measurement of human function gave way to
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statistics, people became individualized through practices of division, classification, and
ordering around a norm. Individuals came to identify themselves in relation to this norm,
thereby making themselves subjects to this bio-political form of government.
Following this idea, prenatal screening might be conceptualized by some as a method of
governmentality that may encourage subjects to normalize themselves (and their unborn
children). Prenatal screening may create resistance to difference and encourages subjects
to do what is necessary to engage in societal normalization. The practice of prenatal
screening may be cloaked in the rhetoric of “choice”, autonomy, and reassurance
(Lippman, 1991; Seavilleklein, 2009). Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) point out that belief
that one is resisting repression (by acting autonomously and making choices) actually
supports domination and normalization by hiding the real workings of power. This
rhetoric of choice is a strong example of the way that citizens may be governed through
enabling action in order to constrain (Tremain, 2005). In this way, the “choice” presented
by prenatal screening may also be seen as a risk to the health of women, children, and
people with disabilities (Lippman, 1991). Prenatal screening may also be viewed as
related to Foucault’s idea that statistical normality is a form of government. The whole
idea of risk status is based on statistical normality, stratified by age. Value judgments of
standard deviation and definitions of the mean (Waldschmidt, 2005) have become the
basis for decisions of risk, further diagnostic testing, and pregnancy termination.

3.3.4 Risk.
Lupton (1999a) sees pregnant women as surrounded by a “complex network of
discourses and practices directed at the surveillance and regulation of the body” (p. 59)
that intensify as they become more noticeably pregnant. Lupton links this risk discourse
to Foucault’s (1978, 1991) conceptions of apparatuses of bio-politics in neo-liberal
societies and efforts on the part of the state and other agencies to discipline and normalize
citizens, to render them docile and productive bodies. Lupton (1999b) develops this
argument further, to compare realist, weak, and strong constructionist conceptions of risk.
Neo-liberalism is a modern political philosophy which aims to transfer control from the
state to the private sector, ostensibly for an improved (free market) economy.
Concerning health policy, neo-liberalism proposes a sort of constructivist governance-
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proposing to make health directly accessible, through strategic (as opposed to
naturalistic) policies and defining “health” not as an absolute concept but a series of
measurable targets (Osborne, 1997).
Strong constructionist conceptions of risk stem from Foucault. This viewpoint sees risk
as socially and culturally created. Nothing in itself is a risk, but according to risk
discourse, everything has the possibility to be risky. Risk is not embedded in an
individual; it is a combination of a number of factors that produce the likelihood of an
action being deemed unacceptable by social norms. Risk does not exist in reality, only in
the culture that created it. Risk discourse is a central component to ensure social order.
Lupton discusses the way in which pregnant women are positioned in a network of
surveillance, monitoring, measurement, and expert advice. This surveillance is enacted by
authorities, members of the public, and women themselves as they self-monitor and selfregulate in order to achieve norms created by knowledges of risk. The web of
surveillance becomes clear when the regulation of pregnant behaviours is considered in
terms of rules about diet, smoking, alcohol consumption and exercise. Lupton sees
pregnant women as vulnerable to these governing surveillance strategies because to resist
is to declare that one does not care about her own health and welfare or that of her fetus.
In fact, many women demand more access to medical surveillance, including an
increased number of ultrasounds to “alleviate anxieties and fears that the fetus is healthy”
(Lupton,1999b, p. 90). This is an illustration of how medicalization requires the
participation of its subjects. To refine Conrad and Schneider's (1980) colonization
metaphor, medicalization does not conquer new territory with weapons, or when the
native inhabitants are sick or sleeping, but rather tempts the inhabitants with new ideas
and technologies, encouraging them to invite these items into their homes, extol their
virtues to their friends and families, and thereby create a niche and re-shape the daily
lives of the inhabitants to the point that they no longer recognize the ideas and
technologies as new or foreign.
Lupton’s ideas of risk contribute to an understanding of why women engage in prenatal
screening, why society supports prenatal screening without question, and the difficulty
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women may have resisting societal norms by questioning medical methods of
surveillance, monitoring and measurement.
O’Byrne and Holmes (2007) take Lupton’s idea of risk even further by examining the
way that risk operates in Plato’s The Good Citizen. O’Byrne and Holmes understand risk
to be constructed through, among other ways, discourses, with definitions continually in
flux to allow mechanisms of control to be synchronized with activities that are ‘risky’ to
the society. This is applicable to prenatal screening, where words such as “birth defect”
create a discourse of what types of children are acceptable to society and what types are
unacceptable and ‘risky’.
One major criticism that feminist scholars raise with respect to Foucault is that by
treating male and female bodies as the same, he does not problematize the gendered
nature of power and does not recognize that they have different relationships to
institutions. Although Conrad (2007) sees medicalization as only marginally more active
on female bodies, most authors in this area view medicalization as much more controlling
to female bodies (ex. Bordo, 1994). Bartzky (1998) states that each woman lives her body
as seen by another, an anonymous patriarchal other (p. 34) and that medicalization has
more impact on women’s bodies as a result of this. Foucault is also criticized for the lack
of agency he attributes to individuals. Many medicalization scholars see individuals as
operating with the institution rather than being operated on, congruent with Foucault’s
bio-power, but as in the discussion at the beginning of this section, it is often unclear if
“operating with” is through acquiescence or agency (ex. Conrad & Schneider, 1992;
Morgan, 1998; Reissman, 1998). Regardless of these criticisms, Foucault is a main
contributor to theories of how medicalization acts as social control.

3.3.5 Congruencies between critical and constructionist
perspectives.
If we accept the constructionist assumption that what we understand about our world is
not arbitrary and that we can fashion our own future by the ways we describe, explain,
and represent the world (Gergen, 1999), we can see that constructionism invites us to rethink our reality, to question the current traditions, practices, and “ways of doing”.
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Critical constructionism asks us to pay special attention to the claims of those who
purport to be objective and neutral. Gergen invites us to ask ourselves the following
questions: What are the repercussions of these ways of talking? Who gains? Who is hurt?
Who is silenced? What traditions are sustained? Which are undermined? How do I judge
the future we are creating? (Gergen, 1999, p. 62). These questions have informed my
standpoint and my thinking on prenatal screening and the ways in which prenatal
screening is discussed in various venues.
Hosking (2008) sees critical questioning and constructionism to be congruent, reasoning
that they can work together because constructionist theories “implicitly embrace
metatheoretical assumptions that center a singular real-world reality (the assumption of
ontology) and sharply distinguish this real-world reality from knowledge about it (the
assumption of epistemology)” (p. 671). This may be part of the confusion Hacking
(1999) identifies in constructionist authors. What is the ontological belief and what is the
epistemological belief? I believe the existence of an empirical, real-world ontology and a
constructionist epistemology is possible and that this combination can produce the
possibility of critical constructionist questioning. When I use my binocular criticalconstructionist lens, I must recognize the way that I am constructing what I see and
acknowledge that the process of research is intrinsically linked with the product- there is
no separation between the two.

3.4 Theoretical Lens
3.4.1 Feminist bioethics.
It is well understood that feminism is not a singular or unitary theory, but rather a large
and amorphous collection of ideas. The feminist work that I engage with to inform my
theoretical lens is that of Abby Lippman, Susan Sherwin and Dorothy Smith. The work of
these women is not necessarily fully congruent, but neither is it contradictory. The
commonalities that I draw together to compose my theoretical lens include a focus on
everyday experience and the value of social justice for women and other marginalized
groups.
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The work of Abby Lippman has been described at length in Chapter 2, so is only briefly
revisited here, to highlight the aspects which inform my theoretical lens. Lippman does
not explicitly claim to be a theorist, but her body of work on prenatal screening suggests
that she adopts a theoretical lens which equates ethics with social justice in everyday life.
Lippman works within the constructionist paradigm to examine the way that dominant
cultural constructions of concepts such as motherhood, gender, disease, disability affect
the everyday lives of women, children, and people with disabilities. While she does not
name her particular constructionist influences, she defines how and what she sees as
constructed. In the following passage, she explores the construction of biological disease:
Despite their biological reality, human diseases, disorders, and disabilities – the
objects of prenatal screening- are not just physical or physiological states with
fixed contours. Rather than being merely “out there” awaiting our discovery, they
are social products with variable shapes and distributions that we fashion,
interpret, and give meaning to via our beliefs, attitudes, values, and interests.
Western biomedicine is our ethnomedicine, and it does not describe a pre-existing
biological reality. Particular social and cultural assumptions (Wright & Treacher,
1982) influence the scientific researchers who give the biological processes of
observed diseases particular forms through their diagnostic labels and causal
attributions. Those forms vary across different human groups and at different
periods of time. How the processes are counted, defined, and studied, and how
people are assigned to the categories created is necessarily context-specific,
reflecting how those with power at any particular historical time construct a
particular physiological or physical condition as a problem. (Lippman, 1994,
p.12)
When assumptions, discourse, and values are predicated on dominant knowledge, how
can members of oppressed groups navigate institutional structures in a way that allows
them to make their own choices and live in the way they want? For instance, would
prenatal screening be needed for “reassurance” if dominant knowledge had not already
“decided that certain women were at risk and that the condition for which the risk existed
warranted diagnosis before the baby with it was born” (Lippman, 1994, p.16)? Phrased
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another way, where is individual choice when all the given options are constructed by
someone or some institution that does not share the conditions that predicate the lives of
the individuals being offered the choice? “Continuing a pregnancy when the fetus has
been found to have Down syndrome cannot be considered a real option when society
does not truly accept children with disabilities or provide assistance for their nurturance"
(Lippman, 1994, p.19). Lippman sees the social world as stratified along lines of gender,
race, class, and (dis) ability. When using this lens to study prenatal screening, a critical
examination of the potential for reinforcing inequities and inequalities in health is
important, as these inequities affect the way that choice can occur.
Many choices are just not open to many women, in particular to those women
who are kept poor, those with disabilities, racialized women, lesbians and so on
(see Roberts, 1997). Seeing choice as gender (class, race, or otherwise) neutral
hides the operations of power that construct choices, reaffirms existing privileges
in society and, in general, glosses over the many differences between women that
matter (Wolf, 1999). It ignores how access to economic and social resources is
essential to freedom of choice and how freedom of choice cannot exist without
secure social justice, what Petchesky (1993) calls the “conditions without which
rights cannot be realised in practice”. It renders invisible the persisting absence of
social justice for women. (Lippman, 1999b, p.282)
Canadian philosopher Susan Sherwin (1992, 1998; McLeod & Sherwin 2000) has
influenced my thinking through her conception of relational autonomy as an essential
element of feminist bioethics. I have discussed relational autonomy at length in Chapter
2. Elements of Sherwin’s theory which are useful for my theoretical lens include an
acknowledgement of the way that power differentials between physicians (medical
institution) and women may influence the decision making processes of women engaging
with the medical system. The individual context and circumstances of a person greatly
affect the options available to her- with this recognition, we can see that for some
women, choosing to engage in prenatal screening and abortion may never be a truly free
or autonomous choice. For others, who have more power and resources in the form of
wealth, social status, and education, the choices presented by prenatal screening and
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abortion may be closer to her own choices. For Sherwin, individual and societal context
is essential to conceptions of autonomy. On a macro level, historical and political
contexts influence bureaucratic decision makers which affect scientific and governmental
funding agendas, therefore affecting the information and options women are required to
use to make decisions about prenatal screening. For example, on a macro level context,
our cultural emphasis on individualism can disguise elements at the source of decisions
and problems, and fail to acknowledge the interconnected nature of power in society.
Canadian sociologist Dorothy E. Smith informs my theoretical lens through her
standpoint theory, which demands attention to contextual factors in order to promote
social justice. Smith explicitly states that her theory is not a theoretical construct, but a
place to begin inquiry (Smith, 1993). Smith’s work is useful not just as a place to begin
inquiry but also as a lens through which every day practices can be considered and
examined.
Smith (1987) has, on occasion, been subsumed into the category of feminist standpoint
theory (e.g. Naples, 2003), however Smith (1993) protests that her notion of standpoint is
very different from Harding (1986) and contemporaries. For Smith, standpoint is an idea
that aids in building a sociology of women’s lived experience. She uses it to explore how
power dynamics are organized and experienced in the context of women’s everyday
lives, paying specific attention to how social relations are embedded in this context.
Smith provides a framework for conceptualizing community (women or other oppressed
groups), starting with an active knower who is connected to others in particular,
identifiable ways (Smith, 1992; Naples, 2003). However, this method does not privilege
the knower, but rather shifts the ground of knowing to the social field. Smith (1992) sees
knowledge as socially organized, therefore “never an act or an attribute of individual
consciousness” (p. 91). Smith’s (1987) method of inquiry is concerned with the
examination of “abstractions” and the ways in which these are combined with concepts
and knowledge to become socially organized practices. Making these practices visible
also makes visible the ways in which we participate in these practices and incorporate
them into our own knowledges (Smith, 1993).
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Smith (1990b, 1990a) has written about ways in which texts can act to organize social
action, and can function to reveal the ways in which bureaucrats and institutions seek to
organize social action. Using the metaphor of the text as a “crystal which bends the light
as it passes through” (Smith, 1990b, p. 121), Smith suggests that the text can be seen as
aiding social organization. “The operative part of a social relation is activated, of course,
by the reader but its structuring effect is its [the text’s] own” (p. 121). By examining texts
we can gain access to the “ontological ground of institutional processes which organize,
govern, and regulate” (p. 122) society- although we may not normally acknowledge this,
due to our habituation to texts. Through a close examination of texts we can also examine
the ways in which facts are constructed to serve the purposes of particular groups, usually
to the detriment of another group. “A fact is constructed in a definite institutional context,
and its organization reflects that context. An inner coherence is established between the
actuality thus represented and the statements that can be made about it” (Smith, 1990a, p.
78).

3.5 Conclusion
Through a bricolage of critical and constructionist theories, my research questions the
taken for granted notions of prenatal screening in an attempt to critically question the
meanings and understandings of this test, and the ways in which they reflect the
meanings and understandings of our broader society. With a focus on the individual
situated location of women being offered and making a decision about whether or not to
participate in prenatal screening, I seek to contribute to knowledge which explains and
informs some of the opportunities and challenges they may face.
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4

Methodology and Methods

4.1 Introduction
In the first part of this chapter, I outline the reflexive approach I use with Kathy
Charmaz's Constructivist Grounded Theory, discuss the congruency between
constructivist and constructionist visions of grounded theory, and address the issue of
why I chose a grounded theory approach to the research. In the second part, I provide a
detailed account of the methods I used for the three linked studies.

4.2 Part 1: Methodology
4.2.1 Reflexive research.
Instead of treating reflexivity as a component of the methods section of this project, I
consider it to be part of the methodology, necessary at each stage of the research process.
The move towards reflexive methodologies is popular within feminist research, as it
recognizes the “shifting positionalities of the researcher and participants ... [and] offers
the opportunity for raising new questions, engaging in new kinds of dialogue, and
organizing different kinds of social relations” (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007).
Considering feminist research to be reflexive research allows many different kinds of
methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative, to find a home in feminist scholarship- a
famously broad and variable field.
Reflexivity is an evolving topic, used and defined in many different ways. Since the
purpose here is not to conduct a literature review on reflexivity, I outline the way I use
the term and set aside other possible ways of considering it, not because they are without
merit, but rather because this is outside the scope of this project. Loosely, I use reflexivity
to mean positional reflexivity (Koch & Harrington, 1998; Macbeth, 2001), or an
examination of the social and individual contexts of researcher and participant as a means
to deconstruct “dualities of power and anti-power, hegemony and resistance, and insider
and outsider to reveal and describe how our representations of the world and those who
live there are indeed positionally organized” (Macbeth, 2001, p. 38). The purpose of this
kind of reflexivity is to seek “a critical understanding of ordinary worlds by reference to
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larger but unnoticed arrangements and conditions” (Macbeth, 2001, p. 40). I think
reflexivity is also important in considering the ways in which an individual’s position
affects the way knowledge is constructed, and how the everyday world is interpreted,
related to, and moved within.
Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Deborah Piatelli (2007) outline the purpose of reflexive
research:
The purpose of research is not to validate a Truth, but to enable different forms of
knowledge to challenge power. Multiple truths and diverse knowledges become
the actual product of research when the subjectivity, location, and humanness of
the knower are included. (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007, p. 498)
Koch and Harrington (1998) discuss academic reflexivity as providing the opportunity to
consciously consider how, why, and when research decisions are made, and how these
decisions affect the research process and product. They encourage researchers to “signpost” their writing with reflexive decisions, allowing readers to engage with the
viewpoints of both the researcher and participants to decide if the research is plausible.
Feminist reflexivity goes farther than this, interrogating not just personal and cultural
views the researcher holds, but also how and why these viewpoints came to be, and the
broader significance of this for how knowledge is generated. Taylor and White (2000)
ask researchers to broaden this conscious consideration of how research decisions are
made to consider how knowledge is generated; they call for researchers and practitioners
to explicitly acknowledge the particular types of knowledge they use to make sense of
situations and events, and to consider how various types of knowledge may be culturally
constructed (Taylor & White, 2000).
Dorothy E. Smith (Smith, 1974;1987) invites feminist researchers to take a step farther
back, to acknowledge our particular standpoint as individuals, and to consider how that
standpoint affects the way we interact with the world (and the way the world interacts
with us). She says that it behooves researchers to think about the individual standpoints
of the participants in the research, and to engage with these individuals rather than
observe them from an outside position. According to Smith (1987), this consideration of
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standpoint is important because nothing (no academic discipline) and no one (no
researcher) can avoid being situated, so Smith (1990b) calls for research that
acknowledges that situatedness and builds it into our methodological and theoretical
strategies. Smith (1987) highlights the ways in which the researcher affects her data: she
“is and must be an active participant in constructing the events she treats as data” (Smith,
1990b, p. 13). The ways in which the researcher constructs the data is one of the focuses
of reflexive thought. This echoes Bourdieu’s instruction that critical theorists must
examine their own relation to the research object, reflecting the scientific gaze back on
themselves (Bourdieu 1993 in Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007).
Smith’s methodology, like all reflexive research, challenges the unquestioning production
of “objective” knowledge (Hesse-Biber and Piatelli, 2007). Smith’s goal (1987; 1990a;
1990b; 1993; 1997) is to elucidate a method of social research that is reflexive about the
everyday experiences of people’s lives, and that asks what are the facts, how did they
become facts, and how does factual knowing occur. This situated line of questioning
requires a “dizzying change in perspective” (Campbell, 2003, p. 11) in pursuit of the goal
of interrogating how people make sense of the world, and how particular meanings are
constructed. Smith (1974; 1987) proposes to change the relationships between the
researcher and the object of knowledge, creating a new relationship based on direct
experience of the everyday world; she asks how else do individuals interpret information
and events, if not through their direct experience? Reflexive research begins with the
researcher’s original and immediate knowledge of everyday life (what Smith terms an
'insider’s' approach), and moves to an exploration of what passes beyond everyday life
and how that particular way of understanding is deeply implicated in how everyday life is
represented (Smith 1974, pg. 12).
An insider’s strategy takes concepts, ideas, ideology, and schemata as dimensions
and organizers of the ongoing social process that we can grasp only as insiders,
only by considering our own practices ... Taking up critique-as-inquiry or inquiryas-critique as an insider adds a further dimension [to inquiries of knowledge of
the relations and apparatuses of ruling]. Inquiry becomes an essentially reflexive
critique. For the relations explored here can be grasped only as we are insiders
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participating in them. At the same time, in exploring them we bring into view not
just our actual practices of thinking, reasoning, reading, making sense of
accounts, and so forth, but the actual social relations we participate in by doing
so. In this way, as insiders, relations that our own practices are embedded in can
be made explicit and examinable through inquiry. ( Smith, 1990a, p.202-204)
By approaching research from this angle, it is possible to link everyday subjectivities
with underlying institutional structures (Doran, 1993). When approaching research in a
way that inquires into the “way things work”, the actualities of our everyday social
practices become visible and research becomes a necessarily reflexive activity: “critique
is investigation and investigation is a reflexive critique, disclosing practices we know and
use ... disclosing how our practices contribute to and are articulated with the relations that
overpower our lives” (Smith 1990a p.204).
In light of these perspectives, the challenge becomes how to incorporate reflexivity into
research in a concrete way. Hesse-Biber & Piatelli (2007) have created a unique method
to increase researcher reflexivity adapted from Conner & Bliss-Moreau’s (2006)
experience sampling, of which I have adopted in an adapted form to increase my own
reflexivity as a researcher. Experience sampling is a technique to document subjective
experience in the moment, and over time. Participants are reminded through various
technological means to stop and record their subjective experience based on questions
offered by the researchers. Conner & Bliss-Moreau (2006) maintain that this resolves
temporal issues such as lapses in memory or the loss of emotion when experiences are
measured at a later date, or when a participant is asked to recall how they felt at a certain
time. Hesse-Biber & Piatelli (2007) call this technique reflexive sampling. Reflexive
sampling involves periodic reminders throughout the project for the researcher to “checkin” with herself about how things are going. By using a reflexive diary, tape recorder, or
notes on a portable data device, key questions can be answered at pre-determined times.
These reflections can be used for reflexive thought later. Hesse-Biber & Piatelli (2007)
suggest some of the key questions one might answer, including questions about
researcher and participant standpoint and positionality, relationship with participants,
attentiveness to difference, and reflexive interrogation of data. Since I am not doing field
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research, but collecting interview data in discrete chunks, I chose to use several events as
markers to engage in reflexivity. I wrote a reflexive journal entry after conducting each
interview, during or after transcribing each interview, when insights occurred to me
during coding, and after each round of coding. I recorded my reflexive journal entries in
the form of emails in to special research memo e-mail account and through handwritten
entries in a research notebook. I have included an example of a typical journal entry as
Appendix 1.
This technique was helpful because I have a hard time remembering to interrogate myself
and my data without what Brookfield (1998) calls a critical incident, or what Smith
(1987) terms a “point of rupture” (p.49) between my personal experience and social
forms of consciousness. When I am working away and things are going well, it is hard to
remember to stop and analyze. Sometimes writing these entries was difficult, and felt
forced. This was especially the case later in data collection, when I felt like I was
repeating some of the same ideas again and again. At other times, I was compelled to
write and wrote freely. In practice, I found that my reflexive journal and analytical
memos blended together, with many areas of overlap. I found these journal entries
helpful in tracing analytical ideas through their progression and identifying possible
topics for manuscripts. For instance, after transcribing Carrie's interview, I wrote a
journal entry about the possible theme of information-seeking:
Transcribing this interview made me think that there's a real possibility for a
paper about what information women would want in order to make a decision
about prenatal screening, what they would find helpful in the pamphlet, when they
want the pamphlet etc. For instance, there have been a number of women mention
they would want to get the pamphlet before talking to the doctor so they
understand a little bit about what they're going to be offered and they can ask
questions at that time, rather than getting all the information at once and having to
make a decision without a chance to think about, it ask questions and then think
about it again. ... A lot of the women are asking the why questions: why would I
want to get this test? Why would I not want to get this test? what can I do with
the information? Structuring the pamphlet to answer these questions might be
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helpful... What is the test, why would I want to get it, why would I not want to
get it, what what will the test tell me, what can I do with that information. I think
that these questions would be helpful.
This idea catalysed a focused code for "information" and that coding produced the
findings for manuscript 3, Chapter 7. More information about this analytical process is
described in Figure 3, section 4.3.5.8.

4.2.2 Constructivist grounded theory.
The methodology of grounded theory was developed in the 1960’s by Glaser and Strauss
(1967) in an attempt to support and systematize the field of qualitative research.
Grounded theory is a research approach that is used to inductively develop theory based
on qualitative data, with all theoretical concepts extracted directly from the data and not
imported from other theories or analyses (Walliman, 2005). Glaser and Strauss’s 1967
work was revolutionary because it blurred the line between theory/research and data
collection/analysis, and challenged the prevailing view of qualitative research as without
rigor (Charmaz, 2000). Glaser and Strauss (1967) provided some of the first written
guidelines for conducting qualitative research, which had previously been taught through
a mentoring system (Charmaz, 2000).
Since its origin in the work of Glaser and Strauss, grounded theory has moved through
many theoretical orientations as different scholars have taken it up and made it their own.
The theoretical framework used in this study is constructivist grounded theory as
formulated by Kathy Charmaz (Charmaz, 2000; 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2006; 2008).
Charmaz’s constructivist grounded theory differs from the more traditional objectivist
formulations of grounded theory in a few key ways. Constructivist grounded theory
(CGT) recognizes that both the researcher and the research participants create data
through their interactions. CGT researchers claim that what is discovered “arises from the
interactive process and its temporal, cultural, and structural contexts” (Charmaz, 2000, p.
524). This is different from objectivist grounded theory (OGT), which builds on the
assumptions that what is observed is independent from the observer. OGT attempts to
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achieve reliability and validity through description, analysis, and prediction. CGT does
not attempt to develop generalizable truth, but recognizes the importance of the
subjective interpretation of the individual and how that subjective interpretation is always
evolving and always influencing interpretation of the data. Charmaz urges a move away
from the didactic and prescriptive guidelines for grounded theory as espoused by Strauss
and Corbin (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) towards a methodology that is flexible, with
emergent and interactive guidelines (Charmaz, 2000).
Grounded theory is, above all, inductive. It starts with the data, with individual cases,
stories, observations- the more variety in the data, the better! These data are analyzed
systematically using a series of categories and codes. These codes emerge from the data,
they are not taken from pre-existing hypotheses or prior studies. Charmaz recommends
line by line coding, encouraging the examination of each minute piece of data as the best
way to find potential significant pieces of information. After some initial coding, themes
and categories can be identified. It is then time to go back and re-code, with these new
insights. Slowly but surely, theory starts to arise from the data, which leads back to more
data collection. As the next data are analyzed, new insights will emerge, making it is
necessary to go back to the first bit of data with these new insights in mind. Grounded
theory is an iterative process, new data reveal more to be studied and more things to
examine (Charmaz, 2004a). Throughout this process, the researcher engages in memo
writing, or taking notes about thoughts that occur during the analysis. Charmaz describes
memo writing as helping to “elaborate processes, assumptions, and actions that are
subsumed under your code” (Charmaz, 2004a, p. 511).

4.2.3 Constructionist approach to grounded theory.
I am working with the constructivist positioning of grounded theory as formulated by
Charmaz (2000; 2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2008). In the following section, I make the case
that Charmaz’ constructivist grounded theory is congruent with a constructionist stance.
To understand the similarities and differences between constructivism and
constructionism, it is useful to conceptualize the two concepts as existing upon a
continuum of perspectives (Crotty, 1998). Constructivisim focuses on the ways in which
individuals construct meaning, and constructionism focuses on the ways in which
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meaning is shaped by social, political, and discursive factors beyond the individual
(Crotty, 1998).
Holton (Holton, 2007)sees the search for a paradigm as futile, and counterproductive,
believing that grounded theory can “transcend specific boundaries of established
paradigms to accommodate any type of data sourced and expressed through any
epistemological lens” (pg. 268). I do agree that grounded theory fits into multiple
paradigms, but I think it is necessary for each researcher who uses GT to explicitly state
the paradigm s/he is working within, and his or her epistemological viewpoint, as this
will strongly shape the questions that researcher asks, the way s/he approaches
participants, the way in which data analysis is undertaken and carried out, and the
themes that “emerge” from the data. In short, the researcher’s epistemological and
ontological assumptions shape the research process, the interpretation of the data
collected, and the themes or theory that may be the outcome of a grounded theory project.
Charmaz almost always titles her work “constructivist” grounded theory (Charmaz 2000;
2004b; 2005; 2006; 2008), but her methodology is also congruent with a constructionist
stance. In this section I will examine direct and indirect epistemological statements
Charmaz has made and argue that her work is congruent with Hacking’s (Hacking, 1999)
vision of social constructionism.
Constructionism and constructivism are often confused and conflated, but there is also
room for congruence between the ideas. Charmaz’s iteration of grounded theory has not
escaped this tendency. For example, in his criticism of Charmaz’s constructivist
grounded theory, Glaser (2002) consistently conflates the terms “constructionist” and
“constructivist”, sometimes in the same sentence. A quick search of the research database
Google Scholar retrieves 300 more hits for “Charmaz AND constructionist” than for
“Charmaz AND constructivist”- this may indicate that Charmaz’s grounded theory is
being used for constructionist research, that the two terms are commonly conflated, or
that the terms may legitimately represent an area of overlap. It may also represent a
general trend in the social sciences towards constructionist rather than constructivist
research.
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On occasion, Charmaz does use the constructionist label. For instance, Charmaz (2005)
describes her work developing grounded theory “as a social constructionist method” (p.
509), and as imbuing “grounded theory with social constructionism” (Charmaz, 2008, p.
401). She explicitly renames her previous work (Charmaz 2000; 2004a; 2006) as
“distinguishing between a social constructionist and an objectivist grounded theory”
(2008, p. 398). Despite this, in most of her work she maintains the “constructivist” label.

4.2.3.1 Charmaz’s explicit definitions.
Charmaz (2006; 2008) explicitly defines her personal version of constructivism, in two
very different contexts. Charmaz (2006) is a glossary entry in a methodological manual,
and Charmaz (2008) is a footnote explanation about why a chapter on CGT is a relevant
inclusion to The Handbook of Constructionist Research. In the first, Charmaz defines
constructivism as:
A social scientific perspective that addresses how realities are made. This
perspective assumes that people, including researchers, construct the realities in
which they participate. Constructivist inquiry starts with the experience and asks
how members construct it. To the best of their ability, constructivists enter the
phenomenon, gain multiple views of it, and locate it in its web of connections and
constraints. Constructivists acknowledge that their interpretation of the studied
phenomenon is itself a construction. (Charmaz, 2006, p. 187)
In a footnote to a chapter for the Handbook of Constructionist Research, Charmaz (2008)
explains her reasons for equivocating between constructionism and constructivism. She
states she is framing her work using “the more general rubric of social constructionism”
(p. 409) to find a better fit with the theme of the book. Charmaz states that her version of
constructivism holds that “people make their worlds but do not make them as they please,
rather, worlds are constructed under particular historical and social conditions that shape
our views, actions, and collective practices” (p. 409), which I see as useful to scholars
working from a constructionist stance. Charmaz then cites other
constructivist/constructionist grounded theory authors (including herself, Adele Clarke
and Anthony Bryant) who locate their epistemological roots in sociological social
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constructionism. Later in this article, in the main text of the chapter, Charmaz (2008)
gives an important reason for sticking with constructivism: incongruent to her vision for
grounded theory, she notes that “20th century constructionism treated research worlds as
social constructions, but not research practices” (p. 398).
These definitions give me room to work with Charmaz’s methodology within a
constructionist paradigm congruent with Hacking (1999)'s vision of constructionism,
which I suggest is congruent with the way Charmaz defines her vision of constructivismit realizes the constructed nature of research practices and research worlds, it holds that
there is a real world which is interpreted in different ways depending on the ways in
which the interpreter has been shaped by her social, historical, and cultural context while
still granting the interpreter agency to shape her own view of the world within that
context, making explicit the situated location of the interpreter’s context/standpoint.

4.2.3.2 Charmaz’s implicit definitions.
In addition to explicit definitions, Charmaz implicitly describes the constructivist
epistemology that informs Constructivist Grounded Theory in many publications. Some
of these epistemological statements may be seen as consistent with a constructionist
approach. For example, Charmaz (2006) sees texts as both individually and socially
constructed: “people construct texts for specific purposes and they do so within social,
economic, historical, cultural, and situational contexts. Texts draw on discourses....” (p.
15). This is congruent with constructionism if emphasis is placed on the way that the
individual constructs texts and is shaped unknowingly by discourse, as opposed to
focusing solely on the individual's conscious construction within that context. Charmaz
(2006) states that a “CGT approach means learning how, when, and to what extent the
studied experience is embedded in larger and often, hidden positions, networks,
situations, and relationships.” (p. 131). This statement is quite congruent with
constructionism, although Charmaz brings it back to constructivism in the next sentence,
focusing on the individual knower: “Subsequently, differences and distinctions between
people become visible as well as the hierarchies of power, communication, and
opportunity that maintain and perpetuate such differences and distinctions. A
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constructivist approach means being alert to conditions under which such differences and
distinctions arise and are maintained” (p. 131).
Implicit statements show that the epistemological tenets of grounded theory can be
interpreted through a constructivist or constructionist lens. Examining these statements
shows that there is room to do constructionist work with Charmaz’ constructivist
grounded theory. Constructivist grounded theory is, in many ways, consistent with
Hacking’s (1999) vision of social construction.

4.2.3.3 Epistemological congruence between Charmaz and
Hacking (1999).
I propose that Hacking’s “unmasking” and “reformist” types of social construction
identified earlier are in many ways congruent with Charmaz’ constructivist grounded
theory. In Charmaz (2005), a paper advocating CGT as a research method of social
justice research, Charmaz details questions in critical social justice inquiry that CGT is
well suited to answer (pg. 513-514); many of these questions are central to the
“Unmasking” type of social construction, exposing ideas to examine what function they
serve, thereby stripping them of false appeal and authority (Hacking, 1999). For
example, Charmaz (2005) lists some questions relevant to social policies and practices
that are directly applicable to my examination of the policies and practices of prenatal
screening.
What are the rules, both tacit and explicit? Who writes or enforces them? How?
Whose interests do the rules reflect/ From whose standpoint? Do the rules and
routine practices negatively affect certain groups or categories of individuals? If
so, are they aware of them? What are the implications of their relative awareness
or lack of it? To what extent and when do various participants support the rules
and the policies and practices that flow from them? When are they contested?
When do they meet resistance? Who resists and which risks might resistance
pose? (Charmaz, 2005, p. 514)
With these questions in mind, I use Charmaz’s Constructivist Grounded Theory within
the constructionist perspective identified by Hacking (1999).
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4.2.4 Why grounded theory?
Charmaz (2005) inspired me to think about the ways in which CGT inspires critical
questioning about social justice issues, considering the standpoint of the researcher and
participants. This congruence of purpose suggested an effective method for investigating
my research questions. When reading the work on metaphor analysis, I also noted an
echo of grounded theory. Both Rigney (2001) and Schmitt (2005) think of metaphor
analysis as revealing insights that can be categorized conceptually to reveal an underlying
theory. By examining the metaphors used in a particular culture, it is possible to develop
a theory about the way an issue is understood by members of that cultural group.
This insight led me to work towards developing a grounded theory project with a
theoretical sensitivity to metaphor. I believe Charmaz would support the theoretical focus
on metaphor, because she encourages researchers to “pay careful attention to
respondents’ language” (Charmaz, 2004a, p.505) including metaphor (Charmaz, 2006).
Charmaz also encourages the adoption and creation of new methods, provided they are
used to support a transparent analytic process (Charmaz, 2008). I am encouraged by
Charmaz’s invitation to stretch grounded theory to adapt it to my own needs and goals
(Charmaz, 2006). Concerning metaphor, I am indebted to the work of Lakoff & Johnson
(1980), who consider metaphors to be a socially contained way of structuring reality
which function by organizing and shaping the way the world is understood.

4.2.5 Social construction, grounded theory, metaphor, and
reflexivity.
The choice of Charmaz’s constructivist grounded theory was carefully considered. I was
intuitively drawn to it because of my own constructionist leanings, but I was wary of the
relativism that constructivism can carry (Boghossian, 2006). I find relativism
inappropriate as an ethical framework and my ethical tendencies made me feel uneasy
about adopting what may be perceived as a relativistic methodology. I draw on a critical
feminist lens and Hacking’s form of social constructionism to overcome the problems
relativism may pose.
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Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) ideas of metaphor seemed congruent with social
constructionism to me, and there is support in the literature for this link. Gurney
(1999)has outlined a number of ways in which metaphor is a crucial component to the
social construction of reality. First, metaphor both constrains and enables social
creativity. It implies a way of thinking and seeing that affects an individual’s relation
with the world. Second, the metaphors used in a particular group define and hold that
social group together, by building and maintaining a shared culture. Sometimes these
cultural metaphors become so familiar that their original meaning is lost- they become a
sort of “shorthand for common-sense social relationships” (Gurney, 1999, p. 1716).
Third, metaphors can be inherently political. The selection of metaphors a person makes
is very significant in the way that they exercise forms of power and resistance. In this
way, metaphors do ideological work (Cresswell, 1997). Fourth, metaphors are
conceptualised within a framework of rhetoric. Appeal to metaphors, aphorisms, and
social maxims add a moral quality to speech, by implicitly expressing values. They
associate common sense (as socially constructed, of course) with morality and prejudice
(Gurney, 1999).
I also noted echoes of Foucault in Gurney’s third point, which is expanded upon in
Cresswell’s 1997 work. The focus on the ways in which power and resistance are
exercised to shape reality supports both my critical feminist and constructionist leanings.
Gurney’s fourth point reminded me of the ancient pre-Socratic Greek philosophers (such
as Gorgias) and the importance they placed on influential power of carefully chosen
language to make a rhetorical point. To these scholars, the content of a message could be
less influential than the way the message was communicated.
Constructionist grounded theory is congruent with an analytical sensitivity to metaphor.
Charmaz has explicitly addressed the use of metaphor as a unit of exploration (Charmaz,
2000) and as a powerful tool for analysis and writing of grounded theory work (Charmaz
2006; 2008). Charmaz (2008) asks us to “interrogate taken-for-granted metaphors” and
invokes Martin (1999)’s instruction for feminist researchers to find the sleeping
metaphors in science and “awaken them”.
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Sleeping metaphors wield power precisely because they remain tacit: They shape
the text and, moreover, our conceptions of the realities it addresses. Such
metaphors shape what we see and how we see it and contain hidden reasons that
explain, justify, and perpetuate why we see it that way. (Charmaz, 2008, pg. 450)
The relationship between my
theoretical perspectives (feminist
bioethics, social constructionism)
and methodological perspectives
(reflexivity, grounded theory,
metaphor) is exemplified in this
quote.

4.3 Part 2: Methods

Figure 1: Eligible Types of Prenatal
Screening According to SOGC Guideline
Test

Markers

Trimester

FTS

NT, β-hCG, PAPPA, MA

1

Quad

AFP, uE3, β-hCG,
inhibin A, MA

2

IPS

NT, PAPP-A, AFP,
uE3, β-hCG, inhibin
A, MA

1&2

IPS -inhibin A

NT, PAPP-A, AFP,
uE3, β-hCG, MA

1&2

Serum IPS

PAPP-A, AFP, uE3,
β-hCG, inhibin A,

1&2

4.3.1 Study design.
In this research project my purpose
was to investigate the process of
prenatal screening in light of the
2007 Society of Obstetricians and

Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC) Clinical Practice Guideline (Summers, Langlois,
Wyatt, & Wilson, 2007), which mandated that non-invasive prenatal screening must be
offered to all Canadian women . As stated in the SOGC guideline, non-invasive prenatal
screening can take several different forms, and due to geographical differences and
resource disparities, SOGC has refrained from endorsing one particular type. Eligible
types of prenatal screening are those which meet the SOGC’s minimum standard for
detection rate (> 75%) and false positive rate (< 3% in the first trimester, < 5% in the
second trimester) (Chitayat et al, 2011). According to Chitayat et al (2011), eligible tests
(see Figure 1) are First Trimester Screening (FTS), Quadruple Serum Screening (Quad),
Integrated Prenatal Screening (IPS), IPS without inhibin A, and Serum IPS. In this
project, the term "prenatal screening" refers to any or all of these different options.

128

4.3.2 Research question.
The primary research question of this thesis is: “From the perspective of women under
the age of 35 in their first pregnancies, seeking prenatal care from a family physician,
how is the process of choosing to participate in prenatal screening enacted in light of the
new SOGC guidelines?”. This guiding question informed my choice to collect data from
three different sources: policies and guidelines, patient education materials, and pregnant
women. The three types of data were chosen to respond to different elements of the
process of choosing whether or not to participate in prenatal screening:
1) How do prenatal screening patient education materials portray concepts
related to prenatal screening?
2) How do policies and guidelines shape the offer of prenatal screening?
3) How do women use information when making a decision about whether or not
to participate in prenatal screening?
With these three sub-questions in mind, I undertook three mini studies, all of which are
united by their relation to the main research question about choosing whether or not to
participate in prenatal screening. First, regarding patient education materials, written
information about prenatal screening may be used by some women to inform themselves
prior to making a decision. These materials may be provided by a physician or found
through a different venue, for instance, passed along by a friend or relative or searched
out on the internet. A close examination of publicly available prenatal screening public
education pamphlets was important to examine some of the types of information women
receive in the process of making a decision. Second, since processes of prenatal screening
in the context of family medicine are shaped by policy, I searched for and analysed
policies that are relevant to the presentation and process of prenatal screening. Finally, I
interviewed women about their thoughts and experiences navigating the process of
prenatal screening. I asked women currently going through the process of prenatal
screening about their experiences so far, including how they came to make a decision
about whether or not to participate.
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4.3.3 Study #1: How do prenatal screening patient education
materials portray concepts related to prenatal screening?
The first study involved a metaphoric textual analysis of publicly available prenatal
screening patient education material (see manuscript one, Chapter 5). The methods of this
study are briefly described in the published manuscript, and elaborated in more detail in
this section.

4.3.3.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria.
Written material included in the study met the following inclusion criteria:
1) Publicly available through health care providers, public health agencies, or
online.
2) Available in English.
3) Aimed at an audience of women considering prenatal screening.
4) Produced by an organization that might be considered authoritative by
women.
5) Addresses prenatal screening.
6) Available free of charge.
7) Any English language material which does not meet these criteria but is
provided by a family physician or other health care provider to a participant.
8) Any English language material mentioned by a participant, authored by an
authoritative source, and relevant to the Canadian context, even if not
produced in Canada.
Materials which are aimed at professionals, written by a non-Canadian organization, or
those which address only prenatal testing were excluded. Peer-written sources or
materials which did not readily identify their author were omitted.
I was hoping to broaden my sample of patient education materials during the interview
process, by explicitly asking interview participants if their health care providers had
given them any written materials and then collecting and analyzing these materials. I was
also prepared to include written material that was not given by a health care provider, if a
woman found and used a source that was of a type that might be given by a health care
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provider (i.e. not a peer-written source). I was more flexible with the inclusion criterion
(#8) for the sources participants mentioned, anticipating that women might, for instance,
find an American pamphlet online.
I intentionally structured the inclusion and exclusion criteria so the publication date of a
pamphlet was irrelevant, reasoning that if the pamphlet is currently available or is being
circulated at the time of data collection, it should be eligible for inclusion. This inclusion
criterion proved relevant, as one interview participant was given an out-of-circulation
pamphlet by her doctor. This pamphlet, entitled "Prenatal Screening: It's your choice",
was produced by the Ontario Maternal Serum Screening Committee. I had collected it
before it was removed from circulation for another project, and included it in the sample
when the participant mentioned it by name.
Interview participants mentioned accessing many sources of information that I do not
consider formal patient education materials. For example, many women talked about
reading popular books, participating in online pregnancy forums, and engaging with peerwritten sources (e.g. blogs). While these are interesting sources of information, close
analysis of this type of written material is outside of the scope of this project. I noted the
information sources mentioned by women and considered the variety of these sources in
analysis, but did not seek to closely examine these sources.

4.3.3.2 Data collection.
I collected Canadian prenatal patient education written materials as a means to investigate
how prenatal screening is explained and portrayed to women. Before conducting
interviews, I collected an initial sample of patient education materials as a way to gain an
understanding of the variety of materials available to women in Ontario. During
interviews, I asked each participant if they had received any written material from their
prenatal health care provider, and if they could remember the title or other identifying
information about the material. I intended to add new written materials to the sample as
they were mentioned by interview participants. While I predicted that my sample of
written material would grow during the interview process, this was not the case.
Participants mentioned finding information online and being given many pamphlets, but
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most had discarded the pamphlets by the time of the interview and few were able to recall
identifying details about those pamphlets.Thus, collection of written patient education
materials was limited to the initial sample I gathered through an online search.
The sample of public education materials included materials developed by professional
colleges related to obstetrical care in family medicine (e.g. SOGC), local health care
institutions (e.g. Northwestern Ontario Regional Genetics Program), academics working
on this topic (e.g. June Carroll et al’s (2007) Genetics Education Project), advocacy
organizations for people with disabilities (e.g. Canadian Down Syndrome Society), and
industry sources that profit from selling the materials for prenatal screening tests (e.g.
Warnex Laboratories).

4.3.3.3 Data analysis.
When analysing patient education materials, I was guided by the inductive principles of
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). After a quick code and a focused code (Charmaz,
2006 see further explanation in the section addressing analytical techniques used for
participant data), I identified metaphors and figurative language as an important aspect of
the information provided by these materials, and chose to focus further analysis on this
aspect of the data. Analysis of metaphor and figurative language evolved into an
approach we called Metaphoric Textual Analysis (Vanstone & Kinsella, 2010), informed
by the work of Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a; 1980b), Schmitt (2000;
2005) and Charteris-Black (Charteris-Black, 2004). Metaphoric Textual Analysis (MTA)
is an approach which combines the inductive strategies of grounded theory (Charmaz
2006) to critically reflect on the various interpretive messages and ideological strains that
may be present in the text, based on the explanations offered by Lakoff and Johnson
(1980a, 1980b) as to the ways in which metaphors are fundamental to the ways in which
a person in a particular historical social location understands the world.
I began analysing metaphors and figurative language using a word by word coding
strategy (Charmaz, 2006) to identify key concepts. Schmitt (2000; 2005)suggests a word
for word analysis of metaphors to establish a lexicon of metaphoric concepts. This is
congruent with Charmaz’s focus on creating codes as the data are studied (Charmaz,
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2004a), and her instruction to “interrogate taken-for-granted metaphors” (Charmaz, 2008,
p. 444) as a way to strengthen analysis and writing. I then segmented texts into
metaphoric parts “by means of anchoring examples and an operationalisation of the
concept of metaphor” (Schmitt, 2000). These units of analysis, the metaphoric parts,
were examined for fit into larger conceptual categories (Schmitt 2000, 2005; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980a). In order to give analytic consideration to the informational impact of
the metaphor, including implicit messages and ideological stances that may be embedded
in particular metaphors, I engaged with the process of critical reflection as ideology
critique (Brookfield, 1998; 2009). I used this particular approach to critical reflection as
a way to alert myself to potential ways in which ideologies might be operating in patient
education materials. This recognition was the first step in gaining insight into the ways in
which patient education materials might help produce what Joe Kincheloe has called "a
meta-awareness of the way consciousness is constructed" (Kincheloe, 2008, p. 218).
While engaging in this analytic process, which was iterative, messy, and at times
overwhelming, I came to recognize that the process of critically reflecting on potential
ideologies at work through metaphor was similar to what Strauss and Corbin (1998)
describe as the "flip-flop" technique for comparison of theoretical categories in their
explanation of Comparative Analysis. Strauss and Corbin (1998) describe Comparative
Analysis in two ways: the first involves comparison of object/object or incident/incident,
and the second is a comparison of theoretical category. For the first, comparison can help
differentiate features and define one object from another. For the second, comparison can
“bring out possible properties and dimensions when these are not evident to the analyst”
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.94). Theoretical comparison can be done via the “flip-flop”
technique, or through the use of systematic comparison. The “flip-flop” technique
involves turning a concept inside out, asking how it might be different, or what might
change if it was different in a certain way. This description mirrors the process I engaged
in to think critically about possible implications of metaphor and figurative language.
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4.3.4 Study # 2: How do policies and guidelines shape the
offer of prenatal screening?
In the second study, I examined the existing policy and guidelines on prenatal screening,
two Clinical Practice Guidelines published jointly by the Society of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists of Canada and the Canadian Council of Medical Geneticists. These
guidelines were considered with regards to their relevance to the offer and presentation of
prenatal screening, in order to suggest an alternative approach to the proposed counseling
model (manuscript two, Chapter 6).

4.3.4.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria.
The inclusion criteria for this study were broad, encompassing any policy document that
affects the way that prenatal screening takes place in Canada. Excluded documents
include private policies (for instance, clinic-specific policies) and policies from other
countries not officially adopted by a Canadian agency. I also excluded policy statements,
suggestions, and reports that originate from a source that does not have direct influence
over how services are provided (e.g. academic articles). Also, documents that were not
available to me as a member of the public were necessarily excluded.

4.3.4.2 Data collection.
The purpose of collecting policy documents was to examine the ways in which they
shape the implementation of prenatal screening. I used various tools to find relevant
policy documents, including policy databases and search engines (both academic and non
academic). When this search failed to yield many results, I contacted relevant
organizations by telephone and e-mail, to ask if they had any relevant policy documents.
The following resources were searched:
Table 3: Search strategy
Databases:
CMA Infobase

National Guideline Clearinghouse
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UpToDate 17.1

Genetic Resources Ontario

MedLine (limit publication type to

Google Scholar

“guideline”)
Contacted the following professional or governmental organizations via e-mail, website, or
telephone:
-

Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

-

Canadian College of Medical Geneticists

-

College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario

-

College of Family Physicians of Canada

-

Canadian Association of Genetic Counselors

-

Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care

-

Health Canada

Few relevant policies and guidelines were found. The Society of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists of Canada, in conjunction with the Canadian College of Medical
Geneticists had produced a clinical practice guideline governing prenatal screening
(Summers et al, 2007). These groups released another clinical practice guideline
concerning prenatal screening in July 2011 (Chitayat, Langlois, & Wilson, 2011). I did
not find any other policies or guidelines, despite inquiries to each professional college. I
did find several policies that were peripherally relevant, such as policies relevant to
abortion produced by the Canadian Medical Association (CMA, 1988) and Society of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada (Davis, 2006) or the Ontario Health Insurance
Plan schedule of benefits for physician services.

4.3.4.3 Data analysis.
Due to the lack of policy documents retrieved, I decided not to undertake an inductive
grounded theory analysis. Instead, I approached the analysis conceptually, examining the
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ways in which the literature on the process of prenatal screening was congruent with or in
conflict with the ideas suggested by Summers et al (2007) and Chitayat et al (2011).
Using the counseling instructions in these policy documents, I conducted a literature
review and examined the implication of these instructions in light of literature on
relational autonomy, informed decision-making, non-directive counseling, and shared
decision-making.

4.3.5 Study #3: How do women use information when making
a decision about whether or not to participate in prenatal
screening?
The third study involved interviews with women who had recently been offered prenatal
screening, but had not yet received results (if they chose to participate). When
interviewing these women, I asked about their thoughts, opinions, and experiences of the
offer and presentation of prenatal screening and their considerations and decisionmaking processes when making a choice about whether or not to participate. The results
of this third study are addressed in manuscripts 3 and 4, Chapters 7 and 8.

4.3.5.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria.
To be included in the study, participants met the following criteria:
1) Fluent English speaker.
2) First pregnancy.
3) Under the age of 35 at expected date of delivery.
4) Receiving initial prenatal care from a family physician.
5) Had not yet received results from prenatal screening (if participating).
Exclusion criteria include:
1) Women who had previously been pregnant.
2) High risk pregnancy that may affect the way prenatal screening is offered or
understood (self-defined).
3) First discussion of prenatal screening with a health care provider that is not a
family physician (unless the provider worked under the direction of a family
physician, for instance, a nurse working in the office of a family physician).
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Most women seeking prenatal care from a family physician will have low risk
pregnancies, as high risk pregnancies are usually referred to an obstetrician or maternal
fetal medicine specialist. I chose not to include women with high risk pregnancies in this
project because they may be offered prenatal screening in a different way, or have
different considerations when considering the offer.
When I corresponded with a women to schedule an interview, I mentioned eligibility
criteria, including "low-risk" pregnancy, letting each women self-identify her personal
level of risk. I decided to let women self-identify rather than imposing additional
exclusion criteria because there is no clear medical definition of “low risk”. In a seminal
paper on the topic of defining risk in pregnancy, Wilson and Schifrin (1980) define low
risk as “a patient not considered high risk”, or a patient not carrying a “pregnancy with an
increased risk of a poor outcome” (p. 653). Inconsistent definitions and assessment of
risk continue to be a problem. Stahl and Hundley (Stahl & Hundley, 2003) categorized
women as high or low risk using several different assessments from Germany, Scotland,
and the Netherlands. There was little consistency between the assessment tools and many
women were classified differently between measures. Jordan and Murphy (2009) remind
us that “the validity of most scoring tools is undetermined and the benefit of prenatal risk
scoring systems remains undocumented” (p. 192).

4.3.5.2 Participant sampling & recruitment.
I arranged to interview women after they discussed prenatal screening with their family
physician, but before they received results (if they decided to participate) or before they
reached 21 completed weeks gestation (if they decided not to participate). The timing of
the reception of results may vary from woman to woman, and is partially dependent on
the type of test chosen. The 2007 and 2011 SOGC Clinical Practice Guidelines (Summers
et al, 2007; Chitayat et al, 2011) present several different options for prenatal screening,
on the understanding that geographic limitations and resource differences throughout
Canada make the endorsement of one type of screening impossible. Practitioners are
invited to use any test that meets the minimum diagnostic standards and screens for the
“most common clinically significant fetal aneuploidies” (Summers et al, 2007, p. 147).
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Each component of screening can take place over a range of gestational dates, making it
difficult to establish concrete gestational dates for recruitment.
Figure 2: Optimal Timing of Screening and Diagnostic Tests

Source: Chitayat et al, 2011; Evans et al, 2007; Wald et al, 2003; Wilson et al, 2005;

Most women who participate in prenatal screening will receive their results in the second
trimester, after the serum screen is analyzed. The blood and urine for the serum screen
should be collected between 15-21 completed3 weeks (Wald et al., 2003), but the earlier
in this time period the samples are collected, the more chance a woman will have to
make a decision about pursuing diagnostic testing and/or pregnancy termination.
Allowing time for collection, analysis, and scheduling of a follow up appointment,

3

“completed” week means the 6th day of that week. Weeks are counted from the date of the woman’s last
menstrual period.
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women who participate in a form of IPS will most likely receive their results sometime
after 16 completed weeks. Some women may participate in first trimester screening only,
or contingent screening and receive their results much earlier (Chitayat et al, 2011).

4.3.5.3 Participant sampling.
The sample began purposefully, with three participants recruited online and through word
of mouth. These initial interviews and data analysis informed purposive sampling
completed at the first London-Middlesex Health Unit Prenatal Fair, where an additional
seven participants were recruited. Simultaneously, an additional participant was recruited
from an online advertisement and another through word of mouth from a personal
contact. After these twelve participants were interviewed and the data was analysed,
theoretical saturation was near, but additional women were sought to shed light on the
theoretical properties of declining screening or having a lower level of education. One
additional participant was recruited online and three additional participants were recruited
from the London-Middlesex Health Unit Prenatal Fair for a total sample of 16
participants. Recruitment ceased at this time, as theoretical saturation had been met.
Charmaz (2006) describes theoretical saturation as the time when “gathering fresh data
no longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of these core
theoretical properties” (p. 113), and advises researchers who believe they may have
reached theoretical saturation to go back and recode earlier data to try and define new
leads in order not to foreclose analytic possibilities and end up with a final analysis that is
superficial.

4.3.5.4 Purposeful sampling.
I used purposeful sampling to identify participants who had recently received the offer of
prenatal screening but had not yet received results (or chosen not to participate).
Purposeful sampling is often confused with theoretical sampling (Coyne, 1997). Indeed
the use of theoretical sampling necessitates a purposeful sample to begin (Glaser, 1978),
as it is impossible to sample theoretically before categories have been formed through
analysis (Charmaz, 2006). Patton (1990 as cited in Coyne, 2003) describes purposeful
sampling as a way of selecting “information-rich cases for study in-depth … those from
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which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the research” (pg.
169). Glaser (1978) further describes the initial sample as taken from groups which the
researcher believes will “maximize the possibilities of obtaining data and leads for more
data” (pg. 45). Women were purposefully sampled through
•

Word of mouth referrals from personal contacts and former participants who
pass flyers (Appendix 3) to their contacts. (2 women)

•

Recruitment posters (Appendix 3) at places young women frequent- fitness
centres, grocery stores, drug stores, community gathering places. (0
respondents)

•

Online pregnancy forums. (4 women)

•

Attendance at the prenatal fairs run by the Middlesex-London public health
unit. These fairs occur monthly and are aimed at women in the first 16 weeks
of pregnancy. (10 women)

Since participants self-selected participation in this study, I predicted that the sample
would likely be composed of women who had thought deeply about prenatal screening,
those with strong interests in related topics (i.e. disability rights, anti-abortion), or those
seeking more information. I reasoned that women who are happy with the process and
have no questions about it might be less likely to volunteer to be part of the study,
although they are an important group to include. This prediction was true for the women
recruited online, but some women recruited at the Prenatal Fair seemed to be satisfied
with their experience and not have particularly strong thoughts or opinions about the
topic.

4.3.5.5 Theoretical sampling.
In addition to purposeful sampling, I also used theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling
shaped the recruitment of new informants in order to elaborate and refine the developing
categories (Charmaz, 2006). This was achieved by focusing recruitment on the emerging
categories and my evolving understanding of the developing theory (Glaser, 1978).
Through theoretical sampling I aimed to recruit women who chose not to participate in
prenatal screening. As analysis evolved, women with lower levels of education and those
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who were considering pregnancy termination in the event of a high-risk result were
sampled theoretically through the use of screening conversations with potential
participants. This methodological decision is discussed further in Chapter 9.

4.3.5.6 Data collection.
I conducted semi-structured interviews with sixteen pregnant women. Each woman was
interviewed once. While Charmaz (2006) thinks it may be important to return to
participants during analysis, if emerging categories require more questioning, in this
project a second interview was not possible. The interview focuses on the presentation of
prenatal screening and intentionally omits discussion of actual results; by the time the
interview data was analyzed, participants would have likely received the results of their
test, which may affect the way they remember or consider the initial presentation of the
test.

4.3.5.7 Design of the interview guide.
Charmaz (2006) emphasizes the importance of a well constructed interview guide in
order to produce rich data for analysis by guiding the participant to reflect on their
experiences. The questions of the interview guide should be constructed to fit the
participant’s experience, while at the same time exploring the interviewer’s topic of
interest. By keeping the interview guide short and open-ended, the interview can become
more conversational and the interviewer can respond to the information the participant is
giving, probing some points for more information (Charmaz, 2006).
While the structure of the interview guide remained consistent between interviews, subquestions changed throughout data collection to reflect my evolving understanding of the
developing theory at the time of the interview. New sub-questions were oriented towards
expanding or elaborating existing categories (Appendix 4).

4.3.5.8 Data analysis.
I inductively analyzed data with the aim of developing theory about the process of
making a decision about participating prenatal screening from the perspective of pregnant
women. Charmaz (2006) sees coding strategies as flexible, provided the research includes
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an initial code which eventually progresses to a focused code. The purpose of the initial
code is to develop a coding plan; the focused code will identify core categories. I refined
these ideas further into theoretical categories, with multiple, iterative rounds of coding
wherein emerging insights fueled additional analysis and data collection.

Quick Code: A “quick code” necessitates textual data. For the interview data, analysis
began with transcription in order to perform a “quick code” (Glaser, 1978; Charmaz,
2006), a fast open code used to keep the researcher’s mind open to the possibilities of the
data by using codes which are “provisional, comparative, and grounded in the data”
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 48). Charmaz (2006) thinks an initial quick code helps the researcher
remain receptive, and sparks new ideas.

Line by Line Coding: After the initial “quick code”, line by line coding of each
transcript (Charmaz, 2000; 2004a; 2006) was completed using literal, theoretical, and
metaphorical codes that are active. Glaser (1978) suggests that coding with gerunds (a
noun derived from a verb, usually ending in –ing) is helpful because these active words
allow the researcher to identify processes.

Focused Coding: Focused coding is used to make relationships and connections
through some of the commonly occurring or significant codes identified in the initial
process. This stage of coding requires decision making about what initial codes are
analytically significant, or what codes may contribute to the formation of categories.

Theoretical Coding: Theoretical coding took place after the completion of focused
coding (Glaser, 1978), to examine the relationship between focused codes. This can help
with formulating an initial theory. Glaser (1978) has identified possibilities for theoretical
coding families (ex. causes, context, identity-self, means-goals). Charmaz (2006)
cautions that although theoretical coding can assist with precision and clarity, theoretical
codes must fit your data and substantive analysis- they should be suggested from earlier
coding. Researchers cannot simply choose one of Glaser’s theoretical coding families and
apply it to the data.
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As an example of how coding categories were formed, Figure 3 is a diagram detailing the
way in which coding evolved for the third manuscript, Chapter 7. This diagram includes
different levels of coding and analytical questions which inspired the next round of
coding.

Figure 3: Example of Iterative Evolution of Coding

4.3.6 Memo writing.
I engaged in memo-writing throughout the entire research process to address reflexive
and methodological considerations. Memo-writing is often seen as the intermediate step
between coding and writing about the theory for presentation or publication (Glaser,
1978), but Charmaz (2008) thinks this conception of memo-writing understates the
importance of the process. Charmaz (2006; 2008) sees memo writing as an integral part
of grounded theory, allowing the researcher to trace ideas and categories as they develop,
and providing a framework for exploring, checking and developing ideas. Memos were
recorded in two ways- as loose notes when needed around specific pieces of data, and as

143

a journal to record my feelings and progress about the project, data, and discoveries.
Charmaz (2008) recommends the following strategies for using memos effectively:
1) Title the memos for easy sorting and storage
2) Write memos throughout the process
3) Use memos to define, delineate, and compare codes
4) Include the relevant data right in the memo
5) Outline the consequences of the code/category
6) Note gaps in the data and conjectures about these gaps
I managed the research memos throughout the project by opening a research-specific email account, where I could e-mail myself memos (written or dictated). This format
allowed me to search the memos and, if needed, to circulate them to my advisory
committee and record their responses. I also uploaded these memos into my data
management software (N-Vivo), so I could link them directly to the data. I wrote memos
after conducting each interview, transcribing each interview, coding each interview, and
during each round of coding. I also wrote memos about the process of the research.

4.3.7 Methodological decisions.
As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, I have been committed to a reflexive approach
to the research process, and to thinking carefully about possible implications of the
methodological decisions I have made throughout the project.
1) I chose to collect and analyze the textual data before the interview data. In part, this
decision was theoretical, as a way of informing myself about the context in which
prenatal screening takes place in Canada and familiarize myself with some of the material
and terminology that my interview participants might encounter. Since it is easier to go
back and re-examine texts, or change search criteria for texts than it is to re-interview
participants, I wanted to go into the participant interviews with as much understanding as
possible. There was also a logistical part of this decision: the use of textual data did not
require research ethics permission or involve a long phase of recruitment.
2) I chose to recruit participants in multiple ways, by posting online ads through
classified ad sites (kijiji.ca, craigslist.ca) and online pregnancy forums; posting ads in
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local businesses and community gathering sites; using social networks to recruit via word
of mouth; attending the London-Middlesex Health Unit Prenatal Fair. I didn't receive any
responses from the classified ad sites or from physical posters. I received a handful of
responses from online pregnancy forums. I received several word of mouth referrals, but
only two resulted in interviews. Others were excluded before an interview because they
miscarried or because they were not receiving prenatal care from a family physician. I
recruited most participants through the Prenatal Fair, where I had set up a table with
recruitment posters and letters of information. I spoke to all participants directly and if
they agreed to be contacted, I collected their contact information and e-mailed or phoned
at a later date to arrange an interview.
I chose to use multiple recruitment methods because I wanted to reach women who
weren't "information-seekers", but those who might see the poster or ad while living their
day to day lives, rather than looking for information on pregnancy. I had ads out for about
a month before I attended a prenatal fair, and had received little response. The word of
mouth referrals meant that I was referred to women who shared news of their pregnancy
very early on; these women may have been more likely to decline prenatal screening or
not be considering pregnancy termination in the event that a condition was found
(Rothman, 1989). Of my final participant pool, 14 of the 16 women were recruited
through ads on a pregnancy related site or at the Prenatal Fair. These women may be
more active in seeking information about pregnancy than others. With that said, as
discussed in manuscript four, there was one woman (Lucy) who chose not to seek
information about prenatal screening and two women (Farah and Nadia) who chose to
stop seeking information. All of these women were recruited through the Prenatal Fair,
suggesting that perhaps attendance at the Prenatal Fair did not necessarily correlate with
an interest in actively seeking information about prenatal screening.
All participants were self-selected volunteers and so perhaps were more interested than
average in research, or in the topic of prenatal screening. No honorarium was offered for
participating. Participants were offered the choice to be interviewed in person or over the
phone; most preferred to be interviewed over the phone (nine of 16 women), even those
who were recruited in person (seven out of ten women), perhaps reflecting convenience.
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For those who were interviewed in person, I offered the option of a public place of their
choosing, the public library, their home or my office (in London or Hamilton). Two
chose to be interviewed in their home, one in my office, one in a public library, and one
in a coffee shop. Four of these interviews were longer than average, perhaps because we
established better rapport, perhaps because there were few distractions, or perhaps
because agreeing to meet somewhere indicated higher interest and a higher commitment
of time to the interview. The women with the shortest interviews were all interviewed
over the phone, all recruited at the Prenatal Fair, and all participating in prenatal
screening. Compared to the other participants they had average level of education, were
average age, had some but not extensive knowledge of people with disabilities. These
women may reflect participants that don't have particularly strong thoughts or feelings
about prenatal screening who may not have responded to an online ad, but agreed to do
an interview when personally recruited.
3) I chose not to do a second interview or any form of member-checking because I was
interested in capturing thoughts and opinions about prenatal screening before the woman
had received any of her results (if participating). I reasoned that the results a woman
received might colour her thoughts about the prenatal screening test, such as creating
reassurance from anxiety in the event of a low-risk result. At the time of the interview,
women who were participating in prenatal screening were on average 15.6 weeks
gestation (range:11-20 weeks). It is possible to receive results as early as 16 weeks along,
which gave a very small window for transcribing and analyzing data in time for memberchecking. At the time of the interview, some women had the results appointment
scheduled within days, making member-checking impossible for this group. I did not
want to collect member-checking data from some but not all women, or to self-impose a
timeline which would place pressure to conduct the analysis very quickly, meaning I
might miss something important, or not be able to engage deeply with the analytical
process. Instead of member-checking with the participant who provided the data, I
decided to query future participants about emerging themes, and incorporate participant
response to the evolving analysis in this way. There was also an ethical element to the
decision not to return to the participants for member-checking: with the possibility that
some women may receive high-risk results, I did not want to re-open the conversation
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about making a decision to participate in prenatal screening, which may potentially cause
emotional stress, or heighten existing emotional stress.
4) For the patient education material collection, I chose to restrict my data collection to
Ontario or Canadian sources, in order to reflect the material that my participants were
most likely to encounter. This means that I would include material published by a
national organization (such as the SOGC) but not a provincial organization from outside
of the province (for example an Alberta based public health unit). I left flexibility in the
inclusion criteria to include any pamphlet or material mentioned by a research
participant. I chose to exclude books and websites, in order to keep the data collection
focused and to remain within one genre of information. These inclusion criteria decisions
were made to reflect the information that would be most likely be available to the
interview participants in the study, but allow flexibility to account for the broad
availability of information online. Many health organizations make their patient
information publications available online, where they can be accessed by a broader
population. Presumably any patient information materials I could find online can be
accessed by my research participants. During data collection, about half of the women
revealed that they were given patient information materials from their physicians. Only
one could provide the title of the pamphlet, the others had discarded, forgotten, or
misplaced their pamphlets.

4.4 From research questions to manuscripts: the
evolution of the research
Grounded theory is a methodology which is useful when not much is known about a
topic, as it aims to start by collecting broad data which will be continually refined
through ongoing analysis throughout data collection (Charmaz, 2006). I started with one
overarching research question and three sub-questions, aimed to address the three types
of data I planned to collect. In the process of data collection and analysis, the questions
were refined, to respond to the type of data available (in the case of the policy
documents) and the evolving categories being identified through data analysis (all three
types of data). An additional round of refining the research questions took place while
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drafting each manuscript; in order to respond to what the data was saying and the
particular story emerging from each data set.
Manuscript one (Chapter 5) responds to the first research sub-question, "How do
prenatal screening patient education materials portray concepts related to prenatal
screening?". I began this study by reading through patient education materials in
order to gain an understanding of the type of information women may receive when
choosing whether or not to participate in prenatal screening. As I was reading,
particular terms and words started to jump out at me. The experience of reading the
patient education materials was transformative, and may be considered a critical
incident (Brookfield, 1998) or a "struck-by" moment (Cunliffe, 1999). At the time I
was reading this material, I was deep in the literature, as necessitated by the
requirements of my program. I was aware of some literature about potentially
prejudicial terms about disability, such as "handicap", but what I noticed when I read
was that the tone of some documents was persuasive, rather than informative. These
two thoughts, about the potential of language to be prejudicial and persuasive,
inspired me to think more deeply about word choices and the impact that they may
have on women. I started to read more about theories of metaphor and the
constructive power of language to shape and constrain understandings of the world,
and of possibilities (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). At the same time, I was examining
policy documents, and I became aware of the imperative for "non-directive"
counseling in the SOGC clinical practice guideline (Summers et al, 2007). The story I
chose to tell about these data addressed the ways in which theories of metaphor
disrupt the notion that communication can be non-directive. I closely examined the
language and metaphors in the patient education materials to reflect upon ways in
which they might be suggestive, persuasive, or otherwise directive of a particular way
of thinking about pregnancy, disability and motherhood.
Manuscript two (Chapter 6), began with sub-question two, "How do policies and
guidelines shape the offer of prenatal screening?". When I wrote this research
question, before I had conducted an in-depth search for policy documents, I imagined
that I would find many different types of policy documents from different health
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professions involved in prenatal screening (family physicians, obstetriciansgynecologists, midwives, genetic counselors), different levels of government
(provincial health insurance agencies, local health integration networks, funding
formulas) and potentially some policy in the grey literature, from advocacy groups
concerned with pregnancy, public health, or disability. When I started to search, I
found that this was not the case. Beyond the SOGC guideline which catalyzed my
interest in this project (Summers et al, 2007), there was very little publicly available
policy on prenatal screening. However, the policy that did exist was extremely
important, precisely because there wasn't a lot of other guidance for health care
professionals counseling about prenatal screening. From my initial literature search,
one aspect of the SOGC guideline stood out as particularly important: non-directive
counseling. This was interesting to me, because it indicated that the SOGC stood
firmly behind the notion that screening should be the choice of the individual woman,
and that they did not conceptualize it as some sort of population "health" issue. I was
also interested to note that the mention of non-directive counseling and informed
decision-making merited only a brief mention, suggesting that physicians were
assumed to be well acquainted with the pragmatic aspects of facilitating informed
decision-making through a process of non-directive counseling. Yet, from my prior
literature review I was familiar with a large body of evidence suggesting that this was
not the case. At this point, I started to consider how to represent my findings in a
manner that would be appealing and helpful to clinicians. From regularly reading the
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology Canada, I knew that if I wanted to address this
clinical audience, I had to write a policy or literature review piece, rather than a
qualitative research piece (see section 9.8.1 for more information), but this fit well,
as they were the only group producing policy about prenatal screening. With this
understanding, and having identified non-directive counseling as a particular element
of interest, I focused my study on this topic. This study examined SOGC policy
directives, in light of the literature on non-directive counseling and other models of
counseling for informed choice, to suggest an alternative to non-directive counseling,
and to provide some detailed ideas for clinicians to consider regarding the ways in
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which counseling to support informed decisions might take place in the specific
context of prenatal screening.
Manuscripts three and four (Chapters 7 and 8) both evolved from the third research
sub-question, "How do women use information when making a decision about
whether or not to participate in prenatal screening?". The data that I collected from
women about their experiences of being offered and making a decision about whether
or not to participate in prenatal screening were so rich that it would be impossible to
tell all of the stories that I saw within these data. During the iterative process of data
collection and analysis, I quickly identified the concept of "information" as an
important analytical construct, and pulled all mentions of "information" from the rest
of the data, in order to consider the different ways in which women talked about this
idea. This became manuscript three, through the iterative process of coding described
in Figure 3, in the Data Analysis section (4.3.5.8). I observed that the literature on
informed decision making constructed the idea of what it was to be "informed" in a
very particular way, relying heavily on statistical and biomedical understandings.
From Sherwin (1998), I understood that the social construction of rationality and
being informed may contribute to problematic aspects of traditional conceptions of
autonomy (for more detail see section 2.5). With this in mind, I approached the data
with the question of what information the women reported as important for their
decision-making process about participation in prenatal screening. I wrote the first
draft of the manuscript to portray these findings, however later then refined the
categories to tell the story of what information women require in a manner which
could be beneficial to clinicians, who are a significant source of information for
women.
In the fourth manuscript (Chapter 8), I examined the interview data as a whole, to
consider the broader processes described by women as they talked about how they
came to make a decision about participating in prenatal screening. In this manuscript I
propose a grounded theory model which describes the whole process, portraying how
women indicated that information was sought, received, and interpreted as they
worked towards making a decision.
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4.5 Conclusion
This research examined the question of how the process of prenatal screening is enacted
in Ontario in light of the 2007 SOGC guidelines, from the perspective of young women
in their first pregnancy. This question was examined using an inductive grounded theory
approach, and drew on data from three different sources: patient education materials,
policy and guidelines, and pregnant women. In this chapter, I described the
methodological approach (constructionist grounded theory) and the particular methods
adopted for this study. In Chapter 9, I explore some of the connections between the
different types of data and discuss the ways in which these three data sets enable a fuller
understanding of the process of prenatal screening.
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5

Critical Reflection and Prenatal Screening Public
Education Materials: A Metaphoric Textual Analysis4

“In most cases, what is at issue is not the truth or falsity of a metaphor, but the
perceptions and inferences that follow from it and the actions that are sanctioned
by it. In all aspects of life, not just in politics or in love, we define our reality in
terms of metaphors and then proceed to act on the basis of the metaphors. We
draw inferences, set goals, make commitments, and execute plans ... by means of
metaphor”
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a p.158)

5.1 Introduction
This paper presents a study of prenatal screening educational materials that uses
metaphoric textual analysis as a means of critical reflection to examine implicit messages
in educational resources. An assumption of the study is that metaphoric language is
important because it shapes our understanding of the world. Lakoff and Johnson (1980a,
1980b) suggest that metaphors are used every time an abstract idea is discussed; they
allow abstract ideas to be understood by comparing them to concrete ideas. This
comparison highlights certain similarities, and disguises or de-emphasizes differences.
Metaphors may also have the effect of creating similarities where none exist. The
acceptance of metaphoric language without examination means an acceptance of the
similarities with the comparative object which shapes the way an object/idea is
conceptualized, discussed, and used.
In 2007, the offer of prenatal screening was expanded. Previously, maternal age (>35
years) was the main criterion when offering testing; after Society of Obstetricians and
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A version of this chapter has been published: Vanstone, M. & Kinsella, E.A. (2010). Critical Reflection
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Gynecologists of Canada Clinical Practice Guideline (Summers, Langlois, Wyatt &
Wilson, 2007), prenatal screening will be offered to all pregnant women in Canada.
When instructing physicians to offer prenatal screening to all women, Summers et al
(2007) explicitly state that counseling about this issue should be non-directive, promote
choice, and be respectful of the needs and quality of life of people with disabilities. This
study draws on metaphoric textual analysis to examine whether the written public
education materials available to Canadian women are consistent with these aims.
This paper begins with a brief examination of prenatal educational materials in the
context of prenatal screening in Canada. This is followed by an explanation of the
methodology and analytical approaches of the study. Findings from the prenatal
screening public education pamphlets are presented, and highlight the figurative and
metaphoric language identified in the educational resources.
The discussion considers the ways in which prenatal screening education pamphlets may
communicate subtle directives to women, and offers suggestions for the design of nondirective prenatal screening educational materials. In addition the discussion considers
the ways in which metaphoric analysis can foster critical reflection and reveal insights
important for the design of educational materials in health care.
It is important to note that discussions of prenatal screening can be morally charged due
to their inherent relation to politicized and ethically contested ideas about disability and
abortion. When educational materials are cast as “non-directive” or neutral, it may be
difficult for patients, practitioners and educators to recognize the ideological assumptions
embedded within. The authors of this paper do not wish to make moral or ethical
judgments with respect to the findings, but rather to illuminate the issue so that those who
design health education materials and those who use them may be better informed.

5.2 Background
This study began with a feeling of dissonance experienced while reading prenatal
screening educational pamphlets. The power of the language within the pamphlets was
striking: specificities about “problems”, “diseases”, “defects” that could be detected
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through “simple”, “quick”, blood and ultrasound tests, “allowing” women to “make
decisions” about “ending the pregnancy”, or “providing reassurance” about a “healthy
baby”. Reading these pamphlets was a critical incident (Brookfield, 1998) or a critical
vibration (Holloway, 2002) that prompted reflection about the implicit messages about
pregnancy and disability communicated in prenatal screening educational materials.
Holloway (2002) describes a critical vibration, or feeling of dissonance/frustration, as
“The Scream”, which acts as a call to theoretical reflection5 from the opposition and
struggle of everyday life. The Scream may take different forms: an inarticulate mumble
of discontent, tears of frustration, a scream of rage, a feeling of unease, of confusion or of
longing. Whether the dissonance we feel arises from direct or indirect experience,
Holloway states that this is the starting point of reflective thought- not reason, not
rational philosophizing, but dissonance and opposition. Holloway’s critical vibration
encapsulates the feeling and process of critical reflection that led to the study.
One of the tenets of prenatal screening/testing discussions in Canada is non-directive
counseling (Summers et al, 2007). Despite this clear guideline, the pamphlets appeared to
use directive language cloaked in the guise of “choice” (Lippman, 1991). Intensive
reading revealed common metaphors and conceptual systems of metaphor that promoted
prenatal tests as a way to “reassure” women about “healthy” babies and find “defective”
fetuses in time for “termination of the pregnancy”. The prevalence of this directive
message was unsettling and fostered critical reflection on the ways that certain common
metaphors promote particular ideological messages.

5.3 Prenatal Screening Educational Materials
5.3.1 Prenatal screening in Canada.
Prenatal screening is a probability calculation based on a number of factors. The
calculation shows the chance that a fetus has some sort of aneuploidy, including an open

5

Holloway does not connect this term with traditional Reflective Practice scholarship and related terms,
although there is an echo of critical reflection in his description of the purpose and operation of theoretical
reflection.
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neural tube defect (e.g. spina bifida), chromosomal anomaly (e.g. Down syndrome), or
physiological anomaly. There are many accepted variations of prenatal screening tests,
depending on the resources of the geographical area in which the test is performed, and
the time at which the woman presents for prenatal care (Summers et al, 2007). Generally,
prenatal screening involves an ultrasound and maternal blood test. The results of these
tests are used with the woman’s age to calculate a probability of fetal aneuploidy.
Prenatal screening tests are not definitive, but are a non-invasive way of determining a
probability. If the probability of aneuploidy is judged to be high, the woman can choose
to engage in an invasive testing technique (such as chorionic villus sampling, or
amniocentesis) that will provide a definitive result. The invasive tests have risks of
miscarriage, bleeding, malformation, and amniotic fluid aspiration (Brambati & Tului,
2005; Farrell et al, 1999) so they are not used unless a non-invasive test establishes a
probability of aneuploidy that is worrisome for the woman. There is no cure or treatment
for most of the aneuploidies detected by prenatal screening, and women who receive a
positive screen for aneuploidy have the options of abortion, adoption, or increased time to
prepare to raise a child with this condition.
In 2007, prenatal screening policy in Canada changed significantly. A 2007 Clinical
Practice Guideline issued by the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada
(Summers et al, 2007) mandated that prenatal screening must be offered to all pregnant
women, in a non-directive way that promotes informed consent and choice (p. 147).
Summers et al (2007) also specify that prenatal screening should be offered in a way that
“shows respect for the needs and quality of life of persons with disabilities” (p. 147). The
opportunity to access prenatal screening can be an important choice for Canadian women.
However, the offer of prenatal screening and ensuing decisions require careful
consideration.

5.3.2 Prenatal public education pamphlets.
Public education pamphlets are used widely in medical screening programs (Fox, 2006)
and are highly valued by women considering prenatal screening as a preferred way of
obtaining information, second only to discussions with their physician (Dahl, Kesmodel,
Hvidman & Olesen, 2006). However, the tone of information, word choice, and balance
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of content provided can effect the way that patients make decisions about whether or not
to engage in prenatal screening (Bryant et al, 2001; Dahl et al, 2006; Loeben, Marteau &
Wilfond, 1998).
Dixon-Woods (2001) discusses the discourse embedded in patient information pamphlets.
She finds that most pamphlets are written from a “patient education” perspective, a
discourse which characterizes patients as incompetent, passive, and forgetful. These
pamphlets seek to educate patients in order to “bring patients’ knowledge into line with
what is medically ‘correct’” (pg. 1419) and to ensure compliance with biomedical
priorities. Raffle (2001) discusses the way screening pamphlets are used to encourage
uptake of screening, rather than provide information to encourage choice. A recent
review of the literature about patient education pamphlets reveals that they are used to
save time in a medical consultation, achieve cost-benefits for the health care system, and
as a substitute for expensive professional time (Dixon-Woods, 2001). Dixon-Woods
(2001) theorizes that a contrasting discourse to “patient education” pamphlets is “patient
empowerment” pamphlets. Patient empowerment pamphlets aim to provide information
as a means of empowering patients to make informed choices, rather than correcting them
or persuading them to acquiesce to biomedical priorities.

5.3.3 Prenatal screening educational materials and nondirective language
The process of decision making around prenatal screening has been well studied in
Britain, the USA, and Australia. Current public education materials about prenatal
screening and testing in these countries have been critiqued for: requiring literacy levels
above that of a general audience (Freda, Damus & Merkatz, 1999); insufficient
information to make decisions about testing (Shepperd et al, 2006); negative tone (Bryant
et al, 2001; Loeben et al, 1998); omission of information (Van den Heuvel et al 2008);
and language that may be viewed as prejudicial (Hodgson, Hughes & Lambert, 2005).
Public education materials with these issues are problematic with respect to the goal of
facilitating non-directive counseling and informed choice as necessitated by the Clinical
Practice Guideline governing this procedure (Summers et al, 2007).
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Many studies address the explicit information included in the pamphlet, such as the
balance of information (Bryant et al, 2001), number of positive and negative descriptive
statements about conditions tested for (Loeben et al, 1998), or content of information
provided (Dahl et al, 2006). Previous studies often mention the affect that word choice
can have on the perception of particular conditions and decision making, however such
studies do not investigate particular words and their implicit messages.
Non-directive counseling, which involves providing sufficient and comprehensive
information in a neutral fashion in order to encourage the client to make an informed
choice, is one of the original tenets of genetic counseling (Fine, 1993; Weil, 2003).
Although long considered the “norm” in genetic counseling practice (Burke & Kolker,
1994) some authors argue that non-directive counseling may be impossible to fully
achieve (Anderson, 1999; Bartels, LeRoy, McCarthy & Caplan, 1997; CunninghamBarley & Kerr, 1999; Williams et al, 2002). Others wonder if it is even desirable
(Anderson, 1999; Benkendorf, Prince, Rose, Fina & Hamilton, 2001; Caplan, 1993;
Clarke, 1994; Gervais, 1993; Weil, 2003) as it may prevent the client from accessing the
full value of the counselor’s professional knowledge and expertise. Nonetheless, the
current guidelines (Summers et al, 2007) advocate non-directive counseling as an
imperative to prenatal screening counseling; the central concern of this study is to
analyze the pamphlets with attention to implicit messages that may be directive.
In light of this review, the questions of the current study are: What are the primary
metaphors and figurative expressions embedded within PNS educational pamphlets
available to pregnant women in Canada? What does critical reflection on these metaphors
reveal about implicit messages embedded within the educational materials? What are the
implications for the design of future prenatal screening health education pamphlets?

5.4 Metaphoric Textual Analysis
This study, one component of a larger grounded theory study about the process of
prenatal screening, used a textual analysis technique we have called Metaphoric Textual
Analysis, informed by the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980a, 1980b), Charteris-Black
(2004), and Schmitt (2000, 2005). A metaphor is a linguistic device that describes one
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(abstract) idea by comparing it to another (concrete) idea (Lakoff & Johnson 1980a). For
example, when an ultrasound image is described as a “picture”, the abstract idea is the
interpretation of sonic data to create a visual image. This is described in terms of a
concrete idea (a picture is a visual image that is not the interpretation of sonic data). This
visual metaphor is extended when we speak of an ultrasound letting the mother “see” the
baby; the word “see” is a metaphor because no visual information is used, a literal
description would be that an ultrasound lets the mother see a visual image compiled from
a mechanical interpretation of sonic/aural data. This level of literal detail can be
cumbersome; the metaphor facilitates understanding by comparing the abstract idea to a
concrete one. However, when a comparison is made certain similarities are highlighted
while differences are de-emphasized. This emphasis/de-emphasis may direct a particular
understanding of the abstract idea.
Metaphoric textual analysis is an approach that analyzes metaphors within textual
material in order to critically reflect on various interpretive messages, and ideological
strains within the text. Such an approach is based on the assumption that metaphors are
fundamental to how humans understand the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a), and that
different levels of reflection may be engaged through metaphoric thought (CharterisBlack, 2004). An examination of metaphoric systems can help to reveal particular
ideologies which may inform that system (Charteris-Black, 2004; Lakoff 2002).
Metaphor can also be used to prompt reflection (Kinsella, 2000), examine unstated
opinions and assumptions (Charmaz, 2006), uncover bias created by provision of
unintentional information (Kitzinger, 1999), and to foster insight into the way an
individual or society systematically organizes the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a).
Metaphor has been used in critical textual analysis to reveal ideologies (Fraser, 2006;
Lule, 2004; Martin, 1984, 1987, 1991; Sontag, 1978; Taylor, 1998, 2008) and has been
developed into an analytical technique (Schmitt 2000, 2005).

5.4.1 Assumptions about metaphor .
More than just a linguistic flourish, metaphor is a way of thinking and persuading
(Charteris-Black, 2004). Metaphor acts as an interpretive bridge between abstract and
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concrete ideas, thus structuring the way we conceptualize the world (Lakoff & Johnson,
1980a). Metaphor creates particular boundaries around the way we can think about and
interact with a particular topic. Lakoff and Johnson (1980a, 1980b) explain how the way
we conceptualize a concept systematically influences the way that concept takes place,
the way we think about that concept, the way we interact with that concept. Metaphors
also act to fill gaps in a lexicon; this may be semantic, accommodating changes in a
conceptual system, or pragmatic, conveying specific intentions of the speaker (CharterisBlack, 2004). Many metaphors are conceptually related. Lakoff and Johnson (1980a) use
the example of Argument Is War; there are multiple metaphors about arguing that
compare it to battling (e.g. attack a position, indefensible, strategy, new line of attack,
win, gain ground etc.) These expressions form a systematic way of talking (and thinking)
about arguing; they also shape the way we enact arguing, as an adversarial process where
there is a winner and loser, attacks, counter attacks, defences etc. How might our
interpretations be different if we thought and spoke about argument in terms of
metaphors of dancing? Dancing metaphors may encourage consideration of the cooperative and artful aspects of arguing, ideas which are hidden or de-emphasized when
describing argument with the metaphors of war.
Metaphor influences understanding in a way that may give false impressions of
physiological systems that may lead to incorrect notions of the body, anatomy, and
medicine (Banks & Thompson, 1996), change treatment decisions (Martin, 1984), affect
the understanding of cellular processes (Brown, 2003; Martin, 1991), and even change
the path of investigation and conceptualization of DNA and genetics (Kay, 2000).

5.5 Critical Reflection
Metaphoric textual analysis invokes a process of critical reflection on the implicit
messages and ideological stances that may be embedded within the metaphors used in the
text. It questions the taken-for-granted meanings of the language used, encouraging these
meanings to be challenged and reconsidered. Critical reflection is a term with multiple
meanings that has been used across several disciplines. In this project we engaged with
the idea of critical reflection as ideology critique (Brookfield, 1998, 2000, 2005). This
approach to critical reflection focuses on becoming aware of the ways in which an
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ideology affects social relations by imposing particular assumptions and belief systems
(ideologies) which encourage, support, and maintain particular ways of viewing the
world (Brookfield, 2000, 2005). Critical reflection is the first step to ideology critique,
encouraging recognition of the ways ideology operates in the world. Critical reflection
helps produce what Joe Kincheloe calls “a meta-awareness of the way consciousness is
constructed” (2008, p. 218), in this instance through language. Such a recognition aids in
the identification and analysis of the way we work in the world and the way the world
works in us (Kincheloe, 2008).
Critical reflection is based on the idea that decisions and actions originate from a
consideration of the broader moral, ethical, political and historical context (Yost, Sentner
& Forlenza-Bailey, 2000) with a focus on ends as well as means (Zeichner, 1981).
Critical reflection is focused on “helping people come to an awareness of how an
[ideological system] shapes social relations and imposes - often without our knowledge belief systems and assumptions” (Brookfield, 2000, p.36). Ideology critique aims to
reveal hidden insights about the nature of the “taken for granted” world (Brookfield,
2000). In short, critical reflection informs the methodology of the current study in a
number of ways. First, critical reflection allows taken-for-granted meanings in the public
education pamphlets to be questioned and different possible interpretive understandings
to be explored. Second, critical reflection draws attention to implicit ideological
messages in the public education materials, and the actions these messages propose.

5.6 Texts: Inclusion Criteria
Thirteen prenatal screening public education pamphlets were included in the study (Table
4). The following inclusion criteria were used to identify texts in the study: publicly
available; available in English; aimed at women considering prenatal screening; written
for an Ontario or Canadian audience; major focus is prenatal screening (although texts
which also discuss prenatal testing were eligible); available free of charge; available
online. Pamphlets aimed at professionals, written by a non-Canadian organization, or that
address only prenatal testing were excluded. Inclusion and exclusion criteria did not
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address the date of publication of the pamphlet; if the pamphlet was available at the time
of the search, it was eligible for inclusion.
Table 4: Prenatal screening patient education pamphlets
Author

Title

URL

Canadian Down

Prenatal Testing and

http://www.ahsc.health.nb.ca/prenatal

Syndrome Society

Down Syndrome

screening/pamphlet.htm

Early Prenatal Risk

First Trimester Combined

http://www.earlyriskassessment.com/Porta

Assessment Program

Screening (FTS)

ls/0/FTS%20Information%20Brochure_v2
.pdf

Genetics Education

For Women and Their

http://www.barriemidwives.com/info/Pren

Project

Families .... A guide to

atal-

understanding prenatal

Screening_A_Guide_to_Understanding.pd

screening tests

f

Integrated Pregnancy

http://www.mountsinai.on.ca/care/pdmg/te

Screening (IPS)

sts/ips

Mt. Sinai Hospital

Ontario Ministry of

Ontario Prenatal Screening http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/publi

Health and Long

c/program/child/prenatal/

Term Care
Ontario Multiple

Ontario Multiple Marker

http://tbh.net/programs_&_services/matern

Marker Screening

Screening Program

ity_centre/ontario_multiple_marker_scree

Program

ning.pdf

Ontario Maternal

Maternal Serum

http://www.lhsc.on.ca/programs/rmgc/mss

Serum Screening

Screening: it’s your choice

/pamphlet.htm

Integrated Prenatal

http://www.lhsc.on.ca/programs/rmgc/mss

Committee
Ontario Maternal
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Serum Screening

Screening (IPS): it’s your

Committee

choice

Northwestern Ontario

Integrated Prenatal

http://www.tbdhu.com/NR/rdonlyres/286B

Regional Genetics

Screening (IPS): Pamphlet

4AC5-E2D0-4FFC-B7F0-

Program

/pamphlet.htm

DE83E576BBD8/0/integratedprenatalscre
eningbrochure.pdf

Northwestern Ontario

Prenatal Screening and

http://www.tbdhu.com/clinics/genetics/gen

Regional Genetics

Testing Options

etics+pamphlets.htm

Northwestern Ontario

Integrated Prenatal

http://www.tbdhu.com/NR/rdonlyres/A792

Regional Genetics

Screening (IPS): Fact

B615-AC33-42DF-91B6-

Program

Sheet

59CD2DAE8BA5/0/integratedprenatalscre

Program

ening.pdf
Society of

Prenatal Diagnosis: Public

http://www.sogc.org/health/pdf/prenatal_e.

Obstetricians and

Education Pamphlet

pdf

Warnex Medical

Prenatest: Prenatal

http://www.warnex.ca/docs/prenatest.en.p

Laboratories

Screening Test 3rd

df

Gynecologists of
Canada

Generation
The educational pamphlets were obtained through an online search of health care
agencies, professional colleges, advocacy groups, industry groups, and government
programs operating in Ontario, Canada. Search strategies were limited to public search
engines in order to locate educational material that is accessible to the public. A list of
search terms is included in Table 5.
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Table 5: Search terms (each +Canada, +Ontario)
Prenatal screening pamphlet

Screen positive, down

Maternal serum screening

syndrome
Integrated pregnancy

Integrated prenatal

Prenatal screening,

screening

screening

brochure

Should I get prenatal

Prenatal screening test

Prenatal screening, patient

screening?

education

Prenatal screening, patient
information

5.7 Analysis
Schmitt’s (2000, 2005) Systematic Metaphor Analysis, based on Lakoff and Johnson’s
Conceptual Metaphor Theory, was adopted to guide the analysis of this study. The
analysis began with an initial review of each pamphlet; metaphors, figurative, and
questionable language were circled. The metaphors and figurative language were then
identified using a word by word coding strategy (Schmitt, 2000, 2005), and grouped both
across and within individual pamphlets. This grouping facilitated the identification of key
conceptual metaphors that established a lexicon of metaphoric concepts. Each conceptual
metaphor system, or series of conceptually related metaphors, was used for interpretive
and reconstructive analysis. Various possible interpretations of each conceptual metaphor
system were then considered using critical reflection.

5.7.1 Metaphors of prenatal screening.
The metaphoric textual analysis of the pamphlets identified many examples of metaphors
reflected both in figurative language and in particular discrete metaphors. Some of the
most salient examples are included below as illustrative examples. The quotes are drawn
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from the prenatal screening educational resources identified earlier, and identified by
resource number.

5.7.2 Figurative language.
Figurative language is a term that refers to a word, or group of words, which do not have
a literal definition (denotation), or which has a connotation that may add layers of
meaning. For example the word “embryo” does not have a concrete definition- the
progression between a blastocyst/embryo/ fetus is defined idiosyncratically (Nisker,
Baylis, Karpin, McLeod & Mykitiuk 2009). Figurative language in this study was found
to be: neutral or suggestive, non-directive or directive, clear or indirect, and able-ist or
oriented toward disability rights.

5.7.3 Neutral versus suggestive terminology.
Neutral terminology is difficult to achieve in prenatal education materials, as seemingly
neutral words such as baby and fetus carry implicit assumptions. One pamphlet used
neutral terminology by adopting the word “pregnancy” throughout. Six pamphlets
consistently used the word “baby”, and two pamphlets differentiated between fetus/baby
at the point of birth. Other pamphlets used the term “fetus” or “embryo” to refer to an
affected pregnancy or decision to abort, and “baby” or “infant” when promoting
reassurance provided by the test, or the desire to have an unaffected child. This
terminology can be suggestive in various ways. As an example, one can readily see that
the phrase “your choice to abort your infant” has a different interpretive and emotional
meaning than “your choice to abort the fetus”. Suggestive terminology was more evident
in some pamphlets than others. For instance one pamphlet declared that a serum screen
performed in the second trimester can “pick up approximately 60% of infants with Down
Syndrome” (#2). The use of suggestive terminology such as baby/fetus can disrupt the
goal of non-directive or neutral counseling, but it can also function ideologically. The
ethically and morally charged nature of these words can communicate an ideological
directive to the reader. A full discussion of the implications of the use of such morally
charged words is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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5.7.4 Non-directive versus directive language
The language in the pamphlets could be seen to be directive to different degrees within
the pamphlet. For instance, the meaning of the screening results can be quite directive of
what should be done after receiving results. A less directive way of describing results is
to describe what they mean without a value judgment. For example, “screen negative
means a lower chance of Down syndrome” (#8) is less directive than using a negative
result to create a dichotomy between health in opposition to disability. This dichotomy is
created when a negative result is said to lead to “the birth of a healthy baby” (#7),
“perfect baby” (#3), or “normal baby” (#9). Conversely, a result is less directive when
described in terms of information currently available, without judgment about future
possibilities. For example, describing a positive result as a higher chance of a “birth
anomaly” (#1) is less directive than describing a positive test result in terms of a
“severely affected baby” (#2).
The way some of the pamphlets portray what the test offers to a woman (or couple) can
be directive, for instance when the pamphlet implies how the woman will feel about her
result. Promising feelings of reassurance, choice, and control in the event of a negative
screening result can direct women to participate in testing, i.e. “normal results of
prenatal screening are reassuring” (#7). This language omits possible feelings of anxiety
or worry the woman may experience if she receives a positive result from the screen.
Many pamphlets omitted discussion of possible feelings and decisions to be made if a
positive result is received, although one discussed this issue in great detail (#11). Less
directive language would include specific information about decisions and plans that can
be made in the event of a positive result, i.e. “prepare for the birth of a baby who may
require additional care, opportunities for prenatal preparation and education of family
members, choice to terminate the pregnancy” (#3).
Another example of directive language was found in the word “risk” which was
frequently used in the materials examined. When pamphlets describe the results as
conveying a “risk”, this may be seen as implicitly directive because the word risk has a
negative connotation. For instance, we don’t talk about someone having a risk of winning
the lottery. A less directive word is one which conveys the likelihood of the results
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without a value judgment, for example incidence (#8), chance (#11, 12), or probability
(#8).

5.7.5 Clear versus indirect language.
Abortion is an integral concept to prenatal screening, since most of the conditions tested
for do not have treatments, or cures. Prenatal screening is usually offered under the
assumption that women can choose to have an abortion if they do not wish to give birth
to a child with an aneuploidy. Many pamphlets fail to state this fact clearly, using vague
phrases such as “make a decision about this pregnancy” (#5) or euphemisms like “choose
whether or not to continue with pregnancy” (#2). Often the word “termination” is used,
although Grimes and Stuart (2010) find this to be vague and confusing, since all
pregnancies terminate eventually- in birth, miscarriage, or abortion. Only one pamphlet
used the word “abortion” (#11).
A number of pamphlets do not address the issue of what to do with test results, or what
choices are available beyond the opportunity to engage in further testing. When this issue
is addressed, it is often set as a dichotomy: abortion or no abortion. For instance,
pamphlet #2 states that women should make the decision to participate in testing “after
considering what they would do if the results suggested there was a problem”, although
the pamphlet does not discuss any option beyond “make a decision regarding continuing
the pregnancy”. Pamphlets 3 and 11 give some alternative options after receiving a
positive screening result, including adoption, preparation for the birth of a baby with
special needs, and education of self, friends, and family members.

5.7.6 Able-ist versus disability rights language.
Many of the pamphlets analyzed for this project contained distinctly able-ist assumptions.
Words such as “healthy”, “normal”, and “perfect” were placed in opposition to
“difference” and “genetic condition”. Genetic conditions and physiological differences
are described as “birth defects”, “problems”, and “abnormalities”. The screening tests are
constructed as providing “reassurance”, and offering “choice”, allowing the
mother/couple to “make decisions about how to proceed”. Prenatal screening tests rarely
detect conditions that can be ameliorated through therapy; most times the “choice”
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offered is about whether to abort a wanted child based on a numerical “risk” that fetus
may have a genetic condition or physiological difference. Disability rights advocates
point out that prenatal screening frequently makes assumptions about “who” ie. ablebodied, “normal”, “perfect” people, are of value to the world (Parens & Asch 2000).

5.7.7 Metaphors
The pamphlets were filled with metaphors, including metaphors that described biological
and technological processes (e.g. test is performed, blood is collected, cross the barrier,
rearrangement of pieces of chromosomes, genetic material, carry a baby), and
administrative issues (the cost is covered, the test is provided for). Sometimes metaphors
were used as euphemisms (losing the pregnancy, assuming the costs of a test that is not
covered). Some words that we use as nouns are also metaphors (labour, delivery,
miscarriage). A number of metaphors reflected strong “able-ist” ideological assumptions.
Many of these metaphors occurred in multiple pamphlets. Three metaphors that dominate
the field are presented below: birth defect, prenatal screening, and prenatal testing.

5.7.7.1 Birth defect.
Birth Defect is a commonly used metaphor that was frequently seen in the educational
pamphlets. Such a metaphor may be seen as implicitly comparing a fetus to a defective
product. This metaphor may be interpreted as commodifying the fetus by emphasizing
that something is wrong, useless, abnormal, flawed, or not functioning, that it is less
valuable than similar “products” without a defect. “Birth Defect” may also be seen as
comparing birth to production, reinforcing the idea of fetuses as products and mothers as
producers. According to Rothman (1989), the commodification of conception implicitly
places the blame for a birth defect on the mother- the “inept worker” (p.6).

5.7.7.2 Prenatal screening.
The metaphor prenatal screening, adopted as the dominant phrase by the medical
community, may also be interpreted as participating in the Birth as Production
conceptual system. Prenatal screening acts as “quality control”, separating wanted fetuses
from unwanted. Screening is the process of examining a number of objects and sorting
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them based on pre-determined criteria; keeping the good, and discarding the bad. Prenatal
screening may be viewed as a metaphor for the process of sifting, of running material
through a sieve (or screen), which catches some pieces of material and lets others fall
through. Kress (2006) observes that in the “screen” metaphor “the sense of partitioning is
strongly present; ... there is stuff on the one side that does not reach the other- and is not
supposed to- the stuff on the one side is actively sorted so as to make it suitable for
whatever uses there may be on the other” (pg 201). When a baker screens, or sifts, flour,
she places the raw material on the sieve and lets most fall through (fetuses without
aneuploidy), but the size of the hole in the sieve (diagnostic criteria) catches the
undesirable material (fetuses with aneuploidy), allowing it to be subject to further
scrutiny and then discarded (aborted) if it is not up to a pre-determined standard. This
metaphor disguises the fact that the diagnostic criteria are arbitrary. While some people
may consider Down syndrome to be a problem, others would not agree; the inclusion of a
condition in a list of unspecified “birth defects” or “problems” does not allow individual
women to think about particularities. The discourse has already decided particular
conditions are a defective way of living, expressed by naming that condition a “defect”.

5.7.7.3 Prenatal testing.
Prenatal testing is also a metaphor, that may be seen as describing the procedure not as
information seeking, but as information validating. A test is something that can be
influenced: diligent test takers will pass, proving their knowledge, worth, or utility;
negligent test takers will fail, proving their laziness, ignorance, or uselessness. A test is
evaluated as pass/fail, and these are valued accordingly. By describing prenatal screening
as a test, the true nature of the procedure may be seen to be disguised. A prenatal
screening test seeks information, it does not validate the information provided by a
woman. The woman being tested cannot do anything to influence the outcome, and her
past actions have not affected the outcome in any way. By using the word test,
responsibility for the outcome is placed on the mother. Although results from prenatal
tests are described as positive/negative, ideological messages (as outlined in the rest of
this paper) may implicitly communicate what the desired result should be; women may
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internalize this and interpret the reception of desired result (negative for aneuploidy) as
“passing the test”.

5.8 Discussion
Prenatal screening is now a routine part of prenatal care for pregnant women of all ages
in the Canadian context (Summers et al, 2007). Education about this process and the
consequent choices available to women is an important complement to clinical practice.
Yet, critical reflection through metaphor analysis reveals that the language used within
such educational material has not achieved the level of neutrality necessitated by the
requirements of non-directive counseling. Indeed subtle ideological messages may be
seen to be conveyed through metaphoric and figurative language, and these messages
may implicitly guide women in the choices they make about their pregnancies.
Metaphor is an inextricable component of language, and so the presence of metaphor
within the educational pamphlets is not in itself problematic. Rather, the analysis reveals
that metaphors may contain ideological messages that appear so natural and self-evident
that they may not be questioned, even though they may guide or influence women’s
understandings, actions and choices. It is this dimension which is of concern. This
implicit directive to conform to biomedical objectives is what Dixon-Woods (2001)
refers to as “patient education” discourse and is prevalent in most of the pamphlets in this
study. Some pamphlets, notably (#8 and 11), participate in a “patient empowerment”
discourse, presenting comprehensive information without directives, so women can
evaluate the information and decide how they wish to proceed.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980a) contend that we are not aware of the ways that metaphors
construct our conceptual system, because we react to that conceptual system
automatically. The subversive potential of metaphor rests on the assertion that they are
“so natural and so pervasive in our thought that they are usually taken as self evident”
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980a p.29). Recognition of the subversive power of metaphor calls
to mind Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse. Foucault (1972) views discourse as a
group of institutionalized statements (including any type of utterance) about a particular
topic (or object) that functions to form that topic. A discourse is a regulated group of
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statements which can combine with other discourses in predictable ways- there are “rules
which lead to the distribution and circulation of certain utterances and statements … but
rather than seeing discourse as simply a set of statements which have some coherence, we
should think of a discourse as existing because of a complex set of practices which try to
keep them in circulation and other practices which try to keep other statements out of
circulation” (Mills, 2003, p. 54). Discourse is the manifestation of thought into language
and defines the ways we can talk or think about that topic (or object), therefore defining
the truth of that topic (or object) (Blood, 2005). By defining the truth of an object,
discourse shapes and constrains our ways of understanding the world. Unreflective
acceptance of a particular discourse shapes the way we perceive reality. This study has
used metaphoric textual analysis as a means to engage in critical reflection, and to
question some of the taken-for-granted messages conveyed in prenatal screening
educational material.
Many of the pamphlets analyzed contained distinctly able-ist assumptions. This discourse
promotes a particular conclusion or choice of action before any other information is
established (i.e. information such as what is the condition, what is it like to live with that
condition, what is it like to raise a child with that condition, what resources are available
etc.). Conclusions are promoted through rhetorical features such as construction of the
oppositions of normal/abnormal, health/disability, reassurance/worry, which create an
idea of what type of person is valued, and construct the way that pregnant women can
think about their future child. Discourses of choice and reassurance, and problems,
decisions, solutions compose an internal logic of seek-detect-destroy. When a physician
offers a test to “reassure” a new mother that her baby is “healthy”, how can she dispute
the definition of healthy, or contest that reassurance may not be provided?
One of the strongest assumptions present in the prenatal screening pamphlets is that
people with disabilities are “defective”, and would be better off if they had never been
born. An alternative idea, one mentioned in only one pamphlet by the Canadian Down
Syndrome Society, is that people are differently abled. Just as society provides resources
and support to average people in the form of public transportation, public education etc.,
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people with disabilities are entitled to similar support in order to promote healthy,
productive lives (Wendell, 1996).
One prevalent metaphor system revealed in the analysis was the notion of Birth as
Production. Martin (1987), Katz Rothman (1989) and Taylor (2008) have described this
metaphor as conceptualizing the fetus as product, mother as labourer, and doctor as
manager. Taylor (2008) has extended this metaphor to show how prenatal diagnostic
testing via ultrasound “represents a way in which doctor/managers try to make sure that
fetuses, whose production they oversee, are of consistently high quality” (Taylor 2008
p.119). Katz Rothman has named this “‘quality control’ on the assembly line of the
products of conception, separating out those products we wish to develop from those we
wish to discontinue” (Katz Rothman 1989, p.8).
The metaphor of Birth as Production provides an example of the way metaphor can
implictly shape our perception of reality and our understanding of concepts. For
example, when women are asked if they want to have a prenatal test on the basis of the
information that “2-3% of babies born ha[ve] some type of major birth defect” (#2), they
may consider the test differently than if asked if they want to participate in a screening
test to tell “the CHANCE [original emphasis] of having a baby with Down syndrome,
trisomy 18, or an open neural tube defect” (#11). The metaphor of “defect” is scary. It
participates in the Birth as Production metaphor system by comparing a fetus to a
manufactured product that doesn’t work, is faulty, mis-formed, should be sent back. This
metaphor is misleading; persons living with Down syndrome or spina bifida may not
think of themselves as defective. However, by using metaphors that analogize a fetus to
a defective manufactured product, the test becomes more desirable- the conceptual
metaphor implies that prenatal screening is a “quality control” test, to find and eliminate
products that are not made to a certain standard. This metaphor is subversive because it
judges the value of people living with certain conditions, without naming those
conditions so the reader can investigate and decide for herself.
Implications for future prenatal screening public education pamphlets are simple to state,
but may be difficult to achieve. Critical reflection on the figurative language and
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metaphors used in this literature is essential. Educational writers are advised to critically
interrogate the metaphors and figurative language used and the implicit messages that
such language conveys. What messages are being conveyed to women, both implicitly
and explicitly? What assumptions about disability may be implicitly present? What are
the beliefs, values and opinions of the writer and how are these portrayed through word
choices? What ideological messages permeate the dominant discourses surrounding this
procedure? How might information be conveyed that supports the aim of informed choice
and non-directive counseling?

5.9 Conclusion
This project does not aim to abolish metaphors from public education literature, nor does
it aim to demonize prenatal screening. Access to prenatal screening is an important
resource for Canadian women. However, it is important that each woman receive
thorough information in a sensitive manner, so she can carefully consider her feelings,
opinions, and options. While many of the pamphlets analysed in this study include
problematic language, some provide comprehensive information stated in simple, neutral
terms. As non-directive educational materials that promote informed choice, the
pamphlets published by Mt. Sinai Hospital and the Genetics Education Project were
exemplary. They included comprehensive information and avoided many of the subtle
ideological directives present in other materials.
The universalization of prenatal screening in Canada (Summers et al, 2007) brings access
to this procedure to a wider demographic of patients, but also provides instructions about
how prenatal screening should be presented. Many of the metaphors currently used in
prenatal screening patient literature do not support the counseling goals of nondirectiveness, informed choice, and respect for the needs and quality of life of persons
with disabilities as mandated by the Clinical Practice Guideline governing this practice
(Summers et al, 2007). A critical examination of the language in these pamphlets reveals
a need for more careful attention to the language used in patient education materials with
the aim to empower women to make an informed choice. This study shows how
metaphoric textual analysis can be used as a means of critical reflection that reveals
ideological assumptions in supposed neutral educational materials. The findings have
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implications for the design of accurate and sensitive prenatal screening educational
materials, aimed at empowering women to make informed choices.
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6

Information-Sharing to Promote Informed Choice in
Prenatal Screening in the Spirit of the SOGC
Clinical Practice Guideline: A Proposal for an
Alternative Model 6

6.1 Introduction
The 2011 Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada’s Clinical Practice
Guideline “Prenatal Screening for Fetal Aneuploidy in Singleton Pregnancies”(Chitayat,
Langlois, & Wilson, 2011) recommends that clinicians, most frequently physicians,
nurses, and midwives, offer non-invasive prenatal screening for chromosomal anomalies
and incomplete neural tube closures to every pregnant woman. The Guideline
recommends that clinicians provide “understandable” information about the screening
tests in a “non-directive” manner in order to “ensure informed decision-making”(Chitayat
et al., 2011). This recommendation is consistent with the 2007 SOGC Guideline on
prenatal screening for fetal aneuploidy (Summers, Langlois, Wyatt, & Wilson, 2007),
encouraging each woman to evaluate her options and consider her preferred course of
action in relation to her particular situation, experiences, and personal values (Chitayat et
al., 2011; Summers et al., 2007). However, recent research in genetic counseling has
raised concerns that non-directive counseling is neither possible (Kirklin, 2007) nor
desirable (Weil, 2003; Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 2002) and may not be the best
way to facilitate informed choice (Elwyn, Gray, & Clarke, 2000; Kirklin, 2007; Weil,
2003). We consider here whether non-directive counseling may unintentionally create
obstacles to the SOGC Guideline’s goal of an informed counseling process leading to
autonomous decision-making, and propose an alternative approach specific to the context
of prenatal screening that combines aspects of informative (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992)
and shared models of decision-making (Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1997; Charles, Gafni,
& Whelan, 1999; Charles, Whelan, & Gafni, 1999).
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proposal for an alternative model. Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology Canada, 34 (3), 269-275. The
copyright of this article is held by the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC).
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6.2 Prenatal Screening for Fetal Aneuploidy
The process of prenatal screening requires pregnant women to make a decision that is
qualitatively different from most other patient decisions because of the necessity to
understand and integrate complex and value-sensitive concepts in a context where there is
no single “right” decision. When deciding whether or not to participate in prenatal
screening, a woman must consider the potential for additional decisions about diagnostic
testing and pregnancy termination (Wilson et al., 2005), as well as psychosocial risks to
herself (Parens & Asch, 2000; Press, Browner, & Tran, 1998; Rapp, 1999; Rothman,
1993) that may arise. These concepts are considered in conjunction with the woman’s
personal values and circumstances (Durand, Stiel, Boivin, & Elwyn, 2010; Markens,
Browner, & Preloran, 2010). As prenatal screening requires women to make a type of
decision that is different from most other medical procedures, it requires a type of
decision-making process that is different from that suggested by traditional models of
informed consent (Whitney, McGuire, & McCullough, 2004; Whitney et al., 2008) or the
models of informative (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992) or shared decision-making (Charles
et al., 1997; Charles et al., 1999; Charles, Whelan et al., 1999; Emery, 2001).

6.3 Informed Choice and Autonomy
A narrow conception of autonomy may be problematic in light of the social and cultural
contexts within which women make decisions about prenatal screening (Thachuk, 2007).
Code (1991) and Sherwin (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000; Sherwin, 1992; Sherwin, 1998)
posit that the way autonomous informed choice is enacted can be problematic for patients
who do not fit the ideal of the autonomous decision-maker; the model of autonomous
decision-making assumes patients to be self-sufficient, independent, articulate,
accustomed to making decisions, and possessed of the resources necessary to allow a
range of choices. In addition, physicians are assumed to have the time, knowledge, and
communication skills to provide the patient with complex information, evaluate the
patient’s comprehension of the information, and encourage the patient to make a decision
based on her values and preferences, without regard for health care costs or legal liability
(Sherwin, 1998). In many instances, these traits and circumstances of the ideal
autonomous decision-maker and the ideal decision-facilitator may not co-exist. Thus,
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pregnant women may not be in an ideal position regarding informed choice in
considering prenatal screening.

6.4 Non-Directive Counseling
The SOGC Guideline’s recommendation for non-directive counseling when offering
prenatal screening (Chitayat et al., 2011) is intended to encourage informed choice that
reflects each woman’s individual values and circumstances. Non-directive counseling is
one of the principal tenets of genetic counseling (Fine, 1993; Kolker & Burke, 1998;
Weil, 2003; Wertz & Fletcher, 1989), and is important because it aims to promote
autonomous informed decision-making (Weil, 2003). However, others have argued that
for reasons of impossibility and undesirability, non-directive counseling may not be the
best way to achieve autonomous decision-making (Elwyn et al., 2000; Fine, 1993;
Kirklin, 2007; Petersen, 1999; Weil, 2003; Williams et al., 2002). There are many
descriptions of non-directive counseling, each with their own particular nuances (Smets,
van Zwieten, & Michie, 2007), and the SOGC Guideline does not identify a particular
model of non-directive counseling or describe how this strategy should be used in the
context of prenatal screening (Chitayat et al., 2011). The following sections will examine
some of the arguments against the strategy of non-directive counseling, and propose an
alternative approach to encouraging autonomous decision-making about prenatal
screening.

6.4.1 Is non-directive counseling possible?
The capacity for non-directive counseling is constrained by the broader context in which
prenatal screening is presented (García, Timmermans, & van Leeuwen, 2008; Smets et
al., 2007). It has been argued that non-directive counseling may not be possible, given the
barriers to dissolving the persuasive authority embodied in the offer of a medical
procedure by a health care provider in an institutional setting (Weil, 2003), funded
through a universal health care program (Hunt & deVoogd, 2003). In these
circumstances, the offer of prenatal screening may imply a recommendation to accept
prenatal screening, thus rendering the goal of non-directive counseling unachievable
(Clarke, 1991).
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The possibility of non-directive counseling may also be constrained by whether or not the
counselor is able to identify and avoid directive elements (Kolker & Burke, 1998). For
example, in a study of genetic counselors, it was difficult for the counselors to determine
what verbal and non-verbal cues could be considered directive (Bartels, LeRoy,
McCarthy, & Caplan, 1997). Further, directive cues may include commonly used
terminology such as “abnormalities” or “risks” (Grant & Flint, 2007; Hodgson, Hughes,
& Lambert, 2005; Parens & Asch, 2000). In addition, making the necessary choices of
what information to present and how to present it can itself be directive (Brunger &
Lippman, 1995; Kirklin, 2007; Rantanen et al., 2008; Weil, 2003; Williams et al., 2002).
Further, clinicians may hold perspectives and opinions about prenatal screening that are
different from their patients’, making neutrality difficult to achieve. This may be
problematic (Cunningham-Burley & Kerr, 1999), because of the power and knowledge
differential between patients and clinicians (Stacey, 1996; Summers, 1994).
Seventy-two percent of genetic counselors (who have received training in non-directive
counseling and are allotted longer periods of time to counsel patients than physicians)
acknowledge that they sometimes counsel directively (Bartels et al., 1997). For example,
clinicians have reported choosing to counsel directively when they perceived that their
patients could not comprehend the information because of low education level, cultural or
language differences, or low socioeconomic status(Bartels et al., 1997; Michie, Bron,
Bobrow, & Marteau, 1997), when the clinician thought there was a “better choice” for the
woman (Bartels et al., 1997), or when the woman was having trouble making a decision
(Bartels et al., 1997).

6.4.2 Is non-directive counseling desirable?
Observational research on non-directive counseling sessions has found that practitioners
counseling non-directively often do so by using indirect speech, such as “some people
may want to…” when outlining various choices or considerations (Benkendorf, Prince,
Rose, De Fina, & Hamilton, 2001). This strategy may lead to confusion on the part of
women about whether or the information applies to them, and it does not invite women to
state their values (Benkendorf et al., 2001). Genetic counselors have reported that nondirective counseling constrains their ability to counsel actively and impedes their wish to
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share the information that is most relevant to a particular woman (Weil, 2003). For
example, a clinician who sees an incompatibility between a woman’s decision and her
expressed values may wonder about incomplete or incorrect understanding and may wish
to counsel more actively (Suter, 1998; Weil, 2003). Non-directive counseling may be
even more challenging for practitioners who do not normally practise in a non-directive
way, especially considering that in other circumstances (such as regulating blood sugar or
controlling hypertension) non-directiveness may be seen as a problematic way of practice
(Caplan, 1993; Williams et al., 2002). Time constraints in primary care medicine may be
an additional obstacle to non-directive counseling(Greendale & Pyeritz, 2001).
It has been argued that non-directive counseling may not be desirable because counseling
in this way may omit discussion of controversial issues related to prenatal screening
(Caplan, 1993), such as issues of disability or pregnancy termination (Caplan, 1993;
Stacey, 1996). If a woman feels a sense of discomfort or moral distress, she may not be
able to identify what issue is causing discomfort, which may prevent her from
considering the source of that discomfort when making a decision (Anderson, 1999). In
addition, counseling in a non-directive way may make it difficult for a woman to identify
directive elements that may creep unintended into the counseling (Clarke, 1997). In this
way, non-directive counseling may harbour unacknowledged directive elements and
therefore may be more disempowering than a counseling model where directive elements
are explicitly acknowledged so they can be considered by the woman (Clarke, 1994;
Kessler, 1992; Kessler, 1997). Women may also perceive the option of prenatal screening
as a medical directive, rather than a choice (Anderson, 1999), even if the information is
presented in a non-directive manner. For example, 37.4% of Canadian women surveyed
about their reasons for participating in maternal serum screening reported that they
participated because my "doctor told me I should have the test” (Park & Mathews, 2009
p.150).
We propose an alternative model to non-directive counseling that retains the spirit of the
SOGC Guideline’s emphasis on the imperative of informed decision-making by
encouraging providers to counsel actively in a way that supports women to make their
own informed choice about prenatal screening.
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6.5 Proposed Alternative Model of Informative DecisionMaking and Shared Decision-Making
To accommodate the specific circumstances of prenatal screening, we propose an
alternative model of decision-making that combines aspects of informative decisionmaking (Charles et al., 1999; Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992) and shared decision-making
(Charles et al., 1997; Charles et al., 1999; Charles, Whelan et al., 1999) (Table 6).

Table 6: Proposed hybrid model for informed and autonomous decision-making in
prenatal screening

Non-Directive Informative
Counseling
DecisionMaking

Shared
DecisionMaking

Proposed
Hybrid Model

Informationsharing

Clinician
imparts
objective,
clinical, valuefree
information

Clinician
imparts
objective,
value-free
information

Clinician and
woman
“exchange”
clinical
information and
values

Clinician and
woman share
clinical
information,
personal values
(woman), and
professional
values (clinician).

Deliberation

Woman only;
clinician
cannot express
opinion to
avoid being
directive

Woman only;
deliberation is
simplified to
“selection” in
this model.

Clinician and
woman engage in
interactive
deliberation,
suggesting and
discussing
treatment options
and preferences

Clinician
counsels actively
in a way that
supports the
woman to fully
understand the
information and
its implications

DecisionMaking

Woman only

Woman only

Clinician and
woman together

Woman only

* “Woman” may also include partner or anyone else the pregnant woman decides to
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include in decision-making
In informative models of decision-making (Charles et al., 1999; Emanuel & Emanuel,
1992), the health care provider gives the patient scientific and clinical information and
the patient deliberates and makes a decision on her own. In contrast, shared decisionmaking (Charles et al., 1997; Charles et al., 1999; Charles, Whelan et al., 1999) promotes
an exchange of clinical information and personal values from both patient and provider,
leading to a shared deliberative and decision-making process.
Shared decision-making was developed in the context of decision-making about lifethreatening illness (Charles et al., 1997), and while it has much to offer clinicians who
counsel about prenatal screening (Elwyn et al., 2000; L. M. Hunt, de Voogd, &
Castañeda, 2005; Legare et al., 2011), the value-sensitive context of prenatal screening
requires careful consideration. Charles and colleagues (1997) conceptualize the process
of SDM as comprising three stages: information exchange, deliberation, and decisionmaking. Charles and colleagues also recognize the value of flexibility between SDM and
an informative approach, stating that in practical use, clinicians may need to change
frameworks midstream (Charles et al., 1999). We propose a particular hybrid model for
the context of prenatal screening, recognizing that each stage depends on the one before
and the end goal of counseling (encouraging the patient to make an autonomous,
informed decision) must guide the clinician’s approach through all stages of the
counseling session.
Légaré and colleagues, who found that both pregnant women and family physicians are
willing to participate in SDM when considering prenatal screening, call for more
“theorization and development of strategies” to facilitate this process (Legare et al., 2011
p.320). Our proposed hybrid model of decision-making in prenatal screening begins with
the information-sharing phase of SDM, uses a particular hybrid of SDM and IDM in the
deliberative phase, and ends with the decision-making phase of IDM (Table 6). Our
model modifies “information exchange” from the model of Charles and colleagues
(Charles et al., 1997) to “information sharing,” in order to explicitly acknowledge that
information can be, but is not always, provided by both parties, and to reflect a
collaborative approach.
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6.5.1 Information sharing phase.
The information-sharing phase of the hybrid approach follows the model of SDM in that
information is shared between the pregnant woman and her obstetrical care provider, with
each sharing both medical knowledge and values. Echoing Freire’s writing on
education(Freire, 1993), Charles and colleagues (Charles et al., 1999) emphasize that
patients are not 'empty vessels' waiting to be filled up with technical knowledge. Rather,
patients come to the clinician’s office with their own beliefs, values, fears, experience,
and, often, medical knowledge from friends, family, or other sources. A woman’s
individual perspectives on prenatal screening, parenthood, disability, and abortion will
affect the way that she will interpret the information received from her clinicians, and so
it is important that clinicians initiate conversations about values and perspectives, so that
the information shared is more relevant to their patients. Bhogal and Brunger (Bhogal &
Brunger, 2010) have written that it is important for clinicians to make an effort to be
aware of their own perspective and to recognize the influence their personal and
professional values may have on the ways they think and speak about prenatal screening
and testing (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010). In SDM, health care providers attempt to be
explicit about their values with patients (Charles et al., 1997; Charles et al., 1999;
Charles, Whelan et al., 1999), and to recognize that their patients’ values may differ;
clinicians using our proposed hybrid approach will be aware that they will later ask each
woman to make her own decision and that providing extensive information about the
clinician’s own values may unduly influence the woman’s decision. Nonetheless,
clinicians using our proposed hybrid approach will keep their personal values in mind,
and might wish to share values related to their clinical expertise and experience,
especially when this perspective would assist in exploring the values or opinions
expressed by the woman during counseling. For example, clinicians might acknowledge
that, in their experience, prenatal screening can provoke anxiety, especially for those who
are not sure what they would do in the event of a high risk result. This can be an
opportunity to explore issues of anxiety, the time frame for receiving results, and feelings
about interpreting uncertain results. Genetic counselors have acknowledged the utility of
sharing their own values, calling for support and guidance about ways in which to do this
productively (Bower, McCarthy Veach, Bartels & LeRoy 2002; McCarthy Veach, Bartels
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& LeRoy, 2002; Weil, 2003) and arguing that patients can make use of the attitudes and
opinions of their counselor without being unduly influenced (Kessler, 1997).

6.5.2 Deliberation phase.
In the IDM model (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992), the patient has full control over
deliberation and decision-making, and the clinician’s role is limited to providing
additional information, if needed, or correcting misunderstandings. In SDM, the clinician
is an active partner in deliberation, suggesting ideas and making recommendations.
As in SDM, our proposed hybrid model envisions the clinician participating actively in
the deliberation process. In contrast to SDM, clinicians using the proposed hybrid model
will counsel actively without expressing any preference for a particular course of action.
For example, the clinician may encourage a woman to think critically about the
implications of particular courses of action and the ways in which her personal values
may come to bear on these different choices (Jansen, 2001). In this way, the provider is a
valuable participant in the deliberative phase, as a caring, informed individual who has
some understanding of the patient’s values and a strong understanding of the possible
implications of different courses of action.
To illustrate the contrast, there is no deliberation phase in IDM; a clinician provides the
information needed to make the choice, assesses the woman’s comprehension, and then
asks her to deliberate without clinician participation (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992). In
SDM, the deliberation process involves interaction between the thoughts, opinions, and
recommendations of the clinician and the patient (Charles et al., 1997; Charles et al.,
1999; Charles, Whelan et al., 1999). The SDM clinician may offer a recommendation and
a rationale, while encouraging the patient to express and discuss reasons for her proposed
course of action. The proposed hybrid model is distinct from SDM in that the clinician
does not make recommendations but assists the woman in considering the available
options and their possible implications, including how these options may fit or conflict
with the patient’s values.
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Of course, some women may prefer that their clinicians take a more or less active role in
deliberation. For women who are clear about their values and desires, a prolonged
deliberation process may not be necessary or desirable. Open communication about
expectations of each other’s roles is necessary to engage in a process that is acceptable to
all parties (Charles et al., 1997). Deliberation may also include other people the pregnant
woman chooses to involve in her decision-making; Charles and colleagues (Charles et al.,
1999) recognize that a patient’s decision-making process often includes consultation with
family, friends, or other health care professionals.

6.5.3 Decision-making phase.
At the time of decision-making, our proposed hybrid model follows the IDM model
(Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992), which encourages a patient to make an autonomous
decision about participation in prenatal screening that reflects her particular situation and
values; it proposes that the patient makes the decision on her own, or in consultation with
her partner or family (as she prefers), based on the information provided by the clinician.
There is no role for the clinician in the decision-making process other than to support and
facilitate the course of action chosen by the patient.
Our proposed model further follows the IDM model, because this approach is more
suitable than SDM for decision-making about prenatal screening given the uncertain
nature of the results and the morally sensitive nature of the decision. In this type of
situation, it is necessary that the provider not have an investment in the decision a woman
makes. Prenatal screening is an example of a decision where clinician investment would
“go beyond the boundaries of an appropriate clinical role because the provider might
harm the patient by inadvertently steering her in a certain direction.”(Charles et al., 1999
p.657) While the application of a clinician’s experience and knowledge to treatment
decision-making may be appropriate in other situations, particularly those for which
evidence-based guidelines suggest there is a “best” treatment (Charles, Whelan et al.,
1999) to achieve patient well-being (Charles et al., 1999), decisions about prenatal
screening do not have one best answer or right way forward. They “are too personal and
too devastating to be made by anyone other than the woman or the couple involved”
(Summers, 1994 p.1690).
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6.6 Conclusion
The SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline on Prenatal Screening for Fetal Aneuploidy
encourages each woman to make her own decision, informed by comprehensive
information about the screening tests and reflective of her personal situation and values.
Rather than non-directive counseling as the best model to serve this goal, we propose a
hybrid approach that combines informative decision-making and shared decision-making
in a strategy to encourage pregnant women and clinicians to discuss prenatal screening in
a way that promotes informed choice based on a woman’s particular circumstances and
values. We recognize that the hybrid approach may impose additional requirements on
clinician time, but we believe it will assist clinicians in supporting women to make
informed choices regarding prenatal screening.
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7

Pregnant Women’s Self-Identified Information
Requirements When Deciding to Participate in NonInvasive Prenatal Screening 7

7.1 Introduction
The provision of information to facilitate informed decision-making is recognized by
professional practice guidelines in many countries, such as Canada (Chitayat, Langlois, &
Wilson, 2011), the United States (ACOG practice bulletin no. 77: Screening for fetal
chromosomal abnormalities.2007), the Netherlands (Health Council of the Netherlands,
2006), the UK (UK National Screening Committee & Department of Health, 2008),
Denmark (Ekelund, Jørgensen, Petersen, Sundberg, & Tabor, 2008), and Australia and
New Zealand (RANZCOG, 2010), as an essential part of the offer of prenatal screening.
For example, the Canadian guideline states that women should be provided
“understandable information … to ensure informed decision-making” (Chitayat et al.,
2011). While there is no single recognized definition of informed decision-making
(Bekker et al., 1999; van den Berg, Timmermans, ten Kate, van Vugt, & van der Wal,
2006), the most common element is that a reasoned decision is made by a reasonable
individual (Bekker et al., 1999); this informed decision is based on “relevant knowledge”,
consistent with the “decision-maker’s values” and is “behaviorally implemented”
(Marteau, Dormandy, & Michie, 2001).
There is extensive literature on informed decision-making8 in prenatal screening and
testing. Existing literature has assessed women's knowledge about prenatal screening
(Dahl, Hvidman, Jørgensen, & Kesmodel, 2011; Gekas, Gondry, Mazur, Cesbron, &

7

A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication: Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E.A. & Nisker, J.
Pregnant women's self-identified information requirements when deciding to participate in prenatal
screening.
8

“Informed decision-making” is often used interchangeably with “informed choice”, and sometimes
conflated with “informed consent”. Informed consent is a legal term. “Informed decision-making”
emphasizes the decision-making process, whereas “informed choice” emphasizes the decision made.
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Thepot, 1999; Goel, Glazier, Holzapfel, Pugh, & Summers, 1996; Jaques, Halliday, &
Bell, 2004; Mulvey & Wallace, 2001; Schoonen et al., 2011), and evaluated whether or
not decisions about prenatal screening could be considered informed autonomous
decisions (Gourounti & Sandall, 2008; Jaques, Sheffield, & Halliday, 2005; Markens,
Browner, & Press, 1999; Rowe, Fisher, & Quinlivan, 2006; van den Berg et al., 2006; M.
van den Berg, Timmermans, ten Kate, van Vugt, & van der Wal, 2005; Williams,
Alderson, & Farsides, 2002). Informed decision-making has been promoted through the
provision of varied information and decision-making resources (Bekker, Hewison, &
Thornton, 2004; Dahl, Kesmodel, Hvidman, & Olesen, 2006; Hunter et al., 2005;
Stapleton, Kirkham, & Thomas, 2002).
It is well established that when asked to make a decision about non-invasive prenatal
screening, many women do not have enough information to make a decision that could be
characterized as an “informed” decision (Gourounti & Sandall, 2008; A. M. Jaques et al.,
2005; Kohut, Dewey, & Love, 2002; Markens et al., 1999; Reid, Sinclair, Barr, Dobbs, &
Crealey, 2009; Rowe et al., 2006; van den Berg et al., 2006; van den Berg et al., 2005;
Williams et al., 2002), and lack of information is one of the most significant sources of
decision-making difficulty (Reid et al., 2009). An “uninformed” decision-making process
has been attributed to insufficient or incorrect information given by the clinician offering
the test (Green, Hewison, Bekker, Bryant, & Cuckle, 2004; Marteau, Slack, Kidd, &
Shaw, 1992; Marteau, Plenicar, & Kidd, 1993; Smith, Slack, Shaw, & Marteau, 1994;
Tyzack & Wallace, 2003), or as a result of either time constraints (Legare et al., 2011;
Legare, Ratte, Gravel, & Graham, 2008; Williams et al., 2002), inadequate clinician
knowledge (Hunt, de Voogd, & Castañeda, 2005; Marteau et al., 1993; Tyzack &
Wallace, 2003) or insufficient effort to include women in the informed decision making
process (Gagnon et al., 2010).
There may also be differences in the information priorities of women and clinicians when
counseling about prenatal screening (Farrell et al., 2011; Freda, Andersen, Damus, &
Merkatz, 1993; Hunt et al., 2005; Park & Mathews, 2009). For instance, the topics
clinicians were observed to emphasize during clinical conversations (ex. risks of
anomaly) were not described as important by patients, or reflected as important in their
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reports of what they understood about prenatal screening (Hunt et al., 2005); clinicians'
lists of pregnancy information topics women would want to hear about during a prenatal
consultation differed significantly from the lists provided by pregnant women (Freda et
al., 1993); women report that pieces of information they deem important for decisionmaking are not discussed by their clinicians (Farrell et al., 2011; Park & Mathews, 2009).
A reported discrepancy between information desired by women vs. information provided
by clinicians was also noted in women who were offered amniocentesis (Durand, Stiel,
Boivin, & Elwyn, 2010).
Further, research on the offer of prenatal screening may place more emphasis on the
information domains that are considered to produce an "informed" decision (information
to understand the test), and less emphasis on the topics that have been identified by
women as influential decision-making factors (information to make a decision about the
test). These information areas may not always overlap (Farrell et al., 2011), suggesting
that for some women, there may be a difference between possessing the knowledge to
understand the test and possessing the knowledge required to make a decision about the
test. This gap may contribute to the reason why health care providers have found it
difficult to construct a conversation to facilitate informed decision-making
(Gottfreðsdóttir & Árnason, 2011). The difference between information for
understanding and information for decision-making may help explain findings that the
level of knowledge a woman has about non-invasive prenatal screening does not
necessarily correlate to self-reports of whether the information received was sufficient for
decision-making (Dahl et al., 2006; Gourounti & Sandall, 2008; Stapleton et al., 2002),
supporting the call for individualized information tailored to each woman's needs in order
to support informed decision-making (Hunt et al., 2005; F. Legare et al., 2011; Vanstone,
Kinsella, & Nisker, 2012). The relationship between the information needed for
understanding prenatal screening and making an informed decision about prenatal
screening is unknown. This project aims to identify the self-reported information
requirements of women to make an informed choice about participation in non-invasive
prenatal screening.
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7.2 Methods
Constructivist grounded theory (CGT) (Charmaz, 2000; Charmaz, 2006) uses inductive
reasoning to identify thematic categories about the phenomenon under investigation. It is
particularly suitable when knowledge is being sought from the ‘ground’ up, for instance
in this study from the first hand accounts of pregnant women (Charmaz, 2006). Grounded
theory is an iterative process, with each round of coding and categorization contributing
to new insights and prompting the need to return to the data to re-analyze, or to return to
the field to collect more data with these new insights in mind.

7.2.1 Recruitment.
Sixteen pregnant women were purposively recruited through the London-Middlesex
Health Unit’s Prenatal Fair [10], advertisements on pregnancy and classified ad websites
[4] and through snowball sampling [2]. Women were sampled to represent a diversity of
perspectives about participation in prenatal screening (Table 7). Sampling was completed
when theoretical saturation was thought to be achieved, that is, when no new categories
were seen to emerge in further interviews. This study received research ethics approval
from the University of Western Ontario (#16988E).
Table 7: Participant Demographics
Pseudonym

Participated in

Age

Urban/Rural

Screening?

# years of

Recruitment

education

method

Abby

No

27

Urban

17

Snowball

Bridget

Yes

30

Urban

21

Online

Carrie

No

29

Urban

16

Snowball

Danielle

Yes

31

Urban

14

Prenatal Fair
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Eva

Yes

20

Rural

13

Prenatal Fair

Farah

Yes

27

Rural

16

Prenatal Fair

Gail

Yes

24

Urban

12

Online

Holly

Yes

26

Urban

15

Online

Isobel

Yes

24

Urban

20

Prenatal Fair

Jade

Yes

28

Rural

16

Prenatal Fair

Kyla

Yes

29

Urban

17

Online

Lucy

Yes

29

Urban

12

Prenatal Fair

Madelaine

No

30

Urban

21

Prenatal Fair

Nadia

Yes

30

Urban

16

Prenatal Fair

Olivia

No

29

Urban

18

Prenatal Fair

Penny

Yes

28

Rural

12

Prenatal Fair

7.2.2 Eligibility.
Women were eligible for the study if they were carrying their first pregnancy, selfidentified as having a “low risk” pregnancy, were under the age of 35 at expected date of
delivery, fluent in English and received the offer of prenatal screening from a family
physician. The criteria of young age and self-identified "low-risk" pregnancy reflect
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women who may not have been offered prenatal screening prior to the introduction of the
2007 Canadian professional practice guideline (Summers, Langlois, Wyatt, & Wilson,
2007). The criterion of first pregnancy attempts to capture a sample who are formally
considering prenatal screening for the first time. Women who accepted the offer of
prenatal screening were eligible if they had not yet received their results. Women who
declined the offer of prenatal screening were eligible if they were at 20 or fewer weeks
gestation.

7.2.3 Data collection.
Interviews were conducted between May and November 2010; 16 participants were
interviewed before theoretical saturation was achieved. Interviews were audiotaped and
transcribed verbatim, and researcher field notes were recorded. Women chose to be
interviewed in person [5] or over the phone [11], with interviews lasting between 25 and
69 minutes (average 41 minutes). Interview questions were open-ended, and inquired into
participants’ experience of being offered prenatal screening by their family doctor and
how they came to make the decision about whether or not to participate. Women were
asked about their information needs and sources, including information from physicians
and other health care clinicians, information from friends, family or others, and
information that they specifically sought out. Women were asked what information was
helpful or confusing in making a decision and what information they thought someone in
their situation would require before deciding about whether or not to participate in
prenatal screening.

7.2.4 Data analysis.
Data were hand-coded and the initial analysis guided subsequent sampling, refining of
interview questions, and analysis in an iterative fashion. QSR N-Vivo 8 (QSR
International 2010) was used to manage the data. Data were coded in a line-by-line
fashion for mentions of information needs, and then re-coded in categories and by theme
(K. Charmaz, 2006). The technique of constant comparative analysis was used to explore
the connections between different codes or categories between multiple participants, and
between different codes or categories from the same participant (Strauss & Corbin,
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1998). Visual diagrams were generated in this process and later used to re-code and recategorize the data in subsequent phases of analysis. Through an iterative process eight
categories were identified related to women’s perceptions of their information needs
concerning the decision to participate (or not) in prenatal screening. The findings are
presented as questions related to information needs during the process of prenatal
screening (Table 8).
Table 8:Self-identified information requirements of women considering prenatal
screening

Category Question
I

What is prenatal screening?

II

What conditions are being screened for?

III

How will the results of prenatal screening be communicated?

IV

How will the results of screening be interpreted?

V

What are the options after receiving the screening results?

VI

What does it mean to live with a child with a condition or disability?

VII

How can an informed decision about participating in prenatal screening be
made?

7.3 Findings
7.3.1 Category I: What is prenatal screening?
Each of the women in this study was interested in information about what the screening
test was, and what it would entail. Most women were aware of the existence of the
screening test but were unclear about the details of the test before meeting with their
physician, "my friend saw the same doctor so she told me ... that there would be
screening, but we didn't go into detail about it" (Carrie). At the time of the research
interview, the majority of women demonstrated a good understanding of at least part of
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the information about the test. Nonetheless, many demonstrated gaps in knowledge, for
instance about the elements of the screening test:
Jade: Even just that information, explaining what it [screening] actually was. I
didn't even know what the elements were when I agreed to do it. I just thought it
was some extra checks they would make during your first ultrasound. I didn't
really know.
The link between the non-invasive, non-definitive prenatal screening tests and the more
invasive, definitive diagnostic testing options such as amniocentesis was confusing to
some women. Five women did not know about the option for definitive testing (such as
amniocentesis), and several others were not sure how the screening test they were
currently being asked to consider was related to definitive testing.
Abby: It wasn’t clear to me that if you choose to have the blood test and if that
comes back positive you can choose the amniocentesis. I thought you can choose
to have the bloodwork AND the amniocentesis.
Madelaine was similarly confused about the relationship between amniocentesis and
prenatal screening, but a discussion with her doctor clarified this information.
Madelaine: When I went to my doctor's office I got more of a sense of it actually
being two distinct stages .... that's part of the reason that having a discussion with
your doctor is important, because it sounds like it's a package deal and in reality,
maybe it isn't.
A desire for more information about the logistics of the test was a theme consistently
identified by participants. Women identified important aspects of logistical information
such as: what the elements of the test would be “how the test is done” (Olivia); how
information would be obtained “I'm interested in what the results are, but also to
understand what they are measuring” (Bridget); what information the test could provide
“what they could find” (Gail); if there is any risk to the mother or fetus “potential risks of
the procedure” (Madelaine); and when the screening tests take place “at how many weeks
you do certain things” (Jade).
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7.3.2 Category II: What conditions are being screened for?
The women in this study expressed interest in receiving information about the conditions
included in prenatal screening. All women identified that it was important to know what
conditions the screening test could detect and to understand what those conditions were.
Madelaine’s family physician told her what conditions could be found, but without prior
knowledge of these conditions Madelaine had difficulty interpreting this information:
“there were a couple of terms that were dropped casually that I had no idea what they
meant.” This information is important because:
Madelaine: If this is a prenatal screen for colour blindness, I think a lot of women
would make a different decision than if it were testing for something like Down
syndrome.
Several women mentioned that it would be helpful to have information about the
conditions written down, so they could do more research if they wished, or so that it
would be easier to remember unfamiliar terms.
Holly: I forget all of them [conditions screened for] except for Down syndrome ...
I would've liked to have a little bit more information on that, maybe a pamphlet
from my doctor ahead of time, so I could look it up.

7.3.3 Category III: How will the results of prenatal screening
be communicated?
Information about how and when the results would be communicated was an important
theme. All of the women who chose to participate in the test were interested in
understanding how and when the results would be communicated, for instance, "would it
be a phone call or would it be in writing?" (Olivia), and who would be relaying this
information:
Farah: She'll get the results and relay everything to me instead of having anyone
else call me directly with any scary information. It definitely made me feel better
that she's in the middle of it all and relates that information back.
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The element of receiving results mentioned by most women was the timing of the results:
Holly: When would I find out? Are you to call me if the results are positive? Are
you just going to wait until I come back in?
Understanding when the results would be received was mentioned by Isobel as important
for thinking about future options, because if a high risk result is received, "you have to
make a decision about amniocentesis pretty quickly". For Danielle, the timing of the
results was important in terms of weighing the options available in the event of a high
risk result,
Danielle: I didn't realize how long it takes and how far along you are when you
get the results. ... I think it would have been a good thing for her [family doctor]
to tell me. ... I just kind of assumed it would be something you find out early on ...
knowing that it's taking this long, I don't think I could get rid of the baby even if
they did find something.
In retrospect, Danielle stated that if she had understood how long it would take to receive
the results and "how far along you are when you actually find out anything" she "would
have just said 'no thank you' and gone on and waited until the baby came".

7.3.4 Category IV: How will the results of the screening be
interpreted?
Information about the results of the test was identified by women as important when
making a decision to participate in prenatal screening. All of the women in the study were
interested in understanding how the results would be interpreted and how reliable the
results were. This information also informed discussion of Category V, the options
available after receiving results from the screening test.
Understanding the results of the test was one of the most frequently mentioned
information needs. In order to decide if they wished to participate in the initial prenatal
screening test, women indicated that they wanted information about how and when the
results would be conveyed, “how long it takes to get the results” (Olivia); the limits of
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the screening results, “they should say this is what you can learn, this is what we
potentially can’t tell you … give a comprehensive picture of what screening can and
can’t do” (Madelaine); and the reliability of the screening results “I think it’s important,
in the part about what the results tell you that they do communicate that it is not
definitive” (Olivia), “the percentage that it’s a false positive or false negative is this”
(Madelaine).
In addition to understanding the results of the test, each woman expressed interest in
information to help her understand the reliability of the results. 15 of the 16 women
recognized that the test did not provide a definitive answer, but rather suggested a range,
probability, or risk statistic:
Eva: I know it's not a for certain thing, they give you a fraction or a percentage of
the chance of having a child with one of these disorders or defects.
Among women who understood they would be receiving results in the form of a risk
statistic, there was significant variability in how women reported interpreting that
number:
Farah: I think it would probably have to be a pretty high percentage for me to be
concerned with, probably over 20% risk, for me to really be worried.
Nadia: One in 1000 would be high-risk.
Understanding the potential for false negative and false positive results was stated as an
important part of interpreting the risk statistic.
Nadia: People [friends] have said that there are false negatives and false
positives, and it is not extremely accurate... it is just numbers and you never really
know how accurate it is.
Olivia: I was surprised to hear that there are a lot of false positives... Why do all
of these women do this test and then end up having it not really tell them
anything?
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7.3.5 Category V: What are the options after receiving the
screening results?
Each woman expressed interest in understanding what options were available in the event
of a high-risk result from the screening test, or a positive result from amniocentesis: Eva:
“What would happen if it came back after an amniocentesis that it was positive, what
would I do and where would I find out information and how do they handle that?”. At
the time of the interview, each of the women in the study indicated that they understood
that pregnancy termination was an option in the event of a high risk result, "you have to
make that decision of what you want to do to continue on with the pregnancy or not to
continue on."(Holly), however many reported that this information was not discussed by
their physician. Jade explained that her family doctor told her that "if there was a positive
test for something we would talk about the options at that point." Others reported that
their physicians left this part of the conversation out entirely: "The one thing that was
missing was if it was positive, what would you do, what were your choices?" (Nadia).
Several women reported that their physicians discussed the options after high risk results,
especially termination, in an opaque way:
Abby: "It's [the option to terminate] something I knew from previous education.
She [family doctor] did say these are defects there is no cure for, but she didn’t
come out and say if you find something wrong you can abort the baby or you can
keep the baby knowing it has a defect."
Madelaine: "She [family doctor] wasn’t using terms like abortion or anything like
that, but she was implying that some couples would take that information and
make a decision and sort of, you know, dot dot dot, expecting us to fill in the
blanks of what that might mean. It wasn’t necessarily obvious, you know, that
couples might make a decision about whether to proceed or terminate with the
pregnancy."
While Madelaine and Abby inferred the options of terminating or continuing the
pregnancy from this discussion, a couple of other women did not understand this. Gail
talked about her assumption of the opportunity for early treatment “I’m sure there is
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research out there on something to help improve Down syndrome in utero”. Kyla stated
she drew similar conclusions from the information received from her physician, but
learned differently after doing her own research:
Kyla: "It was put to me as 'we are going to be testing for chromosomal
abnormalities like down syndrome or spina bifida'. That's all that was said. It
wasn't 'because sometimes people decide they don't want to go through with the
pregnancy'. ... I kind of thought that there might be treatment. ... maybe he is
bringing it up because there is something they can do about it ... and then I
thought well maybe it is so you're prepared. .... I didn't think that people would
terminate because of the test."

7.3.6 Category VI: What does it mean to live with a child with
a condition or disability?
A few women, like Holly, were interested in knowing details about the experience of
parenting a child with one of the conditions. She suggested this information should be
provided by clinicians before women decide to participate in the test.
Nadia: maybe explain a little bit more in depth... Like, down syndrome is a
chromosomal abnormality, the baby will have this, this and this.
Most women, however, indicated interest in learning about what it would be like to
parent a child with a particular condition only if they received a high risk result. When
speaking about understanding what it would be like to parent a child with one of the
tested-for conditions, women used language like “educate myself” (Eva), “give me a
chance to research” (Danielle) or “I would find resources” (Jade), implying they did not
expect that information to be provided by their physician. The two women who stated
they would terminate the pregnancy no matter what condition was found indicated that
they were not interested in receiving this type of information.
A few women who were more familiar with the conditions cited the spectrum component
of the conditions as an important piece of information for women to consider.
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Abby: I know that just because your child has Down syndrome, it varies
drastically. It can be very very mild, or it could be more severe.
This was not, however, a frequently occurring topic of discussion, perhaps because many
women appeared not to be aware of this information.

7.3.7 Category VII: How can an informed decision about
participating in prenatal screening be made?
Participating in an informed way in the decision making process about prenatal
screening was identified by each woman in the study as an important opportunity. Even
the women who had no intention of participating in testing indicated that they were glad
to receive information and to have the opportunity to make their own decision about
participation. While women spoke about the importance of having the chance to choose
whether to participate, many women spoke with concern about making sure they had
enough information to make this decision.
While this ability to make the decision for one’s self was frequently identified as
desirable, a number of women discussed how this may be challenging at times:
Nadia: It is your choice if you want to do it or not. I don’t think she [family
doctor] emphasized that enough with me. I think she made it sound like it was
routine.
Kyla, to whom prenatal screening was presented as the next step in prenatal care, stated
that women need to feel informed enough to make decisions about participation:
I was a little upset. I mean, a better description would be that I didn't feel
informed enough to make the decision .... I think it's great that it’s available for
people who want it, but I think that everybody should be informed before they are
given the option.
Women who indicated that they did not receive sufficient information to feel informed,
frequently described engaging in research and seeking information independently.
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Nonetheless, the participants indicated that information or guidance about resources was
best provided by the clinician offering the test. Gail stated:
If they don’t have enough time to tell you, then they should direct you to some
kind of pamphlet or something.
Madelaine undertook significant independent research on the contextual and logistical
details of the test. She said that it could be “overwhelming” for women and that women
may require the help of their care provider in locating relevant information.
I think there is potentially a lack of knowledge and I don’t know that it should just
be up to women to have to seek that information.
In summary, women spoke of the importance of participating in an informed way in the
decision making process about prenatal screening; of adequate information being
required to make that decision; and that it would be helpful to receive information (or
information resources) from the clinician offering the test.

7.4 Discussion
The participants in this study raised many topics when discussing their information needs
for making a decision about participation in non-invasive prenatal screening. Some of
these topics require a sophisticated understanding of complex information. Analysis of
the interview transcripts identified seven major categories of information that that may
assist pregnant women to make informed decisions about participation in non-invasive
prenatal screening. The categories are framed as questions that may be useful for
clinicians to consider during the offer of prenatal screening, and include: I) What is
prenatal screening? II) What conditions are being screened for? III) How will the results
of prenatal screening be communicated? IV) How will the results of the screening be
interpreted? V) What are the options after receiving the screening results? VI) What does
it mean to live with a child with a condition or a disability? VII) How can an informed
decision about participating in prenatal screening be made?.
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Counseling about non-invasive prenatal screening may present challenges to clinicians,
who may not have enough time available to counsel in a comprehensive way. For
example, in Canada, the average prenatal screening counseling session has been found to
last less than five minutes (Cavanagh & Mathews, 2006; Cavanagh, Mathews, & Crane,
2007). Further, 56% of Canadian physicians were neutral or in agreement that counseling
for maternal serum screening was too time consuming, and only 8% agreed that this type
of counseling is adequately reimbursed (Winquist, Ogle, & Muhajarne, 2008). In
response to such difficulties, clinicians may also consider alternative approaches to
providing information about prenatal screening such as group information sessions after
the first prenatal visit where pregnant women may ask questions, which may require less
clinician time and result in better knowledge outcomes for pregnant women (Baldwin,
2006; Kaiser et al., 2002). Peer support and the opportunity to learn from the questions of
other women is educationally valuable to pregnant women (Freda, 2004), as is more
educational time with a clinician (Baldwin, 2006), such as a physician or other member
of the health care team, such as a nurse practitioner. Additionally, clinician groups may
wish to advocate for appropriate reimbursement for the counseling time required for
prenatal screening.
Pamphlets and other written education materials may be an additional way of conveying
information, as they may be read at a time of convenience, and provide key words for
women who may wish to undertake further investigation (Kenny et al., 1998).
Informational pamphlets have been rated by women as a valuable resource, second only
to a conversation with their physician (Dahl et al., 2006). However, careful selection of
written resources is important because written materials have the potential to be directive
towards a particular course of action through the terminology used, tone, and balance of
content (Bryant et al., 2001; Dahl et al., 2006; Hodgson, Hughes, & Lambert, 2005;
Loeben, Marteau, & Wilfond, 1998; Stapleton et al., 2002; Vanstone & Kinsella, 2010)
and may not provide sufficient content for an informed decision making process due to
either a high literacy level requirement (Freda, Damus, & Merkatz, 1999), or provision of
insufficient information (Shepperd et al., 2006; Van den Heuvel et al., 2008). In addition,
video education has been shown to enhance retention of information (Browner, Preloran,
& Press, 1996), particularly in groups with lower levels of literacy (Freda, 2004).
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Interactive computer education may also increase knowledge, however some have
suggested it may be difficult to integrate into a clinical setting (Griffith, Sorenson,
Bowling, & Jennings-Grant, 2005).
The need for adequate information to make an informed decision about participation in
prenatal was identified as an important theme in this study, and making informed choice
an explicit clinical goal may be helpful for clinicians. One important aspect of an
informed decision is to ensure that women understand that participating in prenatal
screening is optional (Marteau et al., 2001; Michie, Dormandy, & Marteau, 2003).
Although this is clearly expressed in clinical practice guidelines (ACOG, 2007; Chitayat
et al., 2011; Ekelund et al., 2008; Health Council of the Netherlands, 2006; UK National
Screening Committee & Department of Health, 2008), a number of women in this study
and other studies (Kohut et al., 2002; Ladfors et al., 2001; Santalahti, Aro, Hemminki,
Helenius, & Ryynänen, 1998; van den Berg et al., 2005) indicated that they were not
aware that prenatal screening was optional. Clinicians might reflect on how they can
facilitate informed decision making by using the questions identified in this study as a
guide (Table 8), by offering women opportunities to ask questions (Hunt et al., 2005;
Legare et al., 2011; Legare et al., 2008), and by offering information through various
mediums. Clinicians might also facilitate informed decisions by examining their own
assumptions about ‘what is best’ for women (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010), by thinking
about the language they use to discuss prenatal screening (Grant & Flint, 2007; Hodgson
et al., 2005; Parens & Asch, 2000) and by considering the content and presentation of
information (Brunger & Lippman, 1995; Weil, 2003; Williams et al., 2002) .

7.5 Conclusion
The results of this study contribute to knowledge about women's perceptions of their
information needs during the decision-making process about prenatal screening. The
themes identified (Table 8) may present practical guidance that could inform the practices
of clinicians who introduce the offer of prenatal screening. In addition, written
information, direction to resources for further information, and unique education formats
such as prenatal screening groups may help to meet the information needs identified by
women and promote informed choice about prenatal screening.
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8

Women's decision-making about participation in
prenatal screening: Beyond the clinical encounter

8.1 Introduction
Prenatal screening is a testing process offered to all pregnant women in Canada (Chitayat,
Langlois, & Wilson, 2011) and in many other Western countries (ACOG, 2007;
Ekelund, Jørgensen, Petersen, Sundberg, & Tabor, 2008; Health Council of the
Netherlands, 2006; RANZCOG, 2010; UK National Screening Committee & Department
of Health, 2008) through a process of informed decision-making. Prenatal screening
produces a probabilistic prediction of fetal chromosomal anomalies and incomplete
neural tube closures by combining the results from blood tests and an ultrasound with the
woman's age at the expected date of delivery (Chitayat et al., 2011; Lam et al., 2002).
After receiving this information, each woman may be asked to make multiple, contingent
decisions about whether or not to pursue diagnostic testing such as amniocentesis, which
carries a risk of miscarriage between 0.5-1.5% (Wilson, Langlois & Johnson, 2007), and
pregnancy termination.
Informed decision-making about participation in prenatal screening is presented by many
clinical practice guidelines as an essential part of the process (ACOG, 2007; Chitayat et
al., 2011; Ekelund et al., 2008; Health Council of the Netherlands, 2006; RANZCOG,
2010; UK National Screening Committee & Department of Health, 2008). While there is
no authoritative definition of informed decision-making (Bekker et al., 1999; van den
Berg, Timmermans, ten Kate, van Vugt, & van der Wal, 2006), the common element of
different definitions is that a reasoned decision is made by a reasonable individual
(Bekker et al., 1999); an informed decision is based on “relevant knowledge”, consistent
with the “decision-maker’s values” and is “behaviourally implemented” (Marteau,
Dormandy, & Michie, 2001).
Several counseling models have been used to describe how clinicians might facilitate
informed decision-making (Clarke, 1994; Elwyn, Gray, & Clarke, 2000; Emery, 2001;
Legare et al., 2011; Marteau et al., 2001; Thornton, Hewison, Lilford, & Vail, 1995);
these models primarily focus on the roles and informational content of the interactions
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between clinician and patient (Entwistle & Watt, 2006) . This paper examines the
perspectives of pregnant women considering participation in prenatal screening,
examining their information seeking and decision-making practices within and beyond
the clinical environment. The central question of the study is: How do pregnant women at
low risk of having a fetus with an anomaly make decisions about participation in prenatal
screening?

8.2 Existing Models of Medical Decision-Making
Several models of patient-physician communication describe the facilitation of decisionmaking, from different perspectives. Consumerist models of informed decision-making
(Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992) envision the physician transferring relevant knowledge to
the patient so that the patient can make a decision. These one-way models of information
transfer for informed decision-making have been described as analogous to the "banking
concept" model of education criticized by Freire (1970), where patients are passive
"receptacles" for information that is transferred to them, or "deposited" by the physician
(Lee & Garvin, 2003). Consumerist models of one-way information transfer have been
observed to be the prevailing model of patient-physician communication used by British
general practitioners (Goss, Mazzi, Piccolo, Rimondini, & Zimmermann, 2005).
The rise of patient-centered medicine may be linked to the development of models of
shared decision-making, as described by many authors (Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1997;
Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1999; Coulter, 1999; Elwyn, Gray et al., 2000). Shared
decision-making is a two-way model which involves an interactive dialogue between
patient and physician, with each sharing knowledge and values, then deliberating together
to arrive at a shared decision (Charles et al., 1999). Shared decision-making aims to
achieve an active partnership between patient and physician (Charles, Whelan, & Gafni,
1999; Elwyn, Edwards, & Kinnersley, 1999; Elwyn, Edwards, Kinnersley, & Grol,
2000), but has been explored by few authors in the context of prenatal screening (Legare
et al., 2011).
Additional models of two-way information exchange falling somewhere between
informed decision-making and shared decision-making have been described (Braddock,
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Edwards, Hasenberg, Laidley, & Levinson, 1999; Towle & Godolphin, 1999; Towle,
Godolphin, Grams, & LaMarre, 2006). Patient-centered communication may also be
conceptualized as a two-way information exchange with some shared characteristics to
shared decision-making (Wensing, Elwyn, Edwards, Vingerhoets, & Grol, 2002; Weston,
2001).
The common element between these different models is a focus on the ways in which
decision-making occurs inside the clinic, as a result of or during the interaction between
the patient and physician. A complementary body of literature about decision-making has
developed in the discipline of library and information science. With a sensitivity to the
ways in which knowledge is sought and used, there exist a number of models describing
the ways in which information seeking practices and behaviours inform decision-making
processes inside (McKenzie, 2004; McKenzie, 2009) and outside of the clinic (Belkin,
1980; McKenzie, 2003; Pettigrew, Fidel, & Bruce, 2001). Information sciences has long
moved away from a view of the learner as an empty receptacle waiting to be filled with
information (Dervin & Nilan, 1986) to explore more nuanced understandings of the ways
in which information seeking affects decision-making.
Evidence that decision-making about participation in prenatal screening occurs outside of
the presence and direction of a clinician is plentiful, however this topic is underexamined in the healthcare literature. National surveys in Canada (Public Health Agency
of Canada, 2009) and the United States (Declercq, Sakala, Corry, & Applebaum, 2007;
Sakala, Declercq, & Corry, 2002) have stated that health care providers are no longer the
primary source of pregnancy information, with women reporting that they find more
information about pregnancy from books, friends and relatives, and the internet (Declercq
et al., 2007; Public Health Agency of Canada, 2009; Sakala et al., 2002). There is a
growing body of literature describing how patients use the internet, friends and family,
and other sources of information to inform their health decisions (Diaz et al., 2002; Hsieh
& Brennan, 2005; Lagan, Sinclair, & George Kernohan, 2010; Lagan, Sinclair, &
Kernohan, 2011; Larsson, 2009); but little theorizing about the ways in which women
seek, retrieve, and use information when trying to make a decision about participation in
prenatal screening.
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8.3 Methods
Objective: The purpose of this study was to investigate the decision-making processes of
pregnant women with respect to participation in prenatal screening.

8.3.1 Study design.
The methodology of Grounded Theory (GT) (Charmaz, 2000; Charmaz, 2006) was
adopted for this study. Using a grounded theory approach, data were gathered from firsthand accounts, and analysed inductively develop theory about a particular phenomena.
Data were collected and analyzed simultaneously, in an iterative fashion where insights
inform further data collection and analysis.
This study received research ethics approval from the University of Western Ontario’s
Health Science Research Ethics Board (#16988E).

8.3.2 Recruitment.
Pregnant women were recruited through the London-Middlesex Health Unit’s Prenatal
Fair (10), notices on pregnancy and classified ad websites (4) and through snowball
sampling (2). Women were purposively sampled to represent a diversity of perspectives
about participation in prenatal screening (Table 9). Sampling was completed when
theoretical saturation was achieved. Charmaz (2006) describes theoretical saturation as
the time when “gathering fresh data no longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals
new properties of these core theoretical properties” (pg. 113).
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Table 9: Participant demographics
Pseudonym

Participated
in
Screening?

Offered a
choice
about
participati
on?

Would
consider
terminating
pregnancy
if condition
was found?

Age at
time of
interview

Urban/
Rural

# years of
education

Recruitment
method

Abby
Bridget
Carrie
Danielle

No
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Directed
Yes

No
No
No
Unsure

27
30
29
31

Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban

17
21
16
14

Eva

Yes

Yes

No

20

Rural

13

Farah

Yes

No

27

Rural

16

Gail
Holly

Yes
Yes

Directed
Yes

24
26

Urban
Urban

12
15

Online
Online

Isobel

Yes

No

Not unless
fetus
would not
survive to
term
Yes
Depending
on
condition
No

Snowball
Online
Snowball
Prenatal
Fair
Prenatal
Fair
Prenatal
Fair

24

Urban

20

Jade

Yes

Yes

No

28

Rural

16

Kyla
Lucy

Yes
Yes

No
Directed

Urban
Urban

17
12

Madelaine

No

Yes

No
29
Depending 29
on
condition
No
30

Prenatal
Fair
Prenatal
Fair
Online
Prenatal
Fair

Urban

21

Nadia

Yes

Directed

No

30

Urban

16

Olivia

No

Yes

No

29

Urban

18

Penny

Yes

Directed

Yes

28

Rural

12

Prenatal
Fair
Prenatal
Fair
Prenatal
Fair
Prenatal
Fair

8.3.3 Eligibility.
Eligible women were: under the age of 35 at expected date of delivery, carrying their first
pregnancy, received the offer of prenatal screening from a family physician, and fluent in
English. Participants were interviewed after they spoke about prenatal screening with
their family physician, and before they received their results from the screen (if they
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chose to participate in the screening), or before 20 weeks gestation (if they chose not to
participate in the screening). Table 9 describes demographic and theoretical
characteristics of the sample.

8.3.4 Data collection.
Semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 4 for interview guide) were conducted between
May and November 2010 with 16 low risk Canadian women. Interviews were audiotaped
and transcribed verbatim, and field notes were recorded. Women chose to be interviewed
in person (5) or over the phone (11), with interviews lasting between 25 and 69 minutes
(average 41 minutes). Interview questions were open-ended, and inquired into
participants’ experience of being offered prenatal screening by their family doctor and
how they came to make the decision about whether or not to participate in prenatal
screening. Responses were further probed to explore ideas of where information was
sought and received, opinions and feelings about the test, and areas of confusion or
clarity.

8.3.5 Data analysis.
Data were hand-coded in a line-by-line fashion, and then re-coded in categories and by
theme (Charmaz, 2006). The initial analysis guided subsequent sampling and analysis in
an iterative fashion. QSR N-Vivo 8 (QSR International 2010) was used to manage the
data. Visual diagrams were generated to examine the connections between different codes
or categories between multiple participants, and between different codes or categories
from the same participant. These diagrams were used to re-code and re-categorize the
data in subsequent phases of analysis.

8.4 Findings
The findings inform a preliminary theoretical model depicting the processes by which
participants made decisions about participation in prenatal screening. In addition
participants continued to investigate and think about prenatal screening after the initial
decision had been made, often in preparation for making a decision about the results. All
but one woman in the study described an iterative process of receiving, seeking and
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interpreting information. Women described this process beginning before prenatal
screening was introduced by their physicians and continuing after the decision about
participation in prenatal screening had been made. For example, Gail was directed to
consent to prenatal screening at her doctor's office. She described her process of decisionmaking starting with the reception of the information that prenatal screening existed and
proceeding with the gathering of more information to improve her understanding of what
she had consented to do and what future decisions she might be asked to make about the
results of the screening test.
The process of making an informed decision is conceptualized in four categories (Figure
4): 1) Receiving information; 2) Seeking information; 3) Working towards
understanding; 4) Making a decision. This section provides an analytic overview of the
proposed model; describing each dimension, addressing the range of responses
throughout each aspect, and highlighting the different views across circumstances.
Figure 4: The process of decision-making about prenatal screening
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8.4.1 Category 1: Receiving information about prenatal
screening.
The category of receiving information was elaborated by all women in this study. In
particular, three aspects were prevalent in women's accounts: the sources of information
received, the content of information received and a reconciliation of prior understandings
of prenatal screening, pregnancy, and parenthood with the new information received.
Receiving information about prenatal screening was described as the first step in the
process towards making a decision, even if at the time information is received, a decision
is not necessary. For example, many women described learning about prenatal screening
through a friend's experience before becoming pregnant themselves, but stated that they
drew upon the knowledge gained from their friend when it was time to think about
making their own decision. Related to this type of previously gained knowledge, most
women stated they were aware of the existence of prenatal screening before they were
offered it, but did not know many details about the procedure:
Bridget: I really didn’t know about the nuchal translucency long before. Only
when thinking about becoming pregnant did I really read about what it was. But I
was aware of amniocentesis. Obviously diagnostic, but I didn’t realize that there
was something that could be measured as early as 14 weeks or 11 weeks.
A few women had more extensive knowledge from formal education, or because a close
friend or family member had gone through the process:
Lucy: A lot of my girlfriends have got it done and told me about it. That's how I
knew about it. That's how I knew it was coming and that you had to get it done
before a certain time, before 13 weeks.
For five women, the offer of prenatal screening from the physician was the first time they
learned about the possibility of this test:
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Jade: That [doctor's offer of prenatal screening] was the first time I'd heard about
it. I knew that you went for certain checkups when you're pregnant, but nothing
with any detail.

8.4.1.1 Sources of information received.
Women discussed their sources of received information about prenatal screening,
mentioning health care professionals, friends and family, secretaries or administrators in
the offices of health care professionals, prior education and experiences, the media, and
written sources passed along from health care professionals, friends, family and the
public health unit. The most commonly identified sources of received information were
the family doctor, friends and family.
Most women indicated that their family doctor (or nurse working under the direction of
the family doctor) was the most consistent source of information, although not
necessarily the most comprehensive source. All participants received some kind of
information from their physician, however, the depth and breadth of this information
varied greatly. Some women reported that doctors mentioned the existence of prenatal
screening and then scheduled the screening tests without much discussion:
Gail: Beforehand we had no information. Going into it we just knew that there
was a certain time limit we had to follow.
One women stated that her doctor provided ample information:
Madelaine: She spoke about it in detail, to the point where I remember thinking "I
know this- I read the forms". She was very thorough.
The most commonly reported experience was a short conversation with a doctor who
provided written information in lieu of a longer discussion:
Abby: I honestly don't think she talked about it that much. She just said here's the
information pamphlets. ... It was really short, she didn't go into great detail about
anything at all.
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8.4.1.2 Content of sources received
Women reported receiving a number of different types of information from their doctors,
most commonly general logistical information about the test as well as information about
what conditions are screened for and the non-definitive nature of the results. Detailed
information about prenatal screening was usually received from doctors in written form.
Ten women were offered written information by their doctor and described this form of
information as important. Of the six women who did not receive written information, five
spontaneously mentioned that they would have liked to receive written material about
prenatal screening.
Gail: Your family doctor or whatever doctor is caring for you should be able to
tell you [about the screening tests]. If they don't have enough time to tell you, then
they should direct you to some kind of pamphlet or something. I never got
anything.
Friends and family were also cited as a valued source of information by thirteen women.
Most of those who spoke with family or friends about prenatal screening described
receiving experiential information from friends and family that informed the way they
thought about their own decision to participate in the screening test.
Holly: I actually have a friend who missed her date for prenatal screening and ...
her daughter .... has Down syndrome and she wasn't prepared for it. So she
hasn't returned to work ... It affects your life quite a bit,... she's ecstatic that she
has her and she would never want to change anything ... Probably if she did find
out they would have chosen not to have the baby if it was a high probability, and
she's kind of happy that she never did find out because of that.
Fourteen women described receiving information from family, friends, and from past
education and experience about the lived experience of the conditions tested for through
prenatal screening.
Eva: I have a friend who has a child with Down syndrome, so I also knew that if I
needed information or needed support or needed help with anything like that, I
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was sure that she would have tons of it. And obviously, being a parent of
someone with Down syndrome she is kind of an expert about it.
Danielle: I work with kids with disabilities. So I'm probably more aware than the
general population would be about the things that children can be born with and
the complications that might arise.
The theme of receiving information about prenatal screening had two different
components: medical information received in the context of decision-making, and
information (experiential and medical) received in the course of everyday life. Women
described receiving a wide variety of information from these two sources; information
was received from physicians in the context of decision-making, at the time when
prenatal screening was introduced. In contrast, many women discussed the information
they had received in the context of their everyday lives, before they were considering
participation in prenatal screening.
Showing the relationship between category 1 (Receiving Information) and category 3
(Working Towards Understanding) of the proposed model, women described the process
of contextualizing information received in the context of everyday life with new
information received from their physician. As will be elaborated in category 3, women
discussed the ways in which information received from their physicians was
contextualized and made personally relevant in relation to previous information they had
received from friends and family, or past work or educational experiences.

8.4.2 Category 2: Seeking information about prenatal
screening.
In addition to receiving information, fifteen of the sixteen women actively sought
information about prenatal screening in written form, both offline (15 women) and online
(12). Offline written information reportedly accessed by women included information
pamphlets (10), popular books on pregnancy (5) and textbooks from previous formal
education (3).
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Nadia: I have my maternal textbook...and it's not in my textbook. I looked for it...
I went to look for the beginning parts of pregnancy and there was nothing in there
about prenatal screening...That textbook is from 2002, 2003.
Bridget: I had heard of the nuchal translucency and the reason that was used ...
from a book I had bought, A Pregnancy Day by Day.
Twelve women reported accessing online information sources, including popular
pregnancy sites, pregnancy forums or blogs about pregnancy (7 women); medical sites
hosted by the local public health unit, hospitals and research centres (4); and general
‘reading online’ (2). Kyla visited both popular and medical websites:
Kyla: Most of the information I got was from searching on the Internet. It
actually started from a message board of other pregnant women who are talking
about it [prenatal screening]. ... that's where I started finding more and more, to
dig deeper and deeper. I think I came across some official medical sites, but it
would have been nice to have that given to me right off the bat, without having to
search through. Some people might stop there at the message board. And that's
not always the most reliable information.
Kyla's concern about reliable information was echoed by many other women who talked
about: (a) being wary of the information they encountered: "the internet can lead you all
over the wrong place and give you the wrong answers. If you don’t know what’s bogus
and what isn’t, well, you will end up in a web somewhere." (Gail); (b) the ways they
assessed trustworthiness of the information they encountered, "a friend just recommended
'Your Pregnancy Week by Week' because it was written by a doctor, so it seems a bit
more comprehensive and useful" (Farah); and (c) the ability to verify information
between sources: I went to a whole bunch of websites to see if they were around the same.
I know websites can just kind of throw out information, so I went to four or five different
websites.(Eva).
Not all women were interested in seeking information about prenatal screening. Although
fifteen reported seeking information to some extent, the one woman who did not seek
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written information stated she felt the information from her doctor and her friends was
sufficient. She indicated that she wanted to think positively about her pregnancy:
Lucy: The testing can go either way. I'm thinking positive so I don't think that
anything is going to be wrong, I just keep that in my mind. I'm excited to see the
baby in the ultrasound. That is honestly all I think about. I don't think about the
testing, and I don't think about spina bifida and I don't think about Down
syndrome. I don't think about any of that. ... I'm trying to have a great
pregnancy. I don't want to think anything negative about my pregnancy, or about
the baby.
This sentiment about avoiding information that produces fear or anxiety was echoed by
Nadia, who initially started looking online for information but later stopped:
Nadia: I typed in integrated prenatal screening, and I think I read maybe the first
two or three sites. It just explained it in more detail. I read a couple blogs about
it, about women and their experiences and that kind of scared me so I stopped
reading it. Since then, any type of question I have had about my pregnancy or any
fear or anything, I don't even bother looking it up anymore, because everyone has
told me just stay off the Internet and don't read anything. ... I have stayed off the
net and just tried to enjoy my pregnancy the best I can.
Farah was discouraged from seeking information by the nurse in her doctor's office in
order to prevent anxiety: She’s [nurse] been very good to just.... relax me. Stop reading
books! She says. Calm down! Farah agrees with this approach and followed the nurse's
suggestion, avoiding seeking additional information because: I would rather have it
explained to me in terms of what my actual results are than get myself all worked up
about what this number means or that number means.
All but one woman stated that they sought out information about prenatal screening as a
way to enhance their understanding. Some women described seeking information in
preparation to make a decision. Others described seeking information to increase
understanding, or to prepare for future decisions that might need to be made. A few
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women described ceasing to seek information in response to confusion or anxiety aroused
by information that they found. The proposed model attempts to account for the
possibility that a woman might not be interested in seeking information by allowing that
this category may be bypassed. For instance, a woman may receive information, judge it
to be sufficient, and proceed directly to making a decision.

8.4.3 Category 3: Working towards understanding prenatal
screening.
Working towards understanding the information received and sought about prenatal
screening was the category with the most variety and variability, reflecting a multitude of
different ways of interpreting information in preparation to make a decision. The
category of working towards understanding was characterized by discussions about the
ways in which different pieces of information informed one another.
Some women described a process of working to consolidate the information received
from the physician. Strategies such as reading a pamphlet over again, thinking further
about the information presented, talking to a spouse, friend, or family member, or seeking
more information were used to better understand the information presented by the
physician or encountered in other contexts:
Eva: I liked having the pamphlet at home after I had talked to the doctor and had
all my questions answered, then I could go through it again. When you're in the
office they're throwing one million things at you, you're just kind of like "yeah,
sure, that's great". When you get home you're like "yeah, what did she say
again?" You can go through it [the pamphlet] and just refresh your memory. If
you have other people that you want to explain it to, you are giving them accurate
information.
Almost every woman talked about the ways in which she contextualized new information
by comparing it to information obtained at an earlier date. For instance, women who
described previous understandings of prenatal screening frequently elaborated on the
knowledge that informed their current understanding. When Danielle decided to
participate in prenatal screening, she didn't understand how long it would take to receive
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the results. This piece of information, obtained during the wait for results, fostered
reflection on the purpose and process of screening:
If I knew how long it took and how far along you are when you actually find out
anything, I don't think that I would've taken the time to do it, or put myself
through the worrying about what if I do get a positive. I would've just said "no
thank you" and gone on and waited until the baby came. If they see something
serious in the regular ultrasound [second trimester ultrasound] they'll do further
testing and tell you about that anyhow.
Carrie described the experience of being pregnant and her sense of responsibility for
another life as contextualizing information that informed her sense of what was important
to her decision making:
I thought I'd get a screen done if it's available, why not? Why wouldn't I, for my
own interest's sake? ... Being pregnant is different, and talking to my doctor,
reading the pamphlet, talking to my husband, it is more like there is actually a life
now that I'm responsible for. I think that that is more, instead of just doing it for
the heck of it, well let's evaluate what would really happen.
Others talked about their past life experiences and how this shaped the ways they
interpreted information and understood the potential outcomes of prenatal screening.
Farah: I spent high school working in group homes with adults with autism and
down syndrome and stuff so it’s something I always had in the back of my head
that it might be a challenge I have in my life but if that’s the way it goes, that’s the
way it goes. It’s not any kind of dealbreaker or anything.
As women talked about their understandings of the screening test, many described a
process of piecing together different parts of information obtained from a variety of
sources:
Gail: I found it was fairly easy once I understood, like you get to that beginning
level, once you understand what the ultrasound does and you understand what a
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nuchal translucency is, then you work from there. As long as you get that first
building block and you keep following the right steps and learning what this is
and why you do this and what’s for this and that. You kind of find the ladder and
figure it out at the end.
Women understood and contextualized information in individualized ways, drawing on
their own perspectives to interpret the meaning of information they received. For
instance, after learning about false positives, Bridget and Olivia had very different
reactions:
Bridget: I wasn't aware of the false positive rates, but that was described well in
the pamphlet. That was probably the thing that changed [my thinking] the most,
and that was reassuring, the thought of the possibility of having a positive test,
but even then it's not necessarily a true positive.
Olivia: I was surprised to hear there are a lot of false positives. I was surprised to
hear it is not a very definitive test. I was like well, then why do they do this? What
is the point? Why do all of these women do this test and then end up having it not
really tell them anything?
The individualized nature of interpreting information about prenatal screening was also
demonstrated in the way that women described contextualizing information in relation to
their own personal situation. Danielle, who works with children with disabilities,
described the way this affects her thinking about raising a child with a disability:
I think I worry more than the average person might. ... I think I have a better
understanding of what the families with children with disabilities go through on a
day-to-day basis.
Some women described instances where the pieces didn't fit, or they realized that a piece
of information was missing, leading to identification of a gap in understanding:
Danielle: I don't even know if at the first round they can say I think your child has
Down syndrome or if they have to do the amniotic fluid test to say what they think
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it is, or if they know that from the first.
Kyla: It was put to me as "we are going to be testing for chromosomal
abnormalities like down syndrome or spina bifida". That's all that was said. It
wasn't "because sometimes people decide they don't want to go through with the
pregnancy". ... I didn't think that was a possibility when I was thinking about it. ...
Once I went home and did more research, I realized that wow, this is why people
do it.
The category of "Working Towards Understanding" identifies the ways in which women
talked about integrating the information that they received and sought from a multitude of
sources. This category might be seen as a "puzzle piece" approach, with women
describing a process of building understanding of the situation at hand by gathering
different small pieces of information, comparing these pieces of information and
considering them in light of past experiences. The articulated understandings were
formed from medical information but also relied on more personal information, including
information gleaned from the woman's own experiences, information she had received or
was familiar with from friends or family. These different pieces of information were
made personally relevant in conjunction with a consideration of the woman's values and
perspectives.

8.4.4 Category 4: Making a decision about prenatal screening.
All women in the study, even those who were not given the choice of participating in
prenatal screening, discussed multiple decisions to be made. First, the decision of
whether or not to participate in the screening (Table 10). Second, anticipation of future
decisions that may have to be made. These decisions were discussed in relation to
information received and sought, and ways of working to understand the information; the
need for participants to make decisions about prenatal screening provided the context that
bound together and made relevant the information.
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Table 10: Self-reported choices regarding participation in prenatal screening
Made a choice

Directed to
choose

No choice
offered

Total

Participating in Prenatal
Screening

5

4

3

12

Not Participating in Prenatal
Screening

3

1

0

4

Total:

8

5

3

16

As summarized in Table 10, eight women stated they made their own decision about
participating in prenatal screening tests without direction from their health care provider;
five women indicated they were directed towards a particular course of action; three
women reported that they were not given a choice about whether or not to participate in
prenatal screening. The majority of women indicated that they appreciated the
opportunity to make their own decision about participation:
Nadia: I like that I had a choice, that I was given that choice by my doctor.
Olivia: I really appreciated her willingness to let me make my own decision.
Five women indicated that their health care practitioners were directive in some way,
such as verbal phrasing and facial expression (Carrie), giving explicit advice about what
to do (Lucy, Nadia), or through non-verbal means, such as booking the ultrasound before
explaining the purpose of the screening test (Penny, Gail).
Carrie: I know she did say that less than half of her patients choose to have the
prenatal done. She actually said that twice. I thought that, based on her facial
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expression and the look that she gave me, I thought she would encourage us not
to.
Gail: When they mentioned it they said you don’t have to, but we advise it.
Three women stated that they did not perceive that they were given a choice about
participation in prenatal screening. Each woman recounted a different reaction to this
situation. Farah talked about her relationship with her prenatal care provider and was not
concerned that she was not given a choice:
Farah: She didn’t mention if it was a choice. I am sure that if I had concerns with
it, then that would have come up. .... I don’t question, because I’m very
comfortable with her, I don’t question. It might have been different if it was a
doctor I had never met, but because it was someone I have had a relationship with
for years, I’m very comfortable with what she says needs to be done.
Isobel indicated that she had decided to do the test before she entered her doctor's office
and was surprised that it was not offered as a choice. However she was not really
bothered because she planned to do it anyway.
Isobel: It was just thrown in there that this is what you will do then and prenatal
screening was one of the things thrown in there- at a certain time you do this. So
I think it was just assumed that it was something I would want without having a
discussion.
Kyla learned by searching online for information on nuchal translucency that the
screening test is optional and that women who choose to do that test can later choose to
have an abortion if the test comes back positive. Kyla indicated that she was disturbed by
this, because she would not choose to have an abortion and therefore didn't wish to
participate in testing. She was upset that her family doctor did not explain this to her.
Kyla: My doctor just presented it to me as this is what we normally do, and didn't
give me any options. So I'm sure that other doctors are doing that too. For the
most part, people tend to really trust what doctors are saying, they see them as
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the be-all and end-all. What they say is what I should be doing. That's not really
the case. I think it's important for them [women] to be given all the information
that they deserve, so basically informed consent.
Whether or not she was given a choice about participation, each woman in the study
indicated that she had thought about the decisions she might be required to make in the
future. Kyla, reported anticipating how she would handle those choices:
The results, from my understanding, are not 100% unless you do an amnio. I
don't think that I would risk the amnio, if it could be potentially harmful to the
baby anyway. I would just wait and see what happened.
Nadia talked about how she would make a different decision in her next pregnancy:
I am a first-time mom and I am kind of just going with the flow, with what my
doctor suggested to me. ... Thinking about it now, I just don't think that I would
do it again. ... Now that I know about it, and I know as much as I know about it, I
would make a different choice next time.
Of the thirteen women who made a decision about participating, most talked about the
link between how they would approach potential decisions in the future and their decision
to participate in the first part of prenatal screening.
Bridget: Even when we had the choice of whether to book the ultrasound or not,
... at that point I wanted to be sure about having the ultrasound but not wanting to
be pressured to make a decision to go ahead with an amniocentesis. That was
something we had to consider in deciding to have the ultrasound.
Madelaine: I sort of thought of it as a package deal, you know? It was presented
as different stages, it sounded like there would be a decision made after stage one,
but you automatically think of the whole process.
Some women reported that they based their decision of whether or not to participate in
prenatal screening on their anticipation of future decisions that might have to be made.
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For instance, all four women who chose to refuse screening stated that they would not
have an abortion regardless of the screening results. All four women talked about their
decision to refuse prenatal screening in relation to their unwillingness to terminate the
pregnancy, and wish to avoid the potential anxiety that might be faced when waiting for
the screening results.
Abby: I knew that I wouldn’t just all of a sudden decide to terminate the
pregnancy and so that was the primary reason to not even do it. If we did it
knowing that I wouldn’t make that decision, we could potentially have
information that would actually weigh down on us a little bit.
Many women who participated in the test linked their decision-making to what they
planned to do with the results; six participating women stated that they would not
terminate the pregnancy, no matter what the results were.
Eva: Myself, I wouldn't terminate. I would just kind of educate myself on how to,
like what programs there are or what information I need to know to help a baby
with that specific disorder.
Four women who decided to participate were uncertain of whether or not they would
choose to terminate the pregnancy if a condition was found, stating that it would depend
on the particular condition detected.
Lucy: If it was Down syndrome I'd keep it, but if it had spina bifida or the other
thing. Then I'd have to find out the details, but if it was a severe case, I don't
think we would keep it.
For the two women who stated they would terminate the pregnancy if a condition was
found, this opportunity was the reason for participating in the test.
Gail: It [raising a child with a disability] would be too much for us to take on
right now. We know it would be too much for our relationship. ... It just wouldn’t
be good for us. We’re both [specific occupation] and we’re both [additional
occupations].

253

Making a decision about prenatal screening was a theme which was described in multiple
contexts, from the initial decision to participate in the screening test to the anticipation of
later decisions that may have to be made regarding what to do with the results of the
screening test. Of the 16 participants in this study, eight stated that they made their own
choice about participation, five felt directed to a particular decision by their health care
provider, and three were not offered the opportunity to make a decision about
participation in prenatal screening. When women talked about their decision-making
process, many talked about considering multiple decisions at once, often describing their
initial decision about participating in the screening tests in relation to what they would or
would not consider doing with the results of the screening test.

8.5 Discussion
The findings of this research draw on women’s reports of the process of decision-making
about participation in prenatal screening to depict it as an iterative process of receiving,
seeking, and working to understand information to inform practical decision-making and
action. In these findings, the interaction between a pregnant woman and her physician
was identified as an important, although not exclusive, part of the process of making an
informed decision about participation in prenatal screening. This was in contrast to
existing models of informed decision-making, which focus primarily on the roles and
interaction between the physician and the patient and the information shared by each
person (Charles et al., 1997; Charles et al., 1999; Coulter, 1999; Elwyn et al., 2000;
Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992; Michie, Dormandy, & Marteau, 2003). Interestingly, the
women in this study received information from physicians, but also actively sought and
worked with information obtained from non-medical sources, such as popular books, and
the experiences of their friends and family members when making their decisions to
participate in prenatal screening. Given the broad range of sources from which women
obtain information, attention and further research into the information practices of
women may be warranted, so that health care providers seeking to facilitate informed
decisions can support women in obtaining relevant and credible sources of information
(Coleman, 2003; Diaz et al., 2002; Diaz, Sciamanna, Evangelou, Stamp, & Ferguson,
2005; Shepperd, Charnock, & Gann, 1999).

254

Existing models of informed decision-making provide information about strategies that
may be used within a clinic to impart or exchange information to prepare the patient to
make an informed health decision. These models, however, fail to consider the sensemaking and decision-making work that occurs outside the clinic, despite ample evidence
that patients seek information from a variety of sources (Case, Andrews, Johnson, &
Allard, 2005; Declercq et al., 2007; Larsson, 2009; Public Health Agency of Canada,
2009; Sakala et al., 2002) . Given the lack of attention to this aspect of the process,
physician counseling time may not be used as effectively as possible and women may not
be receiving appropriate informational and decision-making support.
Recognizing and acknowledging the information work that some people choose to
engage in outside the clinician's office may contribute to a different way of understanding
the role of the physician in informed decision-making about prenatal screening. Existing
models of informed decision-making conceptualize the physician as the main
information-provider and the woman as the information-receiver and decision-maker
(Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992), or both the physician and woman as informationproviders, receivers and decision-makers (Charles et al., 1999). The findings of the
current study question the boundaries of these roles, emphasizing the breadth of the
woman's role as an information seeker, receiver, interpreter, and decision-maker in
addition to the role of the physician as an information-facilitator. Existing models
conceptualize the content of information relevant for informed decision-making about
prenatal screening quite narrowly, as including primarily medical and logistical
information about the test (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992). Some models acknowledge the
importance of information about the values and perspectives of the woman and health
care provider (Charles et al., 1999) . In addition, this study and others (Farrell et al.,
2011; Hunt, de Voogd, & Castañeda, 2005; Vanstone, Kinsella, & Nisker, 2012) suggest
that women may be interested in considering different types of information when
deciding to participate in prenatal screening, such as timing of the test, options after
diagnosis, possibilities of experiencing anxiety and opportunities for promoting the
welfare of the baby. While the majority of women in this study expressed a strong desire
to seek and use information, it is important to note that not all women have the resources,
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information literacy, or desire to seek information, and women may resist the imperative
to become an "informed patient" (Henwood, Wyatt, Hart, & Smith, 2003).

8.5.1 Models of information seeking to inform health decisionmaking from information science
Beyond the decision-making models considered in the medical literature (Charles et al.,
1997; Charles et al., 1999; Coulter, 1999; Elwyn et al., 2000; Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992;
Michie et al., 2003), scholars in the field of information science have examined patient
information seeking practices to inform decision-making (Case, 2002; Lambert &
Loiselle, 2007; McKenzie, 2004). The information-seeking models however have not
been widely disseminated in the health care disciplines. The contributions made by such
models may have implications for health fields generally, and for prenatal screening in
particular, as they may assist clinicians to re-conceptualize their role as facilitators of
information-seeking rather than as conductors of informed decision-making.
Health information-seeking behaviour has been conceptualized as a means for patients to
obtain the information required to participate in medical decision-making involving a
conscious choice to actively pursue information (Case, 2002; Lambert & Loiselle, 2007).
Models which emphasize active seeking, and do not include passive receipt of
information, or retrieval of information from memory, have been critiqued as potentially
oversimplifying the process of information seeking as a linear, non-iterative action
(Johnson, 1997; J. D. Johnson, 2003; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lenz, 1984; Longo et
al., 2010; Miller, 1989). This critique is consistent with the findings of the current study,
in which participants emphasized the influence of information obtained through past
experience when interpreting new information about prenatal screening. Iterative models
of health information seeking where the seeker plays an active role have been suggested
by some to be more appropriate than linear, non-iterative models (Case, 2002; Foster,
2004; Lambert & Loiselle, 2007).
Sense-making (Dervin, 1983; Dervin, 1999; Dervin, 2003) is a theory which may
contribute to an understanding of the iterative nature of information-seeking for decisionmaking about prenatal screening. Participants in this study spoke about the ways in which
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(a) information gathered through past experiences informed their current information
seeking and (b) the ways in which past experiences helped them make sense of the
information they found when actively seeking. According to Dervin ( Dervin, 1983;
Dervin, 1999; Dervin, 2003), sense-making is a person-centered approach which
describes the metaphorical activity of recognizing gaps in understanding and overcoming
these gaps by building bridges with different pieces of knowledge acquired from different
sources (Dervin & Nilan, 1986). Sense-making holds that knowledge is not a static
representation of reality (Dervin, 1999), but is constantly being shaped and re-shaped, as
well as constructed, re-constructed, and de-constructed. In this way, sense-making rises
beyond the "implicit assumption that there is one right way to produce knowledge or to
use information" (Savolainen, 2006) (p. 1117). Women in this study spoke about the
ways in which knowledge about disability, parenting, and pregnancy gathered through
past conversations and experiences informed the way that they sought, interpreted, and
used information about prenatal screening. This past information from history and
experience was frequently used to contextualize new information, it was the situational
'bridge-building' material (Dervin & Frenette, 2003). It was used to scale the gap in the
information provided by clinicians, or found elsewhere, forming a knowledge from which
to make a decision about participation in the prenatal screening test.
When considering the sources of information used to make sense of information about
prenatal screening, the sociocultural and individual context of the information seeker
(Savolainen, 1995; Tuominen, Talja, & Savolainen, 2002) and the ways in which this
particular contexts shape the information acquired through everyday life (McKenzie,
2003) are important considerations. The ways in which women seek and receive
information about prenatal screening may be unique from other information-seeking
tasks. Women seeking information about prenatal screening are not yet visibly pregnant,
and may not have chosen to share the news of their pregnancy, which may make them
invisible to others they encounter in their everyday life who may have relevant
experiences or knowledge to share (McKenzie, 2003). The personal nature of the decision
to participate in prenatal screening may contribute to a reluctance to discuss this topic
with all but one’s closest friends or relatives. The sensitive nature of the decisions
involved in prenatal screening may provide a barrier to discussion with those who do
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have visibly relevant experiences. For instance, women parenting children with a
disability may find inquiries about their experiences with prenatal screening offensive
(Beck, 2000). This context of an "invisible" situation (Yeoman, 2010), may help explain
why women seeking information on prenatal screening talk more consistently about
information gleaned from past experiences, active seeking and active scanning and
mention proxy information sources only in relation to very close friends or relatives
(McKenzie, 2003).

8.5.2 Discrepant cases: Avoiding information to manage
uncertainty.
While most women in this study actively sought information, one woman did not seek
any extra information and two other women chose to stop seeking information. In
addition, four women chose to avoid particular types of information, by choosing not to
participate in the screening tests. Considering these cases in light of the consumerist
imperative placed on patients to be informed and make decisions about their care
(Henwood et al., 2003) may contribute to understanding the phenomena of information
seeking for informed decision-making, especially given that the discourse around the
need to inform oneself is particularly strong for pregnant women and mothers (Lupton,
1999a; Lupton, 1999b).
Information avoidance is a strategy of information management (Brashers, Goldsmith, &
Hsieh, 2002), and refers to behaviour designed to prevent or delay the acquisition of
unwanted information (Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd, 2010). It has long been
recognized that information avoidance is a technique to avoid anxiety (Maslow 1963 in
Case et al., 2005). Information avoidance has been theorized as an adaptive behaviour to
manage uncertainty (Brashers et al., 2002) by reducing, avoiding, and manipulating
potential sources of uncertainty (Sairanen & Savolainen, 2010). Uncertainty is a
fundamental characteristic of the human experience (Boholm, 2003) and has been
described as a universal feature of pregnancy (Sorenson 1990 in Teman, Ivry, &
Bernhardt, 2011), given the context of increased opportunity for decision-making and
responsibility within a context of ever-increasing choice and risk (Lupton, 1999b).
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In this study, seven women discussed different ways of avoiding information. Four of
these women avoided information about the disability status of their fetus by declining to
participate in prenatal screening. This choice is congruent with Barbour's (Barbour,
Rintamaki, Ramsey, & Brashers, 2011) findings that people tend to avoid information
when they feel no action can be taken, and similar to Sweeny's (2010) theorization that
information is avoided when no desirable action can be taken. All four women who
declined to participate in prenatal screening rejected the option of terminating the
pregnancy if information suggesting an anomalous condition was found (marking this
action as undesirable) (Sweeny et al., 2010). Three women who participated in prenatal
screening also discussed avoiding information. Lucy stated that she did not seek
information about prenatal screening beyond what she received from her doctor or had
previously heard from friends because she already had the information she needed, and
did not wish to seek more information that might detract from her goal to think positively
about her pregnancy. Avoiding fear and anxiety was also cited by Nadia and Farah as a
reason to stop looking for information about prenatal screening, aligning with Sweeny's
(2010) finding that people avoid information when it may cause unpleasant emotions, or
diminish pleasant emotions, and Barbour's (2011) finding of information avoidance as a
strategy to manage negative emotional reactions and avoid interference with enjoyment.
Nadia and Farah's approaches may fit more closely with the strategy of selective
avoidance; both were willing to seek and receive some information about prenatal
screening, but stopped seeking information when that information became unpleasant and
unreliable (Sairanen & Savolainen, 2010) . When Nadia speaks about her experience
reading about other women's experiences of prenatal screening online, she exhibits
'knowledge dismissal', choosing to avoid that information after evaluating it as potentially
inaccurate and threatening (Jemmott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986; Sweeny et al., 2010).
Managing information provided by prenatal screening is a balancing act between seeking
and avoiding information in order to achieve the multiple goals of reducing uncertainty,
maintaining optimism (Brashers et al., 2002), and meeting the medical consumerist
imperative of being an informed patient and exercising decision-making agency
(Henwood et al., 2003).
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8.6 Conclusion
As the women in this study described the ways in which they received, sought , and
worked towards understanding information about prenatal screening in order to facilitate
decision-making, they described a type of knowledge production that centered on each
individual and was gathered, interpreted and used for decision-making outside of the
clinician's office. Women described engaging in active and passive information-seeking
activities, and making sense of that information in relation to prior knowledge and
experiences. Knowledge about prenatal screening was produced through an iterative
combination of knowledge from physicians, medical pamphlets, and medical websites,
with social and experiential knowledge from friends, family members, and other women.
This knowledge was then contextualized with each woman's own life circumstances,
perceptions of risk, and understandings of motherhood, disability, and family. This
complex formation of understanding was described as the basis for decision-making, with
the information provided by the clinician as only one rung in the ladder of knowledge.
The findings have implications for informing a broader understanding of prenatal
screening; one that extends beyond the clinic, recognizes women’s active agency in the
process, and aims to support women in the process of collecting, interpreting and acting
upon information about prenatal screening.
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9

Conclusion

9.1 Introduction
The following chapter ties together the themes presented so far and contextualizes them
as part of a doctoral study with information on the process of the research and
suggestions of quality criteria and strengths and limitations. First, I discuss the research
process, including the contributions and impact of my supervisory committee. I explicitly
address reflexivity, which has been mentioned in Chapter 1 and 4, outlining my particular
understanding of the term and the ways in which I engaged in reflexive thought
throughout the research process. In the middle of the chapter I discuss the links between
the integrated articles presented in Chapters 5-8, tracing the theme of informed decisionmaking through the manuscripts and exploring the underlying themes introduced in
Chapters 2 and 3 through an examination of discourse. In this section, entitled
"Discursive Tensions", I provide a short survey of the language found in data from the
three studies: patient education materials, policy documents, and participant interviews. I
use this material to argue that this language indicates participation in different discourses,
and I discuss the common links between the four manuscripts (Chapters 5-8) in terms of
ideas of medicalization and normalization. In this discussion, I explore the ways in which
medical-institutional discourses structure the social relations and institutional processes
of prenatal screening. After this discussion of the common themes between the
manuscripts, I introduce two sets of quality criteria that could be used to judge this work
from the literature of interdisciplinary scholarship and grounded theory. I discuss
potential contributions this work may make to understandings of patient education
materials, clinicians offering prenatal screening, policy documents, and informed
decision making. Finally, I outline some potential directions for future research and
discuss some of the strengths and limitations of this work.
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9.2 Insights and Reflections on the Research Process:
Impact of supervisors
It is not possible to consider the process of the doctoral research separately from that of
the doctoral program, where each element (coursework, comprehensive exams, proposal,
dissertation) is related, feeding into and building a foundation for the next step. I can
trace particular elements of this dissertation to each component of the doctoral program
and in this way, the research process started long before I began to think about the study
design or collected any data. In this section I discuss the many contributions of my
supervisors as a way of reflecting upon the type of scholar I am attempting to 'come to be'
(Green & Lee, 1995), in order to explicitly highlight the threads of the doctoral process
and the ways in which I have tried to weave them together. In a later section, "Insights
and Reflections on the Research Product", I will discuss the conceptual integration of the
four manuscripts.
The doctoral research process is inherently linked to the supervisory relationship, a
relationship which is not well studied or understood (Grant, 2003; Grant, 2005), as it is
idiosyncratic and traditionally conducted behind closed doors (Green & Lee, 1995;
McWilliam & Palmer, 1995). Green and Lee (1995) contend that "supervision is not
simply a matter of coming to know ... it is also a matter of coming to be" (p.41) and that
it is through the student's relationship with her supervisor(s) that she begins to form her
own identity as an academic. The formation of the academic identity happens through
multiple social and discursive sites, but the supervisory relationship remains one of the
most influential (Petersen, 2007).
I have been tremendously fortunate to have been given the opportunity to work with my
supervisors and their influence and support has shaped this project, and my academic
identity, enormously. Until recently, I had not questioned the convention of mentioning
gratitude to one's supervisors in the acknowledgement section at the beginning of the
thesis. I took for granted that most students are grateful for the time and effort of their
supervisors and that the acknowledgements section was an appropriate place to mention
this. My acceptance of this convention began to shift as I started to think more deeply
about what it means to be a supervisee, and what is asked of the supervisor. Over the past
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two years (2010-2012), I have acted as a research assistant to a project studying
interdisciplinary doctoral supervisory relationships (Hibbert et al., 2012; Vanstone et al.,
2012). My experiences with this project caused me to reflect more consciously on the
contribution of my supervisors and conclude that their influence goes far beyond that
which could be acknowledged up front and then set aside. I have written in Chapter 1 and
later in this chapter about the importance of acknowledging my standpoint and thinking
reflexively about the decisions I've made throughout the research process. This reflexive
consideration of standpoint is not complete without consideration of the ways in which I
have been influenced by my supervisors.
If we consider the dissertation as a piece of woven fabric, I may have chosen the threads
and woven them together, but that is so little of the work of weaving. My supervisors
guided my selection of threads, worked hard to bring new threads to my attention,
pointed out congruencies and inconsistencies in the threads I had chosen, strategized with
me about what threads would be most valuable, most resonant, most useful, and most
realistic. They helped me pick a pattern that could showcase my abilities and overcome
my weaknesses while ensuring that pattern was not overly ambitious or impossible to
complete with the available time and resources. My supervisors taught me how to weave,
demonstrating their preferred techniques and helping me make connections with other
weavers who use different techniques I might wish to incorporate. When I made a
mistake in my weaving, they helped me back up, pick out the flaw, and re-weave the hole
that was left. Sometimes I recognized that I had made a mistake, or left a weak spot in my
fabric; sometimes I would not be aware of this. In this instance, they would gently draw
my attention to the flaw in the fabric, perhaps by suggesting why some might consider it
a flaw, and what action I might take to shore up my work against these criticisms. They
managed to bring my attention to these flaws without making me feel like a flaw in the
fabric was reflective of a flaw in the weaver. When I brought a completed section of
fabric to them, they would work with me tirelessly, helping me re-work that section until
it was as strong and beautiful as I was able to make it. When I felt like tossing the
weaving aside and starting over, perhaps as a potter or a glass-blower, they calmed me
down, picked up the discarded weaving, pointed out the strengths and worked with me to
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overcome the weaknesses, re-inspiring me to start again, and keep going. Truly, I could
not ask for more.
Through my work on the interdisciplinary doctoral supervisory practices project, I came
to realize that for many interdisciplinary students, supervisory committees are rife with
conflict. Interdisciplinary supervisory committee members may have conflicting ideas
about what the PhD is and how it is done (Pole, 1998), what the content and structure of
the different components should be (Blackmore & Nesbitt, 2008), or whether the content
or the act of learning is of primary importance (Franke & Arvidsson, 2011). They may
have different ideas about what their role should be (Franke & Arvidsson, 2011; B.
Smith, 2001). These issues may be further complicated when there are two main
supervisors (Kiley, 2009). After reading about the potential for conflict on
interdisciplinary committees and speaking with many students who have experienced this
conflict, I am so grateful for the intellectual generosity, mutual respect, and flexibility
that my supervisory committee members have demonstrated. While we encountered
many differences of opinion, these differences were always expressed in a respectful and
open way which invited discussion and consideration of the different ways of proceeding.
As a result, I think these differences led to a strengthening of my work, encouraging me
to consider and respond to different conventions, perspectives, and sets of expectations.
This collegial way of working across disciplines has modeled for me an exemplary way
of interdisciplinary working, acting as a strong influence on my process of "becoming
and being" an interdisciplinary scholar (Green & Lee, 1995, p.41).
While it feels artificial to name specific influences and contributions that my supervisors
have made, I will highlight a few specific ideas here. These specific instances are only a
small part of what each person has contributed, but I discuss them in an effort to be
reflexive about what has influenced me and to highlight the way I have approached this
research process. My co-supervisors are Elizabeth Anne Kinsella and Jeff Nisker. My
third supervisory committee member is Pamela McKenzie. One trait these three have in
common is that scholarship is not just a job, but a way of life. As I have come to know
each person better and understand each person's work more fully, I can see the ways in
which they embody the principles espoused in their academic work. To me, this
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demonstrates a consistent philosophy which informs the way they approach scholarship,
teaching, supervision, and collegial relations. The message I take from this rolemodeling is that you should love what you study and study what you love, and approach
academic work with integrity and a comprehensive, consistent philosophical approach.
Over the course of the doctoral research process, I have had the experience of
encountering ideas that change the way I think about the world, a sort of falling through
the rabbit-hole from which there is no waking up. I have begun to understand that the
way to draw strength from this experience is to match these ideas with your personal
philosophy, so that you are forged as a stronger individual rather than as a fragmented
one. Academically, you might experiment with different topics or methods, but the
underlying philosophy of being and knowing forms the core of a consistent and
congruent approach to the work.
The idea of choice has become a central theme of my doctoral work, and I think my
interest and emphasis on choice reflects the ways of working I have observed with Anne,
Jeff and Pam. None of them have ever said that a particular way of doing scholarship is
right or wrong, just that there are different choices. Some choices fit better with others,
each choice in a project leads down a different path, and being a researcher is about
making carefully considered choices. It's not simply about measures of "validity", but
about thinking through the implications of each choice and forming a piece of work that
fits together, speaks to other work in the area, and forms a whole project that you are
proud to stand behind. I think this emphasis on choices and decisions rather than a right
way or a wrong way has been an important aspect of why I have enjoyed the doctoral
process so much: I have been empowered to make my own choices, and entrusted with
thinking through the implications of those choices.
Some of the other lessons I will take with me throughout my own academic journey:
generosity and collaboration over competitiveness and territory; academic work should
not live and die in the ivory tower, but should be based in, respond to, and make a
difference in some part of the world; getting out there, taking risks, trying new things is
always a good idea; research can have powerful effects, so it should be based in
something you strongly believe in; ensure internal congruency by keeping your research
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question in mind throughout the process; the influence of the researcher's personal
convictions and perspective cannot be avoided and so must be acknowledged, if not in
publication at least to yourself. For these ideas and for the continued support,
encouragement, and guidance, of my committee members I am grateful.

9.3 My understanding of reflexivity.
Throughout my doctoral work I have developed an appreciation and understanding for
the potential impact of reflexivity in the research process. Through my reading and
coursework, I have developed an understanding that reflexivity is a contested term used
by many people in many different ways. Most scholars agree that it is necessary for
qualitative research, but there is little agreement on what it is, or how to do it (Finlay &
Gough, 2003). In the following section I detail my own understanding of reflexivity and
outline the ways in which I engaged reflexively with this research.
I am working with Smith’s (1987) idea that reflexivity should not be something done at
the end of research, but that a qualitative research methodology should be inherently
reflexive. This idea has been embraced by feminist researchers from different disciplines,
working in different methodologies (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007). When Smith (1987)
describes her version of sociology from the standpoint of women, she describes it as “a
sociology that will lay out for people how our everyday worlds are organized and how
they are shaped and determined by relations that extend beyond them” (p. 121). This is
what I think qualitative research should strive to do, and I see reflexivity as the way of
doing it.
I understand reflexivity as a two-pronged activity, occurring through conscious processes
of meaning making (Taylor & White, 2000) as well as through attempts to make sense of
our personal experience of the world when it poses a conflict with the ways we
experience what Smith (Smith, 1990b) terms the 'relations of ruling'- dominant
ideological relations that organize our activities in standardized ways (Smith, 1997).
Smith (1983) describes our lived experiences as existing in our memories and encoded to
our memories with social meaning. Our memories of "what actually happened" (Smith,
1983, p.321) arise only at the moment of reflection, and at this moment of reflection are
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encoded as accounts of experience. According to Smith, our methods of constituting
"what actually happened" are not only individual but also social, influenced by
ideological practices and enshrined through this process of encoding. I understand the
implications of this assertion to be that our lived experiences are understood by us
through a process of interpretation which relies on our social experiences and location
(Smith, 1987). I conceptualize this process of experiencing and encoding experiences as
iterative, with each experience reinforcing, shaping, or shedding insight on to our
particular assumptions about the way the world is organized, therefore shaping the way
we encode future experiences. To understand our experiences, we draw on our personal
assumptions, interacting with the world around us to make knowledge, form particular
decisions, and reify or challenge assumptions. This is how I understand situated
knowledge to be created, and why I think it is important to recognize our individual
locations, particular histories, and experiences, and the ways in which these locations,
histories, and experiences shape our interpretations and are located inside a broader social
context.

9.3.1 Engaging in reflexive thought to understand standpoint.
As I began to consider reflexivity as the combination of experiences and socially located
ways of understanding these experiences, I tried to examine my own thought processes to
understand the ways in which I was thinking about my data and my taken-for-granted
assumptions about the way the world works and my corresponding place in it. Smith
would call this an attempt to examine my un-interrogated ways of living within a world
organized by ruling relations (Smith, 1997). While reviewing cancer genetics charts for
another project (Vanstone et al., In Press), I found myself imagining the women beyond
the words in the chart. I recognized in this exercise that imagination was what enabled me
to understand my participants as people and that it could act as a window into their
particular standpoint, as a way to 'make strange' (Greene, 1988) my assumptions about
the data and to query different ways of interpreting what was there. I began to understand
Smith's notion of encoding experience by thinking about the process of imagining, by
monitoring what kinds of aspects of the social world I thought about when I wasn't
trying to do reflexivity or be reflexive, but when I was thinking about something
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uncomfortable and wondering how it might be different. I see this imaginative thought
process as closely linked to narrative reasoning (Mattingly, 1998). When we engage with
narrative reasoning and when we create thick narratives (Nisker, 2004), we are using our
imagination to fill in details of the story that we may not know, or know completely (for
how can anyone ever know completely the details of even a small part of the life of
another?). Examining the ways we choose to fill in these details can be a form of
reflexivity when compared with possible alternative versions of the same story, or
different stories.
We create narratives from our own experiences. Smith (1987) talks about the importance
of beginning from a standpoint rooted in every day experiences and a particular
subjectivity located in a constantly shifting matrix of social locations (Hesse-Biber,
2007). This emphasis on experiences and subjectivity is essential to radicalizing (which
Smith reminds us means “remake from the root”) power relations and ideological
structures. When speaking with interview participants, reviewing interview data, reading
patient education materials or policy documents, I engaged with my own every day
experiences of being a daughter, a sister, a wife, a friend, an employee, and a patient. In
this way, I tried to examine particular situations from the perspective of a social actor in
that experience, in order to recognize how I might place my own person and values into
that experience (Smith, 1983). I consciously imagined what it would be like to be a
pregnant woman reading these documents, or having the experience of considering
prenatal screening within a nexus of social relations. I also used this imaginative exercise
to 'make strange' the experiences of the participants, to try and identify my taken-forgranted assumptions of what they were expressing. This attendance to inferred
experiences or opinions was particularly important since I shared several demographic
characteristics with my participants (Delamont, Atkinson, & Pugsley, 2010). Through
this imaginative composition of narratives, I could begin to see the way that particular
standpoints may interact, providing congruence or conflict with other standpoints.
Creating imaginative narratives about the data I read was a device I used to allow me to
make visible the different facets of my own standpoint, enabling me to see the differences
and similarities between my standpoint and that of my participants. Harding (1987)
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emphasizes the permanent partiality of this type of feminist inquiry- every story is
intrinsically multi-faceted. There is no one true story. I used short quotes as an
opportunity to imagine several different stories that may inform a particular utterance,
and then looked back at the data as a whole for indications of what might or might not be
present. By using an imaginative narrative technique to make visible traces of standpoint,
I attempted to re-ground myself in the data, in what was said, rather than what I heard or
chose to not hear.

9.3.2 Engaging in reflexive thought to make explicit research
decisions.
Decisions in the research process were continuous and ongoing. I was aware of the ways
in which my decisions framed a particular study throughout the process, including the
decisions I made as an individual and with my supervisory committee when choosing the
research questions, picking a venue for recruitment, designing the recruitment poster and
advertisements, writing the interview guide, engaging with women at the LondonMiddlesex Health Unit Prenatal Fair, interacting with potential participants in person,
over e-mail or over the phone- all this before I recorded a single word of an interview.
Sometimes the need to make decisions about the research felt paralyzing. Every door I
walked through meant that there were now other doors I could never walk through. When
collecting data, I had to balance choosing the same doors for consistency between
interviews with trying different doors to see if they yielded richer data. Even decisions
that seemed insignificant, like choosing what clothing to wear to an interview or
recruitment opportunity, at times took on momentous and paralyzing proportions. What
did the clothing say about me as a researcher? What type of participants would see me as
someone they would like to engage with? Who would turn away? How did my
appearance and demeanor affect the way they portrayed themselves? How did my words
create a particular atmosphere where certain responses were encouraged or discouraged?
I noticed that many of the women I recruited in person were white, highly educated, and
displaying subtle signs of wealth (e.g. orthodontically straight teeth). This didn't reflect
the population I observed attending the Prenatal Fair. Did it reflect the population of first
time mothers who attended the Prenatal Fair in their first trimester? Did it reflect the
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population who understood "prenatal screening" or the idea of an interview study as
something they wouldn't mind participating in? Or did it just reflect me? I was really
challenged to move beyond this paralyzing aspect of reflexive decision-making, in which
I had a hard time making any decisions because of the possible ramifications. I have
detailed some of these decisions in Chapter 4. section 4.3.7.

9.4 Insights and Reflections on the Relationships
Among the Manuscripts
I began this research by engaging with literature that was critical of medicalization in
pregnancy, the judgments made by prenatal screening about the quality of life of people
with disabilities, and the directive effects of the routinization of the offer of prenatal
screening. After collecting and analyzing data, my results centered around questions of
information seeking and informed choice, with little mention of the critical literature that
informed the beginning of the work. In a way, this reflects the process of constructivist
grounded theory (Dunne, 2011), wherein the literature review informs the researcher but
is left to "lie fallow" (Charmaz, 2006, p.166) until the formation of the grounded theory
in an effort to "avoid importing preconceived ideas and imposing them on [my work]" (p.
165). The literature I presented in Chapter 2 and 3 informed the way that I designed the
study and approached data collection, but when I analyzed my data, I was careful to
develop the emerging propositions through induction. After analysis, when I returned to
the literature, I found that the emerging theoretical propositions fit better with another
body of literature, that of informed decision-making. I didn't recognize the significance of
this literature at the outset of the work, as is common for many grounded theorists (Dick,
2007; Dunne, 2011; Glaser, 1998), nor did I predict that informed decision-making would
be the most compelling story in the data. While I chose to locate my work within the
literature of informed decision-making for publication, my thinking throughout the
research process was deeply influenced by the initial literature I engaged with, presented
in Chapters 2 and 3. This section presents an opportunity to unite these bodies of thought.
In this section I will discuss two different themes that unite the four manuscripts, and
which engage with and respond to each other. The first theme is informed choice and
decision-making. I engaged with this topic in different ways through the four
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manuscripts, considering how different datasets spoke to this theme and what ideas
different audiences may find most compelling. The second topic of this section is
discursive tensions in prenatal screening. Using the critical literature presented in
Chapters 2 and 3 I highlight and explore points of tension between the medical discourses
used in policy documents and patient educational materials and those revealed in the
narratives of women as they discuss prenatal screening. By contrasting dominant medical
discourses with narrative discourses, I explore ideas of medicalization, normalcy, and
risk. Finally, I will link these two topics together and discuss the ways in which
discursive tensions may impact informed decision-making by creating obstacles to
women's capacities to articulate their own perspectives and make choices congruent with
their own values if these perspectives counter or resist dominant discourses.

9.4.1 Informed decision-making.
As mentioned above, informed decision-making is a theme I address in all four
manuscripts. In manuscript 1, Chapter 5, I work with the concept of non-directive
counseling proposed in the SOGC Clinical Practice Guidelines on prenatal screening
issued in 2011 (Chitayat, Langlois, & Wilson, 2011) and 2007 (Summers, Langlois,
Wyatt, & Wilson, 2007). These policy documents state that prenatal screening should be
offered through a process of informed decision-making and that counseling about
prenatal screening should be non-directive. I don't problematize non-directive counseling
in this manuscript, instead I ask if this instruction is supported by existing patient
education materials. By examining the language used in patient education materials, I
suggest that the language used in the material may often be seen as implicitly directive,
and direct the reader towards particular understandings and certain choices of action.
In Chapter 6, I directly problematize the idea that counseling can occur non-directively,
marshalling genetic counseling literature to argue that non-directive counseling is neither
realizable nor desirable. I work with the concept of shared decision-making, as outlined
by Cathy Charles and colleagues (Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1997; Charles, Gafni, &
Whelan, 1999; Charles, Whelan, & Gafni, 1999) to delineate a particular way that model
can be combined with a more consumerist, informative model of decision-making, as
outlined by Emanuel and Emanuel (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992) to facilitate a counseling
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process wherein the clinician and woman both share their values and information, and the
clinician actively counsels the woman in decision-making, although supports whatever
decision she chooses to make. The model proposed in this manuscript works with two
established models of counseling to propose a way in which informed decision-making
may be facilitated without relying on the tropes of neutrality and non-directiveness,
where each party acknowledges their own preferences and values, and is explicit about
their role in the counseling process.
Chapter 7 addresses the "informed" part of informed decision-making, relying on
interview data to discuss what type of information women require in order to feel
informed to make a decision. The findings are presented in a way that I hope can act as a
guide for clinicians about what information they may want to consider addressing during
the initial prenatal visit. Similar to findings from Hunt (Hunt, de Voogd, & Castañeda,
2005) and Farrell (Farrell et al., 2011), the women in my study were interested in pieces
of information that enabled them to make decisions, rather than information that may
leave them "informed". The distinction between information-for-decision-making and
information to-be-informed is delicate; information-for-decision-making pertains to
topics such as timelines, anxiety, and details about the conditions tested for. This type of
information, described by women as important for their decision-making process, is not
always included in summaries of information which should be provided to ensure a
woman is informed. This article serves to highlight the individual nature of information
needs, and echoes Sue Sherwin's warning that the call for adequate information and
understanding for informed decision-making is problematic because the information that
is available is that which has been deemed relevant by research funders, researchers,
professional colleges, and health care providers (Sherwin, 1998). This however may not
be the particular information that an individual woman finds relevant to her decisionmaking process.
Chapter 8 presents a tentative model of the process of decision-making in prenatal
screening, arrived at through an inductive analysis of women’s reports of their
experience. It looks at how informed decision-making happens in a broader context,
conceptualizing the clinical encounter as one part of an iterative, non-linear process of
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information-seeking, information-receiving, and sense-making which inform the way a
woman chooses to make a decision. The model outlined in this manuscript supports the
idea presented by Charles (1999) and incorporated into Chapter 6, that women arrive to
the clinic with knowledge about prenatal screening and ideas relevant to prenatal
screening. The women in this study talked about how their experiences with people with
disabilities, conversations with friends and family members, or other information they
had acquired in everyday life (McKenzie, 2003) informed the way they thought about
prenatal screening before they entered their clinician's office. This process of being and
becoming informed did not end after the first decision was made, but continued,
subsuming information acquired over the process of the pregnancy to make sense of
prenatal screening in a way which was meaningful for the individual woman. Chapter 8
also addresses the discrepant case, women who chose not to seek information about
prenatal screening and women who chose to actively avoid particular pieces of
information, resisting discourses which assert the imperative to become informed about
health decisions (Henwood, Wyatt, Hart, & Smith, 2003).
These four manuscripts present a case for informed decision-making as a complex,
iterative process which is necessary, but also deeply problematic. Informed decisionmaking is problematic for several reasons. First, notions that information can be provided
non-directively may mask the assumptions embedded in the information provided,
making it difficult for women to identify and resist messages contained in this
information (Anderson, 1999). Second, informed decision-making as we know it relies on
information that has been deemed authoritative and relevant by medical and academic
institutions, shaping the way that we can think about and understand prenatal screening,
motherhood, and disability. Finally, current conceptions of informed decision-making
emphasize the role of the clinician, casting the woman as a vessel to be filled with
information (relevant and comprehensive information, of course) (Freire, 1993; Lee &
Garvin, 2003), from which a decision can be retrieved.
Through the four manuscripts presented in this dissertation, I have challenged this notion
in distinct ways. In the remainder of this section, I will challenge this notion more
broadly, engaging with critical literature on medicalization, normalization and relational
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autonomy to problematize the context in which informed decision-making takes place. At
the end of this chapter, in the section entitled "Implications for Informed DecisionMaking" I attempt to offer a few generative suggestions for future research on this topic.

9.4.2 Discursive tensions in prenatal screening.
When considering whether or not to participate in prenatal screening, women are faced
with the task of identifying their own preferences and values in order to make a decision.
It may be challenging for women to identify and articulate values and preferences which
run counter to dominant discourses of "healthy" pregnancy, "normal" bodies, and "good"
mothers. This may be especially true when prenatal screening is presented without
acknowledgement of the values embedded in the test (Caplan, 1993; Kolker & Burke,
1998; Weil, 2003). Medical discourses of objectivity may disguise the presence of
embedded assumptions and values (Asch, 2000), giving them a subtle form of power, and
making it more difficult for women to think beyond or resist these discursive assumptions
(Anderson, 1999).
Discursive tensions are visible in the contrast between the ways topics central to the idea
of prenatal screening are described in different venues. In this section I consider two
particular areas of conflicting discourse by examining the range of language used to
discuss two apparently straightforward questions. First, who does prenatal screening test?
A fetus? A baby? A pregnancy? The mother herself? Second, what is the aim of prenatal
screening? Does the test detect disorders, diseases, defects and abnormalities or
particular conditions and other ways of being? The narratives of women in this study
reveal that women may struggle against dominant cultural discourses informed by values
and assumptions that may not be readily apparent. Such discourses may pose challenges
or create obstacles to women’s capacities to articulate their own perspectives and make
choices concordant with their own values.

9.4.2.1 Who does prenatal screening test?
As discussed at length in the first manuscript, Chapter 5, prenatal screening patient
education pamphlets use a variety of terms to describe the subject of prenatal screening,
sometimes inconsistently. Some pamphlets used consistent language throughout the
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publication, such as pregnancy or baby; other pamphlets differentiated between fetus and
baby at the point of birth; more problematic were the pamphlets which used the term
fetus or embryo when referring to an affected pregnancy or decisions about pregnancy
termination and the terms baby or infant or child when describing the reassurance that
screening tests may provide, or the desire to have an unaffected child. At times, I found
the choice of language jarring, with one pamphlet stating that a second trimester serum
screen can "pick up approximately 60% of infants with Down syndrome" [emphasis
added] (SOGC, Prenatal Diagnosis: Public Education Pamphlet).
The language in the policy documents is intended for medical audiences. The SOGC
guidelines on prenatal screening (Chitayat et al, 2011; Summers et al, 2007) use very
similar language, duplicating many phrases and sentences. In both documents, baby is
used twice, once referring to a child who was born with trisomy 18 (Chitayat et al, 2011,
p.742) and once ambiguously, referring to age-related risk of affected pregnancy
(Chitayat et al, 2011, p.739). In both, the word fetus is used many times, mostly referring
to affected pregnancies, as pertinent to the topic of the guidelines. This differentiation is
careful, and intentional, used consciously to signal whether the subject of the sentence
has been born or not: "because the woman or her partner has a history of a previous child
or fetus with a chromosomal abnormality" (Chitayat et al, 2011, p. 737). This wording
further reminds clinicians gathering medical history information to inquire about living
children and pregnancies that were aborted or miscarried. Pregnancy is by far the most
prevalent term in both SOGC guidelines, used sometimes in place of a more specific term
such as fetus or embryo: "the chance of identifying a pregnancy with a specific
chromosomal abnormality" (p.738); "the practice of using [technique] to identify at-risk
pregnancies" (p.739). These terms are sometimes ambiguous. For example, the 2011
guideline refers to "pregnancies" as what is conceived (Chitayat et al, 2011, p. 737),
whereas the 2007 guideline refers to "fetus" as the product of conception (Summers et al,
2007, p. 149). There was also ambiguity in the language used to describe who or what
was at risk of having a condition. Sometimes the pregnant woman was at risk (Summers
et al, 2007, p.152), sometimes the pregnancy. Chitayat et al (2011) use the word woman
most frequently, but occasionally referred to her as a patient, a discourse that may be
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seen as medicalizing pregnancy, e.g. "patients undergoing first trimester screening"
(Chitayat et al, 2011, p.742).
While spoken discourse is different than written discourse, examining the words women
chose may reveal tensions between discourses. For instance, the word fetus was only used
by three women, and only once each. In each case, the woman used fetus when
explaining medical information she had received, such as the probability of Down
syndrome, or what the ultrasound measured. Baby was by far the most common term
used by women, usually prefaced by a or your when speaking hypothetically, and my or
the when speaking personally. Women used the term baby to refer to the born and
unborn, affected and unaffected. Child was also a fairly common term, and similar to
baby was used to describe the born and unborn, affected and unaffected. Seven women
used the word kid, usually to describe what life would be like after they gave birth: "I
think I would love that kid no matter what" (Olivia), or as a way of ascribing personhood
to the fetus, such as Holly did when describing how it would be difficult to make a
decision about whether or not to terminate an affected pregnancy because "it is still your
kid, right?". Pregnancy was a term that was used by every woman, mostly to describe the
process of being pregnant, getting pregnant, or feeling pregnant, except, notably, when it
was used to describe decisions to terminate, end, or continue the pregnancy. In contrast to
the policy documents, women did not talk about the pregnancy as being at risk or tested.
In women's speech, pregnancy referred to the process of being pregnant, unless they were
talking about abortion, in which case they used similar terminology to the policy
documents.
There was a noticeable difference between the discourses used by women and those used
within the policy documents with respect to who or what was tested. Educational
pamphlets struck a middle ground between the medical discourse of the policy documents
and the narrative discourse of the women. Some pamphlets used similar language as the
women, including adopting the term baby, even discussing events before birth. Others
used medicalized discourse, referring to fetus and embryo, or using pregnancy to describe
the 'product' rather than the 'process'. There were clear discursive patterns in the
interviews with pregnant women; women commonly used the words baby, kid, or child to
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refer to both the born and unborn. They rarely used the word fetus, except when repeating
medical information. Similarly, pregnancy referred almost exclusively to the process of
being pregnant, and was not used to talk about what or who was tested or affected.
Women's tendency to use personal terms such as baby may reflect their adoption of the
idea of motherhood; the use of medical discourse distances this relationship, perhaps a
necessary tactic to make the possible consideration of terminating the pregnancy a little
bit easier.

9.4.2.2 What is prenatal screening looking for?
As discussed in the first manuscript, Chapter 5, pamphlets used many different terms to
describe what the screening test detected, including disease, disorder, defect,
abnormality, anomaly, and the names of the conditions, such as Trisomy 18, or Down
syndrome. Many pamphlets placed these terms in opposition to words such as healthy,
normal, or perfect, stating that a negative result will lead to the birth of a healthy, normal,
or perfect baby.
The language used in the policy documents is consistent, with many phrases shared
verbatim between the two SOGC guidelines (Chitayat et al, 2011; Summers et al, 2007).
The language used in these clinical policy guidelines is more specific and scientific,
including aneuploidy, which refers to the possession of an unusual number of
chromosomes and refers to conditions such as trisomy conditions, (ex. Down syndrome)
which manifest when three chromosomes exist (triploid) where two are typical (diploid).
Both policy documents also refer to open neural tube defects, a class of conditions such
as spina bifida, that result from incomplete neural tube closures, and open fetal defects,
including gastroschisis and omphalocele. Neither SOGC policy document uses the word
defect to refer generally to birth defect, language that was present in a few pamphlets.
The word disorder is prevalent in both policy documents, referring to single gene
disorders, autosomal recessive disorders, and "rare disorders of cholesterol and estriol
biosynthesis", "common and mild disorder, X-linked steroid sulfatase deficiency"
(Summers et al, 2007, p.151). Chitayat clarifies that "screening for a disorder should be
undertaken only when the disorder is considered to be serious enough to warrant
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intervention" (p.738). Disability was not used frequently in Chitayat (2011) or Summers
(2007), only to state that screening programs should respect the needs and quality of life
of people with disabilities, and to describe that particular conditions are associated with
"intellectual disability" (Chitayat et al, 2011, p.744), an improvement from the language
of "mental handicap" (Summers et al, 2007, p.148) and "mental retardation" (Summers et
al, 2007, p.153) used in Summers et al (2007). Summers et al (2007) and Chitayat et al
(2011) both use the less charged words affected and unaffected, but define affected as
"individuals who have the disorder for which the screen is being performed" (p.158;
p.750). The word condition is used four times in each document, referring to
"chromosome conditions" (Summers et al, 2007, p.148) and "genetic conditions"
(Summers et al, 2007, p.153). Both Chitayat (2011) and Summers (2007) also use the
normal/abnormal dichotomy, stating that prenatal screening has the "benefit of reducing
the numbers of normal pregnancies lost because of complications of invasive procedures"
(Summers et al, 2007, p. 146)
In women's speech, disorder was infrequently used, once each by three women. Defect
was more common than disorder, used by six women, once or twice each. Three out of
the eight total occurrences of defect referred to heart defects. Disability was a more
common word, used repeatedly by four women and a few times by three others.
Handicap was used by two women, once each. Condition was the word I used as an
interviewer, and many women picked that term up and used it once or twice after hearing
it from me. Only two women used the word condition before I introduced it.
Abnormality was used by four women, and followed the word chromosomal almost every
time it was used. Normal was most frequently used to describe results, habits, feelings,
and was only used a few times to describe people. One woman, Jade, used sophisticated
vocabulary such as "characteristics", and "disposition" to refer to the conditions tested
for, but this was not common. The most common words used by women were problem or
issue, describing "chromosomal abnormality or some other problem" (Bridget),
"developmental issue" (Gail), "genetic issue" (Carrie) or just generally used to state that
the test would provide information about whether there was a "problem with my baby's
health" (Nadia) or the baby "has some kind of issue" (Abby). At times it was apparent
that women were struggling to find the right word to use, and interviews are full of
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attempts to find the right word, such as "I think it will tell you if there's a chance of some
sort of problem with the baby, like some sort of defect, I don't even know if that's the right
word, some sort of genetic issue with the baby" (Carrie) or queries such as "is Down
syndrome really a disease or is it just a defect?" (Penny).

9.4.3 Discursive tensions and participation in narratives of
medical discourse and everyday understanding: Illustration
of broader critical themes.
By examining the words used to answer two basic questions about prenatal screening
(who does prenatal screening test? what is the prenatal screen looking for?), two distinct
discourses were identified: medical discourse and the everyday discourse used by women
as they describe their thoughts and understandings of prenatal screening. These
discourses were found to overlap in many of the prenatal screening educational
pamphlets, which are intended to act as a bridge between two types of knowledge, and to
"educate" pregnant women into particular way of understanding prenatal screening
(Dixon-Woods, 2001). Smith (1990) describes the function of texts encountered in
everyday life as offering "access to the ontological ground of institutional processes
which organize, govern, and regulate the kind of society in which we live" (p.122). By
thinking about the ways in which the policy and patient education pamphlets act as
constituents of social relations of discourse, we may begin to see the ways in which these
texts act to organize social relations (Smith, 1990b).
Drawing on the ideas of medicalization and normalization, I am interested in the ways in
which medical-institutional discourses structure the social relation and institutional
processes of prenatal screening. Using examples from data presented in this section and
in the four manuscripts of this thesis (Chapters 5-8), I discuss such relations in the
following section.
Practices of bio-power, or governance through normalization of the body (Foucault,
1990) act by encouraging women to act, to participate in the discourse of the body as a
knowable, measurable, standardized object (Foucault, 1990). Such practices have the
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effect of identifying and re-categorizing bodies which do not fit the medicalized ideal of
normal. Through this process of identification and categorization, individuals are
encouraged to exercise their power to intervene and transform these potential people into
something which would be identified as normal or acceptable (Foucault, 2003). In this
conception, "normal" is a social construct, aided by the ability of medicine to measure,
count, and calculate, in order to appraise or judge acceptable and unacceptable ways of
being. These practices of classification and codification are central to the emergence of
the concept of disability, dividing some people from others and objectifying them
(Tremain, 2005). The process of classifying or coding some types of people as "other"
can be seen in the language of measuring, identifying, finding, detecting, reporting, so
that labels of disorder, defect, disability, abnormality, can be applied. The language used
by women in this study echoes the creation of the atypical person as "other" but is less
quick to label, using general words such as problem or issue, that participate in a much
larger category than the more heavily loaded words of disorder, defect, or abnormality.
Informed decision-making participates in the process of bio-power by enabling women to
choose to act; it encourages them to participate in this social normalization. Belief that
one is acting autonomously and making choices however supports domination and
normalization by hiding the real workings of power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982); a
mechanism that indicates the success of power (Foucault, 1990). By cloaking prenatal
screening in language of choice and autonomy, women are encouraged to participate in
the workings of this powerful apparatus, to measure and identify anomalies so they can
be reported and extinguished (Lippman, 1991; Seavilleklein, 2009).
When considering the different language used to describe who is tested, it is possible to
see that depersonalized language of pregnancy or fetus may function to prevent a
pregnant woman from thinking of her pregnancy as a member of her family until the
testing process has been complete and the fetus/pregnancy has been measured and
classified as "normal". The tendency to experience a pregnancy as "tentative" (Rothman,
1989) until testing is complete has been understood as closely linked to prenatal
screening and testing for some time (Rothman, 1989; Taylor , 2008). Women carrying
wanted pregnancies may resist this discursive attempt to distance themselves by using
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personal terms such as baby or child before birth. Women who stated they did not plan to
terminate their pregnancy if a condition was found made comments that prenatal
screening could not detect everything that might be "wrong" with their baby, or that they
did not consider the conditions detected by prenatal screening to be reason to sever the
relationship that already existed with their child. This can be understood as active
resistance to medicalized understandings of normal and to the consequent discursive
imperative to strive for "normal" children.
When considering discursive imperatives to participate in prenatal testing and subscribe
to medicalized ideas of normal, there were four women who chose to participate in
prenatal screening, but stated that they would not terminate their pregnancies if a
condition was found. They may be seen as participating in the medicalized discourse of
measuring and classifying, however also as resisting the discourse of normalization, by
stating that they would not choose to terminate their pregnancy if a condition was found.
All four women explained their choice by stating that prenatal screening would give them
a chance to educate themselves and prepare to raise a child with a disability. They
acknowledged that they would face additional challenges as a parent and that their child
would require additional support. This may represent a simultaneous acknowledgement
of and resistance to the societal discourse of normalization. This discourse is
acknowledged through an appreciation that a person with a disability may face many
challenges, many of which are socially constructed as our society has formed itself to
primarily accommodate typical people (Wendell, 1996). The women’s unwillingness to
act to ensure that their child and family conforms to the normalized standard may be seen
as an example of resistance.
All women in the study made comments which acknowledged that children born with the
conditions detected by prenatal screening will face additional challenges in their lives.
Women indicated that they understood that they had personal responsibility to mitigate
these challenges, either by terminating an affected pregnancy, or by educating themselves
and securing the extra resources necessary to support an affected child to his or her full
potential. The individual as a locus of responsibility is a hallmark of medicalization
(Wilkerson, 1998), where social roots of problems and solutions are obscured and
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responsibility to act is transferred to the individual and away from society (Morgan,
1998). Prenatal screening presents a clear example of this principle: the onus is placed on
women to detect and abort fetuses with disabilities, obscuring the responsibility of
society to help all people live to their full potential. The participants in this study
discussed ways in which they would use their personal resources to support a child with a
disability.
Informed decision-making is the mechanism by which modern day genetics is separated
from eugenics (Duster, 2003). Granting women the choice to participate in prenatal
screening empowers them to participate in governing their own bodies and families
(Foucault, 1990) and disguises the workings of medicalization and normalization.
However, what does choice really mean when the choices and the context within which
those choices will be enacted are constructed by others (Beaulieu & Lippman, 1995;
Lippman, 1991; Lippman & Wilfond, 1992)? The choice of whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy is not truly a choice unless another viable option is offered, such as the choice
to raise the child within a society that will provide the necessary resources and support to
ensure that child is given the opportunities of all other children. It is not a choice to
choose to terminate a pregnancy after a condition is found because you cannot afford to
care for that child, even if you would value that child (Sherwin, 1998). When considering
questions of informed choice, we must examine the context in which those choices are
constructed:
When a woman's sense of herself and her range of opportunities have been
oppressively constructed [so that] ... hav[ing] a(nother) child will impose unjust
and intolerable costs on her, it does not seem sufficient to restrict our analysis to
the degree of autonomy associated with her immediate decision about a particular
treatment offered. We need a way of acknowledging how oppressive
circumstances can interfere with autonomy. (Sherwin, 1998, p. 28)
Autonomy is a concept which underpins the idea of informed decision-making, and as
discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of autonomy can be problematic for feminists, who
support the protection it affords for vulnerable people, but are wary of the assumptions
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embedded within it. Oppression may remain an unrecognized constraint to autonomy
equal to coercion, internal compulsion and ignorance (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000).
Models of counseling to support informed decision-making strive to remove coercion
through careful directions to the clinician to act as non-directively as possible (Charles et
al., 1999; Elwyn, Gray, & Clarke, 2000; Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992; Michie, Bron,
Bobrow, & Marteau, 1997). These models attempt to remove ignorance by carefully
considering the information necessary to be considered informed, and investigating how
this information may be most effectively exchanged. Models of informed decisionmaking, including the ones I present in Chapter 6 and 8, rarely address the question of
oppression.
Sherwin conceptualizes the relationship of autonomy and oppression as antagonistic, with
the value of autonomy serving to hide the barriers of oppression by letting those
indoctrinated into the North American culture of individualism and autonomy think of
their successes as self-created and deserved, therefore creating an obliviousness to the
barriers that oppression and disadvantage pose to self-determination and autonomous
action (Sherwin, 1998). In turn, oppression poses a barrier to the necessary conditions for
autonomy, by questioning rationality, constructing the information available and the
definition of ‘informed’, and creating coercion through the circumstances of everyday life
(Sherwin, 1998). Sherwin (1998) calls for attention to the broader social context in which
individuals make decisions, acknowledging the interconnected nature of a person in her
society (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000).
These theories raise issues for further and future attention in considerations of informeddecision making in prenatal screening. They suggest that rather than focusing solely on
improving the counseling processes that facilitate informed choice about prenatal
screening, attention needs to be paid to the societal context within which prenatal
screening happens, including the resources available to women, children, and people with
disabilities. When interview participants talked about what they would do if they received
a high risk result from prenatal screening, they all discussed the available choices with
some relation to their own ideas of what it would be like to raise a child with a disability
in this society. For some, this was a feasible idea, but one which would require them to
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draw on additional resources, to educate themselves, secure appropriate health care and
child care, set their living space up to accommodate a child who may have a mobility
impairment. For others, who stated they would choose to terminate their pregnancy if
they received a high-risk result, the reasoning was also bound to society. Penny perceived
that people with disabilities have fewer choices available to them: "I wouldn't want to live
that life ... I just want a healthy child that can run around and have all the choices and
make those choices".
These considerations open up broader social issues of significance to prenatal screening.
If we live in a society where people with disabilities don't have the same choices
available to them as people without disabilities, how can we imagine that the choice of
whether or not to raise a child with a disability is a free and autonomous choice? The
choice to participate in prenatal screening is deeply embedded within the particular
societal context in which it is made. With this understanding, promoting informed choice
is re-constructed as promoting informed choice between a range of limited possibilities,
where the limit of the range of available choices varies for each person, depending on her
personal circumstances. While informed decision making in prenatal screening appears to
be an individual autonomous choice, as my dissertation draws to a close I find myself
raising questions concerning the social aspects of informed decision making. When
considering informed choice against an understanding of the ways in which disability and
normality have been constructed in our society, a significant tension emerges. This area
warrants in-depth consideration in future work about informed choice in prenatal
screening.

9.5 Quality criteria
As introduced in Chapter 1, I approached this interdisciplinary inquiry from a standpoint
rooted in a new way of considering the quality of scholarship in the humanities and social
sciences; this shift draws on the criteria of reflexivity, situation/standpoint,
(re)production, (re)presentation (Hodge, 1995) rather than generalizability, validity and
statistical significance (Denzin, 2009). In the ongoing debate regarding quality criteria for
qualitative research, I take a quasi-foundationalist stance (Denzin, 2009; J. K. Smith &
Demeer, 2000), asserting that there is no "single gold standard for qualitative work"
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(Denzin, 2009, p.154) and quality criteria should respond to the particular aims and goals
of the research. For this research, I propose the use of specific quality criteria related to
interdisciplinary research. I also outline some quality criteria specific to evaluating
grounded theory work.

9.5.1 Quality criteria for interdisciplinary work.
In response to the shift in social scientific inquiry identified by Hodge (1995) and in
recognition of the challenges of evaluating interdisciplinary work using disciplinary
quality criteria, a body of literature has emerged which considers the unique challenges
and contributions of interdisciplinary work and proposes corresponding quality criteria
(Boix Mansilla, 2006; Manathunga, Lant, & Mellick, 2006; Mitchell & Willetts, 2009;
Mitrany & Stokols, 2005; Wickson, Carew, & Russell, 2006).
Quality criteria for interdisciplinary work have begun to emerge from a number of
different scholars. Common elements of this body of literature include: assessment based
on contribution to different knowledge domains; effective communication of findings to
multiple audiences; flexibility when working with a wide variety of literatures; breadth
vs. depth considerations; reflexive approaches to the research process and different
bodies of knowledge; coherent epistemological, methodological and theoretical
perspectives (Boix Mansilla, 2006; Manathunga et al., 2006; Mitchell & Willetts, 2009;
Mitrany & Stokols, 2005; Wickson et al., 2006; Vanstone et al, 2012).

9.5.1.1 Different disciplinary audiences.
Contributing and communicating to different disciplinary audiences is a significant
challenge, but one which lies at the heart of interdisciplinary work. As I continue my
academic career, this measure of quality may become the most prominent and most often
evaluated (Boix Mansilla, 2006). I will discuss specific contributions of this work in the
next section of this chapter, so here I will address the efforts and challenges of
communicating to different audiences. The integrated article format allowed me to
examine different stories within my research and to write them up in a way that spoke to
particular audiences. For each manuscript, I made choices about the story that would be
told, the language that would be used, the findings that would be highlighted and the
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conclusions that would be drawn. I thought of this exercise as employing different ways
of looking, focusing on some elements while letting others fade into the background. For
instance, in the first manuscript, I focused on the research process, on the ways in which
critical reflection on metaphor and figurative language opened different types of insights
and enabled a different way of looking at the forces which shape and construct informed
decision-making in prenatal screening. The second manuscript concerns the adoption of
an approach from the discipline of genetic counseling into the discipline of medicine. I
attempted to address this clinical audience by focusing on the practical applications of a
theoretical idea, trying to walk the line between providing sufficient theory to explain and
justify my idea without getting lost in an aspect of the work which may not be interesting
or useful for clinicians. In the third manuscript, I focused on the findings of the research
and the ways in which those findings might benefit a clinical audience. In the fourth
manuscript, I attempted to address a gap between the literature in health and library and
information sciences (LIS). Both disciplines address the question of how people use
information to make decisions, but the nuanced theories and models in the LIS literature
have not significantly permeated the health literature. In each manuscript, I tried to avoid
terminology which may be confusing or misleading to particular audiences (Mitchell &
Willetts, 2009), reviewing the disciplinary literature and reading similar work in the
journal to which I planned to submit in order to ensure that I was writing in the expected
style and genre of that discipline, so that the work would be relevant and applicable to the
specific audience.

9.5.1.2 Flexibility with the literature.
Flexibility when working with a wide variety of literatures is a measure of quality that
neatly summarizes why I enjoy interdisciplinary research. When I started reviewing the
literature for this project, I focused on medical literature which addressed the nature of
the prenatal screening test, including who was screened, who did the screening, and how
and when the screening was done. I used social scientific literature to address the
questions of why prenatal screening was problematic or beneficial, what the
consequences might be for different groups of people. As the work progressed, I moved
into the philosophical literature, reading about ethical and critical theory. I appealed to
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linguistic literature when I started thinking about the function of metaphor and figurative
language. Thinking about the argumentative powers of language led me to literature
about genetic counseling, adult and patient education, counseling psychology, and
decision-making. Collecting data and identifying a new story about the use of
information for decision-making sent me to the literature in the field of library and
information sciences. Each stage of the research revealed a door to a new body of
literature, or perhaps more accurately revealed a hallway that contained several new
doors. For me, one of the joys of doctoral work was the chance to explore a huge variety
of literature and to think about the ways in which it was constructed, supported or
challenged by other literatures and to see how the integration of bodies of literature that
didn’t usually "talk" to one another led to new ways of thinking. I approached the criteria
of flexibility by continuing to look for new ideas and by trying to relate these ideas back
to each other. While this part of the work was a joy, its corresponding challenge was the
notion of breadth vs. depth.

9.5.1.3 Breadth vs. depth.
‘Breadth vs. depth’ is often used as a shorthand to refer to the traditional requirement of
doctoral work to ‘master’ a body of knowledge, rather than command a shallow
understanding of many bodies of knowledge. Golde and Gallagher (1999) challenge this
traditional requirement by stating that the pursuit of depth over breadth has led to
increasingly specialized scholars who may fail to "acquire a sufficiently solid base of
knowledge in their own discipline, much less another field, to make significant research
contributions" (p. 283). In order to understand the ways in which our work applies to
multiple fields and to avoid re-inventing the wheel in a different discipline, we must have
a broad understanding of the knowledges, histories, and problems of multiple disciplines.
In an additional argument supporting the necessity for interdisciplinary scholars to have
broad knowledge bases, Golde and Gallagher (1999) state that "working at the interstices
of two disciplines means conceptualizing and undertaking research in the absence of
established and proven frameworks and models. Trying to integrate two disciplines often
means resolving conflicts between research paradigms and methods" (p. 283). It is in this
challenge that I see the potential for interdisciplinary depth. As will be discussed shortly,
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interdisciplinary work requires congruency between multiple epistemological, theoretical
and methodological approaches. Constructing a congruent bricolage of approaches
requires a depth of understanding of the literature and scholars used. My approach to the
question of breadth vs. depth has been to attempt to acquire and demonstrate a broad
command of the literature and a deep command of the research approach.

9.5.1.4 Reflexive approach.
Mitchell and Willetts (2009) suggest that reflexivity is important for several reasons:
showing explicit engagement with the process of research across disciplines and
literatures; demonstrating awareness of contradictions and gaps between materials from
different contexts; providing evidence of the researcher's capacity to articulate her
theoretical positioning and the impact of this position on research choices; externalizing
the internal processes of the researcher in order to acknowledge limitations, offer
alternative perspectives, and question research choices. I have written about reflexivity
in multiple places in this thesis, introducing the idea of standpoint and positional
reflexivity in Chapter 1, discussing the use of reflexivity in the research process and
reflexive decisions that have been made in Chapter 4, and outlining the standpoint of the
current work, including limitations and possibilities for future work in the current
chapter.
I think reflexivity is important to enable me to recognize the ways in which my personal
standpoint influences the research I produce. I can point to three different ways I came to
this understanding. First, my commitment to a constructionist perspective means that I
am conscious of the ways in which I am, as a researcher, constructing knowledge
(Charmaz, 2006), and the ways in which I am, as a person, constructed by knowledge
(Foucault, 1972). Second, one of the scholars I use to inform my theoretical perspective,
Dorothy E. Smith, emphasizes the importance of a reflexive stance in relation to the
decisions made about research and in recognition and consideration of the ways that the
particular standpoint of the researcher, the research participants, and the readers interact
to produce the research (Smith, 1987). Third, the exercise of writing reflective journals
throughout the research project (Hesse-Biber & Piatelli, 2007) has demonstrated to me in
a concrete way the relationship of research product and the research process. After this
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experience, I cannot imagine being able to step outside of myself and design or conduct a
study without acknowledgement of how my personal knowledge, experience, and
standpoint is implicated. I think acknowledgement of the ways in which we shape the
research we do is essential to the ability to move beyond that influence and establish a
'strong objectivity' (Harding, 1987).

9.5.1.5 Coherency and congruency.
Coherent theoretical perspectives are an important element of good quality
interdisciplinary work (Crotty, 1998). Good quality interdisciplinary work should have a
thoughtful pairing of epistemological and methodological perspectives, with enough
information about this choice that readers can understand the rationale for the pairing as
well as the value and limitations of the chosen approaches (Mitrany & Stokols, 2005).
Taking the view that disciplinary knowledge cannot be isolated from the ways in which it
was created (epistemology, methods, theories, history) (Bauer, 1990), I agree with
Wickson's (2006) proposition that interdisciplinary scholarship should use different
bodies of knowledge to critically reflect upon each other. The value of interdisciplinary
scholarship is the new knowledge created in through this integration. Manathunga (2006)
explains that the development of a diverse yet coherent epistemological and
methodological approach is an important aspect of interdisciplinary learning, and
demonstrates the ways in which the student can construct and apply knowledge in a
higher order way, providing evidence of meta-cognitive skills in the creation of this
understanding. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 I have provided a fairly extensive review of the
literature I am engaging with and an exploration of how the epistemological paradigm,
theoretical perspective and methodological choices work together. While this work
informed the way I designed the project, carried out the research, and wrote the four
integrated articles, the relationship between these ideas are not made explicit in the
articles themselves. In an earlier part of Chapter 9, I picked these ideas back up, and
discussed how they formed the structure within which my articles were researched and
written.
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9.5.2 Quality criteria for grounded theory work.
In addition to the interdisciplinary quality criteria outlined in the previous section,
Charmaz (2006) offers guidelines for quality criteria grouped around the categories of
credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness. Unfortunately, she offers few
guidelines for achieving or evaluating these criteria (Flick et al., 2007). Below I detail
how I worked to achieve credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness in both the
process and product of my research.
Credibility: I understand credibility in the research process to be related to the way in
which categories and themes are generated inductively from the participant data. In the
research product, I understand credibility to be related to making plausible claims
appropriate to the strength of the data collected, neither overstretching nor understating
the findings. I understand credibility to be ensured by conducting a thorough study
(Charmaz, 2004a) and by providing enough evidence in the text that the reader can
follow the logic of the researcher and form an independent assessment of whether the
data support the findings. To achieve credibility in my work, I made sure I was intimately
familiar with the data by doing all collection and transcription myself; completing memos
and field notes throughout the process of data collection and analysis; working with the
data in multiple contexts, asking varied questions of it; comparing the data to itself; and
searching for discrepant cases to stretch my analytical categories. I engaged in
simultaneous data collection and analysis, ensuring that further data collection and
theoretical sampling was driven by analytical insights. In writing my findings, I included
as much textual data as the format allowed, in order to allow readers to make an
independent assessments of my findings. The criterion of credibility may be achieved by
providing "thick descriptions" (Geertz, 1973, p.6) of the data, illustrating conclusions
with substantial extracts from the raw data. This is a commonly used strategy in the
interpretivist tradition, and serves to make the analytical processes more transparent to
the reader as well as to emphasize that the conclusions drawn by the researcher are
informed by her interpretations and are not intended to represent one universal truth
(Peck & Secker, 1999). The integrated article format often restrained the amount of raw
participant data that could be included; the fourth manuscript, significantly longer,
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permits the inclusion of more participant data, allowing the readers better access to the
data I collected.
Originality: Charmaz (2006) suggests that the findings of a grounded theory study
should offer new, fresh insights that are both socially and theoretically significant and
which can challenge, extend, or refine current ideas, concepts, and practices. The
theoretical and practical contributions of this study are original in the questions that can
be considered through an interdisciplinary approach. The findings are described in
relation to the practical and applicable aspects of the medical literature; the critical
insights of bioethical literature; and the information-seeking and decision-making process
insights of library and information sciences literature.
Resonance: Charmaz (2006) describes resonance as the way in which the findings of a
grounded theory study portray the fullness of the studied experience, drawing links to
larger groups, institutions, or individual lives. I attempted to address these links by
drawing out different facets of the research findings for different audiences in each
manuscript, demonstrating how the findings may be linked to clinicians, policy-makers,
and women. Charmaz (2006) also explains that resonance is achieved by focusing on the
insights revealed in liminal, unstable, and taken for granted meanings. I have attempted to
achieve this by using metaphors and figurative language as a sensitizing concept for
analysis, and by employing the technique of critical reflection to examine my analysis for
tacit implications.
Usefulness: Interpretations offered by the researcher should have practical applications in
the everyday world, spark further research into other substantive areas and contribute to
knowledge (Charmaz, 2006). In the manuscripts, I have attempted to make practical links
to the potential applications of this research in various contexts. At the end of this chapter
I discuss the possibilities for future research and the contributions and relevance of this
research to various areas.
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9.6 Contributions of this work
9.6.1 Implications for patient education materials.
As established earlier in this work, written materials can be a powerful way of shaping
understanding and what constitutes our perceptions of truth. Written materials participate
in particular discourses, are ascribed authoritative status, and define the truth of a
phenomenon (Blood, 2005) therefore shaping and constraining the way that that object
can be understood (Foucault, 1972). Through participation in particular discourses, texts
can act to organize social action, constructing facts to serve the purposes of particular
groups (Smith, 1993; Smith, 1990b). Smith uses the metaphor of a crystal to describe the
ways in which texts work, "bending the light as it passes through (Smith, 1990b, p. 121),
or shaping and structuring information in a way which suggests a particular truth. Smith
sees textual analysis as a way of examining the institutional context in which facts are
constructed; the organization of the text reflects that context. "An inner coherence is
established between the actuality thus represented and the statements that can be made
about it" (Smith, 1990a, p. 78).
With this understanding of the ways in which written material functions, it is important to
consider specific word choices and the power that language has to shape understandings
of prenatal screening, potentially describing particular actions or choices as more
desirable or more correct than other choices. As established in Chapter 5, it is impossible
to avoid metaphor or figurative language in human communication. The implication of
this work is not that this type of language should be avoided, but that it should be
carefully considered, and queried for the conveyance of intentional and unintentional
meaning.
Written information materials are strongly desired by pregnant women, as sources of
information to refer to later when information is more relevant or when women feel less
overwhelmed by new information; to help give information to other decision-makers (e.g.
partner); to provide key terms for further information seeking; to give more detail than
the healthcare provider is able to. Written information may be an important aid to
informed-decision making, if the material is carefully considered in terms of
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comprehensiveness, comprehensibility, and balanced tone and content. Written material
may be especially helpful if received before counseling with a clinician, as it can provide
a general understanding of the phenomenon at hand. In this way women may use the
counseling time to ask questions and deepen their understanding about particular aspects
of prenatal screening that are relevant to their decision-making process rather than using
clinician counseling time to learn the basic information about screening tests.

9.6.2 Implications for clinicians providing prenatal care.
Language used in counseling can shape and constrain understandings in much the same
way as the language used in written materials. It's important for health care providers to
question themselves about the words and terminology they choose to use, asking what
messages are being conveyed, both implicitly and explicitly to women. What
assumptions are present? How are the beliefs, values, and opinions portrayed in the
words they choose? How might this language support or obstruct the aim of informed
choice?
This process of self-questioning requires clinicians to recognize that they carry more than
medical information about prenatal screening (Charles et al, 1999), and asks them to be
aware of the ways in which personal values and opinions inform their thoughts and
speech about prenatal screening (Bhogal & Brunger, 2010). Conversely, women carry
more than just personal information and values; they may have medical information or
understanding which informs their thinking about prenatal screening. This study asks
clinicians to think of the counseling process as a two-way interaction where both parties
have information to contribute and personal values to consider, and to recognize that for
women, this process may begin before and may continue after the clinical encounter. It
may be helpful for both parties to have an explicit conversation addressing what the
woman needs or wants from her clinician in order to facilitate informed decision-making
about prenatal screening, and what the clinician is willing and able to provide.
This conception of the clinical counseling encounter as a two-way interaction where both
parties possess information and values suggests the importance of understanding the
varied ways in which individual women may make decisions on sensitive issues such as
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prenatal screening, recognizing that a 'one size fits all' approach is not appropriate. Some
women may choose to gather information and make sense of it outside of the clinical
encounter, relying on the clinician as one information resource but not necessarily the
main information resource. Others may wish the clinician to take a more primary role in
information provision. Some women may have made their decision to participate in
prenatal screening before they arrive at the first prenatal visit; others may require the
chance to think it over, talk with their partners, friends, or family members or to ask
questions of the clinician at a later date.
There are many demands on clinician time and the suggestions for facilitating informed
choice in prenatal screening exacerbate these demands. With acknowledgement of the
additional time resources that counseling about prenatal screening may require, clinicians
may wish to consider creative approaches to imparting information, such as directing
women to online or other educational resources, having electronic information available
at the office, offering group information sessions before individual counseling,
employing non-physician health care providers for counseling purposes, or providing
written information before the counseling session, so that clinician counseling time is
used for particular questions and discussion rather than informing women of the basic
information.

9.6.3 Implications for policy.
Following the suggestion that a 'one size fits all' counseling approach does not work for
prenatal screening, this work suggests that counseling about participation in prenatal
screening is a nuanced endeavour which requires clinician time and energy to respond to
the unique requirements of each pregnant woman. The integration of counseling about
prenatal screening into the existing time allotted for the first prenatal visit, without extra
remuneration or educational resources, does not support clinicians in helping women
make informed choices. The original clinical practice guideline universalizing the offer of
prenatal screening (Summers et al, 2007) was issued by a professional college that does
not control the fee-for-service payment structure of the Canadian health care system. It is
not the SOGC’s role to financially support clinicians to dedicate additional time to
counseling about prenatal screening, however they may provide educational support to
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clinicians in the form of counseling strategies and informational resources for both
women and clinicians.
As genetic testing services become increasingly prevalent in primary care, prenatal
screening will become one of a variety of tests that primary care physicians will be
responsible for offering, or for identifying appropriate referrals to genetic counseling
resources (Greendale & Pyeritz, 2001). Other work has shown that additional educational
resources are needed to provide appropriate primary care for other types of genetic
testing (Burke & Emery, 2002; Carroll et al., 2009; Carroll et al., 2011; Harvey et al.,
2007; Nippert et al., 2011; Suther & Goodson, 2003). This study focused on prenatal
screening, but the findings about counseling, written materials, and information-seeking
and decision-making are relevant to many other types of genetic screening. Genetic
testing asks people to consider complex scientific information and mathematical
probabilities in turn with their personal values and beliefs. The profession of genetic
counseling has been established to aid in this consideration, but genetic testing has
expanded into primary care; professional and funding policy needs to respond to this
evolution by providing educational and resource support for primary care providers asked
to assume this additional responsibility.

9.6.4 Implications for informed decision-making.
The ideas about informed decision-making and possible solutions outlined in this work
are not able to be wrapped up in a neat paragraph or two. As described earlier in this
chapter, I think current conceptions of informed decision-making are deeply problematic
for several reasons, but I have yet to arrive at a better alternative. Sherwin writes that
feminists are often conflicted about the idea of autonomy because this concept provides
protection and agency to vulnerable people, but also "hides the workings of privilege and
masks the barriers of oppression" (Sherwin, 1998, p. 25). I think informed decisionmaking is the best option we have right now, and in my work I have tried to suggest ways
in which it could be improved, including acknowledgement of embedded values and
assumptions, appreciation of the individualized requirements for information, and
understanding that the information-seeking and decision-making processes start before
and continue after a visit with the clinician.
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I think for many women, prenatal screening is an important opportunity and I agree with
the premise of the policy documents, that it should be offered to every pregnant woman
(Chitayat et al, 2011; Summers et al, 2007). I strongly believe that every pregnant
woman should have the right to make her own choice about whether or not to participate
and what to do with the information she receives from the screening test; just because a
choice is constrained by societal context doesn't mean it's not an important choice. After
working on this project for five years, my own take-home message is that we should
afford people who have atypical needs the same support to reach their potential as we
afford those who have typical needs (Wendell, 1996). If we spent as much money
supporting the lives of people with disabilities as we do on research and clinical services
designed to prevent those lives (Lippman, 1991), we might stand on firmer ground when
espousing the importance of autonomous and informed choices.

9.7 Directions for future research.
While undertaking this research I have identified several tensions between individuals
and society. The premise of expanding the offer of prenatal screening is based on
individual rights; as evidenced in the Clinical Practice Guidelines (Chitayat et al, 2011;
Summers et al, 2007) through the emphasis on informed decision-making and
autonomous choices, women should be able to make their own choices about how much
information they want to know about their pregnancy, and what to do with that
information. At the same time, social forces may act in many different ways (through
language, available resources for child raising, social ideas of normality,
accommodations of people with different needs) to shape and constrain the choices that
are available to women. Future research may explore these tensions and their
implications for informed decision-making.
This thesis addresses a particular type of prenatal screening that can identify particular
conditions through specific mechanisms. As medical science progresses, more conditions
are able to be identified prenatally, and different therapies become available, the offer
and consideration of prenatal screening will become more complex. In 2008, Fan and
colleagues published an account of a technique that can be used to find and analyze fetal
DNA through a maternal blood sample taken as early as the 14th week of gestation (Fan,
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Blumenfeld, Chitkara, Hudgins, & Quake, 2008). This technology, known as noninvasive prenatal diagnosis, will enable women to obtain diagnostic information early in
pregnancy without any physical risk to the mother or fetus. The ability to analyze DNA at
an early stage in pregnancy will widen the number of conditions that can be detected
through prenatal screening, opening a Pandora's box of possibility (Benn & Chapman,
2010; de Jong, Dondorp, de Die-Smulders, Frints, & de Wert, 2009; Newson, 2008).
In this work, I didn't explore the pragmatic and logistical aspects of the offer of prenatal
screening. Family physicians are a famously overburdened group, who juggle challenging
patients, a high workload and time limitations while also trying to participate in
continuing education, improve relationships with their patients, cope with limited health
resources, imposed rules and regulations, and a lack of support from specialists (Lee,
Brown, & Stewart, 2009). Counseling about prenatal screening takes time, and the
strategies I have proposed in this thesis increase the amount of time required by the
family physician. There has been significant research into innovative ways to impart
information about prenatal screening without one-on-one physician-patient interaction
(Baldwin, 2006; Browner, Preloran, & Press, 1996; Griffith, Sorenson, Bowling, &
Jennings-Grant, 2005; Kaiser et al., 2002), and further research may explore the ways in
which this type of clinician-absent information provision impacts the process of informed
decision-making. For instance, information may be provided prior to a visit with the
physician, so that counseling time can be used to clarify understanding, deliberate, and
discuss implications of different decisions rather than impart basic information.

9.8 Strengths and Limitations
9.8.1 Communicating with different disciplinary audiences
Contributing and communicating to different disciplinary audiences is an important
aspect of high quality interdisciplinary work. There were times in which I experienced a
tension between retaining the intent and integrity of the work while adapting to the
specific expectations and terminology of a particular discipline. Sometimes these were
small issues, such as using the word results when I would prefer to use findings. In these
minor instances, I took a pragmatic approach and structured the work in a way that I
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thought would be understandable and compelling to a particular audience. At other times,
communicating with different audiences posed more significant challenges to the
integrity of the work. As an example, I had hoped to submit one of the manuscripts to a
relevant clinical journal with a short word count. One of my supervisors advocated for
this piece by contacting the journal editor to ask if there was flexibility with the word
count, considering that my qualitative manuscript would include the data in the body of
the text, rather than in tables or figures. We received a response that stated that while this
particular journal was not opposed to qualitative research, they preferred that quotations
be omitted, or paraphrased and summarized. Since the exclusion of participant data
would compromise the credibility of the work (Charmaz, 2006), we chose to submit that
paper to another journal.

9.8.2 Re-committing to a focused inquiry
In the Quality Criteria section, I discussed the interdisciplinary imperative to engage with
a wide array of literature and how this was one of the most enjoyable aspects of my
doctoral program. However, engaging with a wide variety of literature has concomitant
weaknesses. While a wide range of interdisciplinary literature allowed me intellectual
flexibility and the ability to respond to my study data in a unique way, it was a challenge
to keep a sufficiently tight focus on the research questions. Throughout the doctorate, but
especially in the beginning, I was constantly reading new ideas and expanding my
research proposal to encompass these new ideas. While I knew that I had to rein in this
tendency so that the research did not become too diffuse, it was a constant challenge to
put aside interesting, valuable, and invigorating ideas, especially when I could see the
ways in which these ideas could be made relevant to the project. This task became easier
after I started collecting data; I began to identify a theme of informed decision-making in
the data and this became the touchstone for keeping my research focused.
Engagement with a wide variety of interdisciplinary literature also presents the challenge
of choosing what definitions and theories to represent as authoritative. Working within a
disciplinary frame, some of this work has already been done. Disciplinary knowledge
presents a range of possibilities to choose from, and a foundation of what combinations
are acceptable. Working in an interdisciplinary way, I was challenged to find and
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evaluate ideas from many different sources, reconciling tensions where I could find them.
I fear that I have not found all the tensions, or exhausted all the sources. While I
understand that it is impossible for any scholar, disciplinary or interdisciplinary, to
conduct a literature review that is absolutely exhaustive, I think this is an additional
challenge for those who engage with literature from a wide variety of disciplines.

9.8.3 Process vs. product.
While some may conceptualize the purpose of doctoral research to be the production of
knowledge, I firmly believe that the purpose of doctoral research is also to learn, practice,
and demonstrate proficiency in the research process (Franke & Arvidsson, 2011). This
tension is often echoed in the language used to describe quality criteria (Reynolds et al.,
2011). The product of the research is one way of evaluating whether the student has
fulfilled this criteria, but I propose several other indications of this achievement: the
explanatory and narrative aspects of the thesis detailing the doctoral journey; indications
of other research productivity and growth on one’s CV; a well organized and
intellectually compelling public presentation; considered and thorough answers to
examination questions; consistent and comprehensive theoretical underpinning to the
work.
I have engaged with the idea of the doctorate as a process rather than a product
throughout the entire program, choosing methods, theories, and methodologies I wanted
to learn and practice; incorporating as many ideas as possible; becoming actively
involved in many other research projects in order to learn new ideas, work with different
scholars, practice my existing skills, and expand my list of accomplishments. As I was
writing my dissertation, I have used many ideas gathered from these extra research
projects, the knowledge and experience I gained throughout the whole doctoral program
has influenced not just the research product that I have produced, but the way I think of
research, academia, and the world.

9.9 Conclusion
This dissertation has addressed informed decision-making about participation in prenatal
screening in Canada, since the advent of the 2007 SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline
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(Summers et al, 2007) which universalized the offer of screening tests. An examination
of data from patient education materials, policy documents, and pregnant women
currently experiencing this process has generated four integrated articles which comment
on various aspects of informed decision-making. An examination of the literature on
autonomy, normalization, medicalization, and governmentality has revealed a tension
around an individualized way of considering informed decision-making: the choice to
participate in prenatal screening is deeply embedded within the particular societal context
in which it is made. It becomes clear that promoting informed choice about prenatal
screening is not just a matter of providing clear and comprehensive information, but
includes broader considerations of how choices are constructed and the ways in which
particular courses of action are enabled and constrained.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Example of Reflective Memos for participant "Lucy"
The memos I wrote after interviewing Lucy and transcribing the data are typical of most
of the memos I wrote- short and focused on a couple of aspects that seemed meaningful,
or gave me pause.
Post-Interview Memo for Lucy
Lucy was one of my "typical" expected responses- didn't really understand it was a
choice, didn't really think about it, is doing it to see the baby, would have an abortion if it
was something "severe" but not for down's syndrome.
Interestingly, she has been the only one not to know the meaning of "positive
result"/"negative result" so far..... I expected this to be a more common confusion. She's
also the only one without a university or college degree, so that might have something to
do with it.
She said her doctor was pushing the test and when I asked why she thought he was
pushing it, she compared it to a flu shot, a precaution. this was interesting comparison,
especially from someone who would keep the baby if it had down syndrome.
She has also been the only participant to mention a nurse- the fam doc told her about it
very briefly as a "everyone gets it", then she was brought to the nurse who gave her a
pamphlet, but didn't really talk about the screening at all.... possible the family doc didn't
really talk about it because it was expected that the nurse would??
the information that mattered most to her, and the info she suggested other women should
have was details about living with the conditions tested for, before deciding whether to
get the test.... she was quite focused on this. I wonder if this is also reflective of her lower
education level? not knowing or caring about false positives, or probabilities? when I
asked how much risk would be high risk (1%, 10%, 70%) she said "any" would be high
risk.....
I think I need to search out women with lower education levels to round out some
categories which I can already see emerging.
also, I have a hard time knowing how to talk when I sense there is a gap in understanding,
or a lower level of education. I don't want to use words that are not known and make the
person feel dumb, but I also don't want to talk down to her..... I struggled with that
throughout this interview
Post-Transcription Memo for Lucy:
Transcribing this I remember how difficult this interview was, how I kept trying to pull
answers out of her.... she didn't seem like she didn't want to participate, and she seemed
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to have some strong opinions on the topic, but she just wasn't very eloquent. It was a
difficult interview. A lot of yes and no answers with little elaboration.....
I was also conscious of not wanting to use words she didn't understand, I could tell she
had a lower level of education and I didn't want to talk down to her but at the same time I
wanted to be accessible. This was made more difficult by the fact that she didn't have a
lot of information or knowledge about the test, but also couldn't identify this.... there was
nothing she was confused about, didn't want information from her doc on anything else,
didn't want to talk about anything else, didn't have any questions.... For all the questions
re: any more investigation or what could your doctor have done better, she would always
answer "somebody else might.... but for me it was fine"
I guess this interview was the stereotype of a low level of education and low level of
interest. You don't know what you don't know.... it also may be a clue to my recruitment
problems. Why would someone with these views agree to talk to me, to give their time?
This might be the majority viewpoint and it might be what I am missing in my
sample....... someone who doesn't know alot about the test, hasn't problematized it, doing
what their doctor tells them, has misgivings about some things but is not really
complaining or thinking about it too much......
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Appendix 2: Research Ethics Approval

Signature omitted from published thesis

Contact information omitted from published thesis
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Appendix 3: Recruitment Poster

Contact information omitted
from published thesis
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide
1. I wonder if as we begin if you could tell me a bit about your understanding of
what prenatal screening is?
2. Were you surprised to be offered prenatal screening?
3. Can you give me some background about why you think your doctor offered
prenatal screening to you?
4. How did the doctor bring up prenatal screening?
a. What did you talk about?
b. Did you talk about prenatal screening with anybody else?
5. What was the offer of prenatal screening like for you?
a. Can you describe, in detail, the process of the offer and your thoughts
about it?
b. What kinds of things did you think about?
c. What kind of things did your doctor draw to your attention?
6. Did you think about prenatal screening before you became pregnant?
a. Do you know other women who have been through this process?
7. Please tell me what you understand about the screening process:
a. What will the results of the screen tell you?
i. Did you talk about statistics?
b. If you receive a negative result from the screen, what does that mean to
you?
c. If you receive a positive result from the screen, what does that mean to
you?
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d. If you receive a positive result from the screen, what are your next
options?
i. What level of risk would you consider high? i.e. 1 in 10, 1 in 100,
1 in 1000?
8. Have your views about prenatal screening changed, since talking to your doctor
about the option to participate in screening?
9.

Was there anything you were confused about, or wished you had more time to
discuss during the prenatal screening visit?

10. Did your doctor give you any written material, or direct you to other resources to
learn more about prenatal screening?
11. Did you do any additional investigation into prenatal screening?
ie. through the internet, through other educational resources, through other health
care providers, through the internet, etc.?
12. What information would you want someone else in your situation to know?
a. Would this be best coming from a doctor, or written in a pamphlet, or
communicated in another way?
13. What is the next step for you?
14. Is there anything else that you want to talk about? Anything that stood out for you
about the process of prenatal screening? Anything you liked? Anything you wish
had been done differently?
Demographic questions:
A) How did you find out about the study?
B) How old are you?
C) What do you do for a living? What type of education do you have?
D) Do you live in a city, small town, or the country?
E) Are you raising this child with a partner?
F) How many weeks have you been pregnant for?
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Appendix 5: Letter of Information and Consent
Health Professional Education
Faculty of Health Sciences
University of Western Ontario
Victoria
Hospital,
Rm E5-324
Contact
information
omitted

from

London, ON Canada N6A 5W9

published thesis

(519) 661-2111 x89161, Fax (519) 685-8783
prenatal@uwo.ca

Title of Study: The process of prenatal screening from the perspective of low-risk
pregnant women
Student Researcher :
Meredith Vanstone, PhD Candidate, Health Professional Education, Faculty of Health
Sciences, University of Western Ontario
(519) 661-2111 x89161, prenatal@uwo.ca
Supervising Researchers:
Dr. J. Nisker, PhD, MD, Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, University of
Western Ontario (519)685-8781, jeff.nisker@lhsc.on.ca
Dr. E.A. Kinsella, PhD, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Western Ontario
(519)661-2111 x81396, akinsel@uwo.ca
Dr. P. McKenzie, PhD, Faculty of Information and Media Studies, University of
Western Ontario (519)661-2111 x88497, pmckenzi@uwo.ca
You are being invited to participate in research on prenatal screening, involving women
in their first pregnancies who are receiving prenatal care from a family physician. Please
take your time to make a decision and discuss this proposal with family members,
friends, or your doctor, as you feel inclined.
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information you require to make an
informed decision about participating in this research. It is important for you to
understand why the study is being conducted and what it will involve. Please take the
time to read this carefully and feel free to ask questions if anything is unclear. Once you
have read and understand the information, you will be asked to sign this form if you wish
to participate in the study.
WHY IS THIS RESEARCH BEING DONE?
This research explores the ways in which women in their first pregnancy experience the
offer of prenatal screening, including consideration of this offer, and decision making
about whether or not to participate in testing. The reason to study this experience at this
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time is because a new medical policy has recently come into place recommending doctors
offer prenatal screening to all women, rather than just women over the age of 35. This
research is interested in your thoughts on prenatal screening based on discussions you
have had with your doctor, friends, and family, and information you have read. This
study is the main component of my PhD degree at the University of Western Ontario.
WHO IS ELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE?
To participate in this study, you should be under 35 years of age, less than 17 weeks into
your first pregnancy, and receiving prenatal care from a family physician.
HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE IN THIS STUDY?
There will be at least 8 women interviewed, although this number might increase up to 40
if the researcher feels that she needs more participants to get a better understanding of the
issues.
WHAT ARE MY RESPONSIBILITIES IF I PARTICIPATE?
This project involves an audio-taped interview with the student researcher
(Meredith).This interview will occur in a place of your choosing, such as your home, the
interviewer’s office, or a public place of your choice. It is also possible to be interviewed
over the telephone. The interview will take place after you discuss prenatal screening
with your family physician, but before you receive the results from screening (if you
choose to participate in screening). For most women, this will be between 9 and 17 weeks
of pregnancy. The interview will last between 30 and 60 minutes, and address topics such
as your understanding and opinions about being offered prenatal screening.
There is only one planned interview, and you will not be contacted again by the
researchers. If you wish to contact the researchers, you may do so using the contact
information provided on this letter.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS?
There will be no physical risks to you in this study. We are not studying any physical or
drug therapies that you might be undergoing. We will be asking you about questions that
might make you feel uncomfortable, such as what you thought about when your doctor
was describing prenatal screening, or how you talked about the test with your partner.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS?
You may or may not receive any benefits from this study. There is no compensation
offered to participants. You may benefit by knowing someone is interested in your
experiences, and studying how this experience might be improved for other women. You
may not benefit personally from your participation.
WHAT INFORMATION WILL BE KEPT PRIVATE?
All your information will be kept confidential. Any identifying information that is
recorded on the audio tape during the interview (for instance, your name, your partner’s
name, your place of work etc.) will be discarded when the data is turned into a computer
transcript. Information recorded on the tapes will be kept private.
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The data from this research may be used in a future publication. Your words may be
used, but they will not be tied to any information that may identify you.
The audiotapes of the interviews will be kept in a secure location and will only be
accessible by the researcher and her supervisors. They will be kept for up to five years
and then destroyed. Anonymized transcripts of the interviews will be protected by
passwords and stored on a secure server or computer, accessible by the researcher from
home or office. Only the research team has access to the recordings and transcripts of the
interviews.
CAN PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY END EARLY?
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to answer
any questions, or withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose to withdraw, you
may choose if you would like the information you have provided so far to be destroyed,
or if that information is ok to keep using in the final report.
WILL I BE PAID TO PARTICIPATE? WILL I HAVE ANY COSTS OF
PARTICIPATION?
Although you will not be paid to participate, your parking and other expenses will be
reimbursed.
IF I HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, WHO SHOULD I CONTACT?
If you have any questions now or in the future, you can contact the researcher, Meredith
Vanstone. You can contact her by email at prenatal@uwo.ca or by telephone (519)6612111
x89161.
You can omitted
also contact
faculty supervisors,
Dr. Jeff Nisker
Contact
information
fromher
published
thesis
(jeff.nisker@lhsc.ca) and Dr. Anne Kinsella (akinsel@uwo.ca).
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or the conduct of the
study, you can contact the the Office of Research Ethics at (519) 661-3036 or by email at
ethics@uwo.ca. Please note that representatives of the University of Western Ontario
Health Sciences Research Ethics Board may contact you or require access to your study
related records to monitor the conduct of the research.
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CONSENT STATEMENT:
I have read the Letter of Information and I agree to participate. All questions have been
answered to my satisfaction. I will receive a signed copy of this form.
_________________________________________
Participant Name
_________________________________________
Participant Signature

_____________
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Consent form administered and explained in person by:
________________________________________
Name and Title
________________________________________
Signature

____________
Date
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Annual Clinical Meeting, Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of
Canada

05-2011
London, ON

Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J.
Women’s Self-Identified Information Needs When Considering
Participation in Integrated Prenatal Screening
Paul Harding Obstetrics and Gynecology Research Day

01-2011
Ottawa, ON

Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J.
Facilitating Informed Choice in Prenatal Screening: What do pregnant
women want to know?
CIHR Bi-Annual Meeting, Training Group in Reproductive, Early
Development and In Utero Health. [Student Keynote Presentation]

06-2010

Vanstone, M., Chow, W., Lester, L., Ainsworth, P., Nisker, J.,
Brackstone, M.
Characteristics and Understandings of BRCA-positive Women with
Preventable Breast
Cancer
Canadian Bioethics Society

Kelowna, BC

06-2010
Kelowna, BC

Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J.
Prenatal screening patient education pamphlets: Metaphors, figurative
language, and ethical implications
Canadian Bioethics Society

03-2010

Bourgeault, I.L., Declercq, E., Sandall, J., Wrede, S., Vanstone, M., van
Teijlingen, E., DeVries, R., Benoit, C.
Comparative Perspectives on Maternal Request Caesarean Sections in
Canada, the US, the UK and Finland. [Poster]
ESF EMRC/SCSS Exploratory Workshop: Promoting Normality in
Childbirth Across Europe

Dublin, IRE

10-2009
Washington,
DC

Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J.
Non-Directive Counseling and Medical Metaphors: Critical Discourse
Analysis of Prenatal Screening Patient Education Pamphlets [Poster]
American Society of Bioethics and Humanities Conference

06-2009
Halifax, NS

Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E. A., Nisker, J.
Reading Between the Lines: Metaphors in Patient Education Pamphlets
Annual Clinical Meeting, Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of
Canada
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06-2009
Halifax, NS

Vanstone, M. & Nisker, J.
Comparison of Genetic Testing in Canada: Legal, Ethical, Policy issues
Annual Clinical Meeting, Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of
Canada

05-2009
London, ON

Vanstone, M. & Nisker, J.
Genetic Testing in Canada: From Pre-pregnancy to Adult
Paul Harding Obstetrics and Gynecology Research Day

05-2009
London, ON

Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E.A., Nisker, J.
Metaphor as an Approach to Critical Reflection
Engaging Reflection in Health Professional Education and Practice
Conference

02-2009
London, ON

Vanstone, M., Kinsella, E.A., Nisker, J.
Prenatal Screening Patient Education Pamphlets: Critical Discourse and
Metaphor Analysis [Poster]
Western Research Forum

PRIZES, AWARDS & SCHOLARSHIPS:
2010-2011

CIHR Training Award; Reproductive, Early Development and In Utero
Health (REDIH) ($17,800)

2010

“Student Abstract Award” Canadian Bioethics Society. ($900)

2009-2010

CIHR Training Award; Reproductive, Early Development and In Utero
Health (REDIH) ($17,800)

2009

“Young Scholar Award” Engaging Reflection in Health Professional
Education and Practice

2009

University of Western Ontario Research Travel Award ($500)

2009

First Prize, Poster competition (Social Sciences, Arts, Humanities)
Western Research Forum

2008-2009

University of Western Ontario Research/Thesis Award ($1500)

2008-2009

SSHRC J.A. Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship – Master’s Award
($17,500)

2008-2009

Ontario Graduate Scholarship (declined) ($15,000)

2003-2007

McMaster University Dean’s Honour List

2003-2004

Canadian Millenium Foundation Scholarship
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SELECTED WORK EXPERIENCE
2011-present

Research Assistant, Center for Education Research and Innovation
Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry, University of Western Ontario
• Involved with data collection, analysis, interpretation, for several
interdisciplinary medical education projects.

2007-2011

Research Assistant, various departments
University of Western Ontario
• Drs. Lorelei Lingard, Kathy Hibbert, Anne Kinsella, Jeff Nisker,
Susan Ray
• Departments of Medicine, Obstetrics and Gynecology; Faculties
of Nursing, Education, Health Sciences. Interprofessional
Network for Scholarship of Professions' Research Education
(INSPiRE).

ACADEMIC SERVICE
2011-12

Reviewer, Reflective Practice, Canadian Family Physician, Journal of
Obstetrics and Gynecology Canada

2010

Research consultant. Hamilton Civic League Survey on Public
Engagement.

2009

Conference selection committee, program committeee (member),
abstract review committee (Co-ordinator). Engaging Reflection in Health
Professional Education and Practice, University of Western Ontario, May
2009

2007

Organization and hosting committee (member), International Conference
on the Healthy Embryo, University of Western Ontario, November 2007

